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Abstract 
 
The key concern of this practice-led PhD is that lived reality and visual culture exist in a 
personal and political relation, one which politicises a viewer’s search for alternatives through 
the image. This suggests that cultural productions are an ideal context for addressing matters 
of social change; it also reverses the classic critiques of spectatorship within Fine Art, which 
emphasise critical awareness, the transmission and possession of knowledge and also activity, 
or participation, in the promotion of political agency in spectators. In this thesis I have used my 
own moving image and live performance art practice as the basis for reframing these 
perspectives on spectatorship. The context for this research was, in part, the enduring 
influence of classic critical positions in fine art practice, such as Debordian analyses of the 
image and Lacanian readings of the viewer. Yet, the ubiquity of viewing today, and dominance 
of the image, seemed to call for a new analysis of the viewer’s experience, from the viewer’s 
perspective. For instance, I provide a reading of a spectator’s relationship to the protagonist 
they view in an image using Attachment Theory, linking attachment to agency in order to 
challenge the common identification of separation between the viewer and image. I undertook 
this research as a viewer of culture and maker of artworks, but also as an artist who makes 
artworks from a viewer’s perspective, in order to critically rethinking our relationship to the 
images that we view. My own artworks respond self-consciously to viewers’ potential 
expectations of images, and the protagonists in them. For this reason I choreograph human 
interactions, which are always implicitly directed at the viewer, in a way that might prompt 
them to recall their own desire to find agency through images.  
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Claire Hope 
 
Politicising Agency through Affect 
 
Art Practice Introduction 
 
On entering the Group Photo exhibition, the viewer could see one screen on the far gallery 
wall to her right - this was the part of the work in which the actors’ poses most recalled those 
of a group photograph. She could see another screen slightly to her right on the facing wall, 
in which the actors performed a series of choreographed interactions. Then, she could see 
another to her left along the wall; in this part the actors moved and interacted differently, 
more freely. The monitors themselves were flat screens, 42” and black rimmed. The gallery 
furniture was reduced to a minimum with the invigilator’s desk located next to the door.  
 
Group Photo is a soundless moving image work that, in the first part, shows five people 
standing in a line being scanned in four tracking shots: head and shoulders, chest and torso, 
hips to knees, and knees to feet. These images are blue, cool in tone. The actors are depicted 
in moving image; although they stand still, facing front, as if waiting for a photograph to be 
taken against a plain background. The actors’ expressions range from neutral to light smiles, 
but one actor breaks this pattern by looking longingly into the camera as it passes in front of 
him. Other small disruptions are visible as the rest of the body is scanned: hands rubbed 
abstractly, a stain on a trouser leg. Then the head and shoulders of four couples are framed 
individually in static shots. These images are orange, warm in tone. The standard pose is a 
broad smile as each actor looks into the camera; smiles are held for the duration of the shot. 
Yet smiles fade as each actor’s difficulty in maintaining the prescribed pose becomes visible. 
Beyond this, further disruptions occur: an older woman looks suggestively into the camera, a 
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young woman shows (while smiling) that she has food between her teeth and a young man’s 
broad smile becomes increasingly strained. 
 
The second part of the work begins with moving images rendered in a deeper blue tone. The 
camera scans from the left, stopping at the first person’s arm that it finds - a woman’s. As the 
camera focuses on her forearm, she responds by rolling up her sleeve and showing her bare 
arm to the camera, turning it so that different sides can be seen. Then a woman moves to 
gently support her outstretched arm with two hands. In the second sequence, which is also 
depicted in equally blue-toned images, the camera scans to focus on a man’s chest. Under its 
gaze, he moves forward from the group, holding out his arms sideward: displaying his 
clothed chest for the camera and turning as he does so. Two adjacent members of the group 
move to place their hands on the each side of his body, with their arms extending away from 
him, presenting his torso to camera. In the third sequence, in warm images that are also 
deeper in tone, the camera focuses on the shoulders of two men before it scans down to their 
hands hanging loosely by their sides. With the camera holding its focus, the two men slowly 
move to hold each other’s hand. Then, one of the men releases his grip and takes the other 
man’s hand, spreading out all its fingers, displaying his palm to the camera. In the final 
section a man and woman’s head and chest are framed in the same deeper orange tones. The 
woman stands facing the camera with a serious expression; the man, his body angled, smiles 
broadly and looks into the camera. The actors relax their poses and expressions - the man 
turns to face the camera then both slowly move to face each other. They look into each 
others’ eyes with affection. Then the woman moves to touch the sides of the man’s face with 
her finger tips, angling his head away from the camera, and hers towards it.  
 
The final part of the work begins in blue-toned images that are lighter in tone. The head and 
shoulders of a female actor are shown as she stands still, facing the camera with a light smile. 
Gradually she relaxes her pose, rolling her shoulders, stretching her neck, and exploring her 
teeth with her tongue. Then the camera shows the torso of a man standing, left side angled 
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towards the camera. His hand is on the shoulder of a man sitting next to him; he is adjacent 
to a woman. The man relaxes his pose by rolling his shoulders, wriggling, turning to the front 
and letting his hands hang by his sides, while the others maintain their poses. After this an 
older woman is shown sitting, as the camera focuses on her arms which are crossed casually 
over her knees. She relaxes her pose, splays her legs, slumps in her chair, rearranges her top, 
and folds her arms. Next, in warm-toned images, the group appear to be having a 
conversation. Yet the camera only ever shows two people at a time and there is still no sound. 
They appear to be debating a subject, while gesticulating and expressing themselves. As each 
person speaks, the group listen, shifting their gaze to the next speaker. In the following 
sequence, in blue-toned images, two women are holding hands; yet the camera only shows a 
close-up of their hands. As others in the group add their hands to the women’s, the camera 
narrows its focus, then the image cuts.  After this, a man has put his arm around a woman’s 
shoulders. The camera focuses on his hand as it rests on her shoulder, onto which more hands 
are added - then the camera cuts. In a head to hips shot, a woman stands while another hugs 
her from behind. As a third woman comes to hug her from the front, a man puts his arms 
around this woman, and the first. Then, as another man puts his arms around the first and 
second women; the camera cuts. Finally, in warm-toned images, the group move, play, 
interact together – the camera once more only focusing on couples. The group are shown 
pulling each other up from the floor, seeming to decide what to do in front of the camera, 
dancing, rocking, making human bridges, laughing, play fighting, being affectionate - then 
the camera cuts.  
 
My moving image and live performance artworks link disparities in social position to the gap 
between lived reality and the visual media we consume. In these works, actors are people one 
might encounter daily, yet what they say and do is drawn from different sources across life, 
public discourse and visual culture. As actors adopt different points of view within one work, 
viewers’ assumptions about the representation of a person are challenged, as actors seem to 
both embody and disrupt the social position they occupy.  
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Common experiences of work or labour are often performed by actors whose roles shift 
between those possible in visual culture and those likely in lived existence, albeit so that the 
edges of each position are not always clearly visible. In my 2011 moving image work, Sky High 
Quality and In Great Shape a casually dressed group of people of mixed ages and backgrounds 
are shown in a fixed frame shot. Their acting out of scenes in an empty corporate meeting 
space recalls a business role-playing session. Yet, the scenes form a hyperbolic reading of the 
decline of the social group through history, in which a viewer’s relationship to who they view 
was an explicit theme. Actors’ positions changed significantly, particularly in terms of their 
power or place in a hierarchy. Flashed images of shapes, architectural sites and natural forms - 
recalling advertising and the fast-paced edits of television - further disrupted any initial reading 
of the situation by a viewer. Together, this combination of actions and effects sought to 
challenge the fixing of images, and stereotypes in art and culture, in order to connect the 
limited representation of people in images, to the limitations of available social positions in 
life. The motive force of the deterministic narrative often portrays a person who might be 
easily underestimated performing the disparity between a person’s dreams of a different life in 
or beyond capitalism, and the contemporary lived realities that contextualise them. The effect 
of this approach is often humorous in a way that recalls the absurd: this is always a faintly 
black kind of humour, one based in pathos and the tragic.  
 
While my work is most concerned with reality, both how it manifests itself between people, 
and in what we experience, it is only through my work’s relationship to culture and social 
position that it’s meaning is fully realised.1 Yet this appearance of familiarity, the feeling of 
recognition is used as a basis for its disruption, as allusions to visual culture and abstract 
                                                 
1
 The centrality of the notion of ‘reality’ for my work is strongly influenced by materialist thinking; the need to 
recognise what it is that we see, know and experience concretely. I am interested in Object-oriented philosophy 
which, undermining the significant influence of Kant’s ‘correlationism’ on fine art practices, encourage us to 
recognise what faces us as ‘real’. Relatedly, the capacity for people to recognise what is ‘common’, in response to 
what is ‘seen’ and known to exist, where each can agree that it exists, is emphasised.   
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gestures beyond life and culture serve to destabilise what might have already been ‘known’.2 
Albeit that this cultural knowledge is approached via notions of hierarchy too: I will often recall 
forms of culture that are dated, unfashionable or apparently lack cultural merit while situating 
them within a context of fine art making. Allusions to cinematic romance, ‘B’ movies, comic 
books, the internet, popular music, music videos are conflated with the concerns of cinematic 
distanciation and conventions of fine art production. The presence of incompatibilities 
between cultural languages and approaches suggest the existence of class within cultural 
forms - of distinctions which are uncomfortable but are nonetheless made. The position of 
cultural forms in time is important too, where what is outmoded is used to enable comparison 
with what is deemed most current. In this way the present may be better explored through its 
relationship to notions of the past and future. The ultimate intention is that particular cultural 
choices or associations can be linked to aspects of lived experience in ways that may provoke 
feelings about inequality and agency, as they relate to other people, and the image.  
I intend that my moving image and live performance works recall fixed roles, familiar contexts 
for action and interaction from life in capitalism. This recognisable and potentially 
underwhelming context is combined with roles and relationships drawn from culture, with a 
view to disrupting the expectations of both. I do this by employing a form of collage to 
produce valenced roles, dialogue or visual effects. This involves combining disparate sources, 
codes, ways of behaving, recognisable and abstract gestures and movements, which all 
possess - or deliberately lack - associations with images and social forms common to capitalist 
life. These various sources are centrally used to ‘compile’ actors’ roles, to produce a 
fragmentation that is internal to what they do, rather than manifesting as visual imagery cut 
together (although I have worked this way too). These ‘roles’ are produced in a way that seem 
to exist between a continuum and a hierarchy. They, at any one point, occupy a place in a 
changing ‘state’ (which I imagine to be explored ‘horizontally’) and reference a shift in social 
                                                 
2
 The work I make assumes knowledge in its viewers, and bases what it depicts on what may be familiar to them. I 
am concerned with reproducing what people will recognise, from life and culture, yet in such a way that it can be 
viewed differently.   
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position (which I imagine to be explored ‘vertically’). These trajectories of an actor’s role are 
central to the work that I make by both suggesting and manifesting new, shifting social and 
subject positions, also states of being. The possibility of what a person can be or become is key 
here in a way that is always underscored by the extremes of experience that do exist in 
capitalism. Yet there is also a planned impossibility about the extents of an actor’s role, which 
may span what is most desirable, banal and abject about life. For instance, a man’s desperate 
use of self-promotional statements to maintain his assumed lover’s interest, is the focus of my 
2011 moving image work Values, Efficiency and Commitment. At its most extreme, this 
strategy parodies desirable social positions by making those who would occupy them confront 
what is least ideal in life. 
 
So my work approaches themes which allude to the occupation of one reality, and desire to 
realise another. In this way, ambition, and differently, ‘becoming’ run through the work that I 
make, arising in different ways in different works.3 There is something propositional here, as 
believable people take on positions of greater power or visibility in life and cultural 
productions. Relatedly, change is a central theme, in ways which manifest structurally in the 
work, as much as literally within an actor’s role. Here, the potential limitations of a person’s 
position, as defined by the way a person is ‘framed’, are often set against such freedom as that 
role permits. Yet the nature of this change is too fast and dramatic to be assumed ‘natural’, 
making the notion visible as much as viewable. The realities of work reoccur as a theme, often 
in relation to idealised notions of romance. Where, in contemporary life, romance may often 
                                                 
3
  ‘Becoming’ is closely linked to affect, where affect is based in the encounter between bodies and is said to be 
‘born in in-between-ness and resides as accumulative beside-ness’, to mark fluctuations in ‘bodily capacity’, and of 
‘force-relations’, and is ‘at once intimate and impersonal’. Where ‘affect is integral to a body’s perpetual becoming 
(always becoming otherwise, however subtly, than what it already is)’, it represents an encoding of change within 
the fluxes of bodily affect that are mediated by encounter. So, as ‘becoming’ is often defined, in political terms, as a 
potentially ‘radical’ force, ambition may be its opposite. Where ‘ambition’ is, a ‘drive to succeed or progress’ also a 
‘strong desire or aspiration’, this can be conceived as occurring ‘within’ the existing capitalist system. If becoming, 
at a bodily level, or at the level of political subjectivity, effectively opposes ambition, this could define a problem 
that confronts the working person: to achieve within capitalist culture, or to work to change or overcome it? This is 
a central concern around which my work revolves. Melissa Gregg and Gregory J Seigworth, ‘An Inventory of 
Shimmers’, in The Affect Theory Reader, Ed. by Melissa Gregg and Gregory J Seigworth (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2010) p. 2-3. ‘ambition’: The Concise Oxford English Dictionary of Current English, ed. by Della 
Thompson, 9
th
 edn. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).  
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be pitched as the one thing that mollifies the reality of lived existence, the hyperbolic dream of 
this is frequently satirised in my work, when it is combined with more disconcerting aspects of 
life.  
 
Mechanisms of control are made explicit in the work, such as the misapplication of disparate 
‘sources’, in Stacy’s Risk, or a surfeit of images, in Sky High Quality and In Great Shape. What is 
personal about control is both openly acknowledged and made potentially suspect. The 
control that I as maker, and also the actors, have over the work is self-consciously visible. Here, 
possible mistakes, or overbearing choices, serve to disrupt what might be thought admirable 
about the role of the artist by undercutting hopes of her competence or honesty. In this way, 
my role as a director, artist, and producer is placed in doubt and my position as an employer of 
actors is made questionable yet self-consciously visible, thereby unsettling the representations 
produced. Through this, a kind of awkwardness, a feeling of sickness or destabilisation is 
created between the viewers’ identification with the work, what is represented, and its 
choreography. This ‘nausea’ is the result of a disruption of what we think we know about our 
reality, and also of what we expect from an artwork, or a cultural production.  
 
The narrative results of these moving image and live performative artworks often serve to 
compress action in time, as structure becomes applied in an overzealous way. The endings 
allude to, or reverse, popular narrative conclusions across fiction, film and history – such as 
rebalancing inequality, achieving fantasies of vengeance and realising personal, social or 
structural change. The desire for popular narratives to produce ideal outcomes tends to be 
heightened in these works, through an excessive or obvious overarching series of events, or 
through the way they are resolved too quickly or obviously. The potential of a person to 
develop through a narrative is deliberately thwarted, or made explicit in my work, the 
outcome usually being an impasse, or tragedy. Yet this approach is designed to emphasise a 
person’s potential to change - and the limitations the actor faces in portraying that change.  
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The relationship of a performer to her role is treated self-consciously. Roles are written in ways 
that are particular to the performer used, and now increasingly, the audience addressed. I try 
to stretch an actor’s position, to take them beyond a common role, or themselves, to enable a 
form of becoming in the role, as an alternate ‘them’. Also, in new works I have yet to show, the 
viewer becomes implicated in the performance when the casting responds to the general 
demographic of the gallery space. Such a direct relationship is raised between the viewer and 
the participant where they may have things in common – social class, gender, age, etc. This 
serves to avoid the potential for performers across culture and media – to occupy an ideal 
position, to be a role model in a potentially better situation than the viewer. It also supports a 
form of subject-to-subject identification by avoiding the potential for performers to be seen as 
objects, or ‘entertainers’. Yet at the same time the formal distance maintained between the 
audience and the viewer, either through distancing methods in moving image, the 
maintenance of a ‘fourth wall’ or prevention of dialogue between the performer and audience 
in performances, also serves to affirm a separation.4 This separation is between the viewer, a 
working performer (either depicted in the image or present in the flesh) and my role as maker. 
There is no doubt that this performer is doing something different to the viewer; they may be 
like the viewer, but are not that viewer. They are also doing something demonstrably 
choreographed.  
 
                                                 
4
 Marina Vishmidt has said, ‘when we look at performance as a mode or practice in contemporary art we see it is 
more complicated than’ the ‘affirmative logic of performance’ suggests, ‘since the presence of the subject is in a 
way mediating the absence of an object, and this is in fact the dialectic of contemporary labour as well.’ For 
Vishmidt, ‘performance engenders a blurring and confusion between subject and object’. Vishmidt has also spoken 
of Tino Sehgal’s, and Theaster Gates’s performance work where, ‘Either you, as a viewer, agree to the social 
contract of the work—which involves focusing on the immediate, direct experience of orchestrated sociality in 
Seghal’s case, or a processual and temporal theatre of community in Gates—or you try to understand the 
conditions of possibility of these performances, including working conditions, the performers’ agency, power 
relations in this ensemble of social mimesis, and so forth. Each perspective cancels out the other, rendering any 
critical approach off limits, or even redundant, because the distance demanded by critique breaks the social 
contract of frictionless exchange on which this work is predicated (just like in the service industries that it 
emulates).’ Vishmidt adds, ‘The work places itself beyond critique, by its participants or its viewers, because it does 
not base its criteria on anything but the language and parameters of “autonomous art,” while at the same time 
using only social relations—such as the economy and layers of institutional mediation in Gates’s case—as its 
“material” and territory of action.’ I am interested in the valences of closeness and distance which surround 
Vishmidt’s arguments here - and performance as a whole: namely those of identification and distance, affirmation 
and negation - arguments that will be central to this text. Marina Vishmidt, ‘What is Speculation as a Mode of 
Production’, Lecture, Weld, Stockholm, 17 October 2013; Marina Vishmidt, ‘Mimesis of the Hardened and 
Alienated: Social Practice as Business Model’ e-flux journal #43, March 2013, 1-11 (p. 9). 
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 I am interested in the relationship of the viewer to the work, in how they address people in it 
as subjects, objects, or something in between. To address this I make a deliberate choice to 
maintain the viewer, at a time when ‘participation’ in fine art performance, and moving image 
installations has become mainstream. Where installation art sought to expand the artwork 
into a space, and arguments were made for the ‘disruption’ of singular readings of artworks or 
culture, the role of the viewer - heavily criticised within left politics - has been side-lined.5 Yet, 
at a time when different forms of ‘immersion’ in art are commonplace, it seems important to 
address in more detail the politics of viewing in art and culture.6 The popularity of participatory 
and inclusive works, as shown at the recent Documenta 13 exhibition, seems tied to Dorothea 
Von Hantelmann’s framing of the lineage of the artwork in line with the changing mode of 
economic production.7 Where participation may correlate with the shift to an ‘experience’ 
economy the political implications of an art practice that resists such a transformation, or 
seeks an uneasy relationship between capitalist product and artwork seem clear.8  
 
                                                 
5
 Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s notion of ‘embodied perception’ supported the expanded ‘perceptual’ effects of works 
of art that occupied space, using it in a way that eschewed the ‘visual’ emphasis of objects or two-dimensional 
works. For Merleau-Ponty, as perception occurs via the body, vision of a thing is ‘inseparable from a person 
perceiving it’. This expanded notion of perception had a significant impact on the progress of recent art history, for 
instance by focusing on the ‘immersive’ qualities of artworks. The Post-Structuralist reading of art and cultural 
works sought to disrupt singular ‘texts’ and the gaze of the viewer by providing critical responses to depictions of 
life that encode or affirm existing inequalities, discrimination and prejudices. The singular author was disrupted, and 
re-imagined as a multiple, shifting, non-white, non-male, non-Western figure. Such thinking supported a critical 
form of reading cultural productions that underpinned a call for people to act politically. Claire Bishop, Installation 
Art (London: Tate Publishing, 2005), p. 50. 
6
 Where it has been common for moving image to be presented as immersive multi-screen installations, more 
recently, based on the philosophical developments of Object-oriented philosophy and the work of Quentin 
Meillasoux, Graham Harman and others, there has been a return to the object, and to the use of moving image to 
address objecthood. Where, contrary to Kant’s ‘correlationism’, which links what exists to perception, Object-
oriented philosophers have sought to emphasise the existence of the material world, beyond human perception, 
based on scientific and mathematical views of its history.  
7
 For Hantelmann, as ‘the exhibition is a priori bound up with the production paradigm of contemporary market 
societies, to survive as a modern ritual it must constantly change and readjust its relation to the object in line with 
current socioeconomic conditions.’ This invites a correlation between the ‘experience economy’, ‘affective labour’, 
Vishmidt’s ‘service industry’ and experience-orientated artworks, as well as underpinning the remaining presence of 
the object as thing, person, or product, within art. It also raises the ‘mimetic’ function of art, whereby it comes to 
emulate the appearance and operations of the economy at the time (i.e. the relationship between Conceptual Art 
and bureaucracy), or adopts dominant aesthetics, i.e. the digital. Dorothea von Hantelmann, Notes on the 
Exhibition: 100 Notes – 100 Thoughts, No.088, Documenta 13 (Kassel, Germany: documenta und Museum 
Fredericianum Veranstaltungs-GmbH, 2012) p. 6. 
8
 While participatory artworks may, more broadly, have accords with the ‘experience economy’, John Roberts has 
said, concerning recent politicised practices that, ‘this moment of social participatory activity, is being driven by a 
counter-political logic in which artistic thought-experiments, models of dissensus, microtopian and utopian 
imaginings in artistic form, offer moments of what I would call anti-capitalist socialisation.’ John Roberts, The 
Political Economisation of Art, Leeds University February 29
th
 2012. 
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Yet, as the centrality of viewing to the capitalist economy remains, amidst the dominance of 
mobile platforms, personal computing and web-based content, it is the relationship between 
viewer and image which most interests me.9 It is a relationship that I maintain and consider as 
a primary focus of my own work, one that could be contextualised and, in ways, best 
highlighted by a wider context of participation and immersion in art. The intention is that this 
work may sit uncomfortably among other works and have an unsettled relationship to its 
viewers, other images, cultural productions and the realities of lived existence. Based in what 
we can already see and know, this work recalls what is familiar, and then seeks to explore what 
we would prefer our reality to be, through our relationship to and expectations of images. 
Here, what is most familiar may be made most arresting, or what is most ‘cold’ might result in 
most feeling. The ambition of this work is to provoke particular affects associated with 
viewers’ desire to pursue alternatives through their relationship to other people in images; this 
leads me to the specific concerns of this thesis.  
 
I have used my three screen moving image work Group Photo, 2014 to illustrate and 
accompany the arguments that I make here. Aspects of the work are described or analysed in 
inserts placed in advance of each section of the thesis. At the end of the text, the work is 
discussed in relation to the main conclusions of the thesis. Group Photo was commissioned by 
Amy Charlesworth, curator of the University of Bradford’s Gallery II. It was funded by the Arts 
Council and its installation devised especially for the space. The three screens were positioned 
on three different walls in what is a long, white-painted gallery space. I produced the work to 
have three distinct parts: the first referring most directly to the group photograph, the second 
involving choreographed movements, and the third freer interaction by the group.  Despite the 
order I imagined them occupying, it was intentional that the viewer could experience them in 
any order, as much as simultaneously – depending on where they stood in the space. For 
                                                 
9
 What might be called the ‘nominal interactivity’ afforded viewers by mobile platforms is of interest here. The 
touch screen on a mobile phone or tablet enables us to ‘swipe’ to change the image or page rapidly – yet our using 
is still rooted in viewing. This seems to provide a limited form of agency, one that the work that I make disallows. 
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clarity only, I will refer to each part of the work in the text according to its ‘order’ in the 
sequence. The exhibition ran for a month. 
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Thesis Introduction  
 
The key concern of this PhD project is that lived reality and visual culture exist in a personal 
and political relation, one that politicises a viewer’s search for alternatives through the 
image.10 This means that cultural productions become an ideal context for addressing matters 
of social change. Psychological and neurological findings show that the impact of visual culture 
on a person may be deep and hence highly personal. They also show culture supports the 
management of emotion and thought. As we are able to feel like a person whose action we 
watch, it is possible to view cultural choices as a desire to occupy another reality to our own, 
through a social experience. This contextualises our experience of the real directly in relation 
to our desire to be someone or somewhere else in culture. Hence, the essence of our 
relationship to imagery is a desire for change. 
 
In my work I fuse idealised cultural signifiers reflecting our desire to escape lived reality, with 
the realities that one may wish to escape from. This refers tautologically to our desire for 
change within an escapist medium. I disrupt direct identification with a protagonist, and 
problematise emotional effects. I do though, in the movement of bodies, always recall 
affective positions and seek to inspire affect and emotion via indirect means. By combining 
roles assumed possible in life, with ones deemed more ideal - in a way that supports changes 
within the parameters of each - I refer to ambition and becoming. In effect, actors hegemonize 
the roles of others in culture or life with more power or influence.11 Yet the limitations of these 
changes make the notion visible, rather than the experience satisfying. 
                                                 
10
 When I speak of the image in this thesis my emphasis is on the ubiquity of the image in public life, in advertising, 
on television, on the internet, in cinema – in visual culture. Yet, as the critics of ‘the spectacle’ did, I would 
emphasise the status of the image in art as correlating with, rather than differentiating from, the wider form of 
visual culture.  
11
 ‘Hegemonize’ derives from ‘hegemony’. While Antonio Gramsci’s usage of hegemony, also, Ernesto Laclau and 
Chantal Mouffe’s interpretations of his approach, are particularly relevant to this thesis, the early definition of 
‘hegemony’ used in Russian Social Democracy is also important. Perry Anderson describes the development of the 
notion of hegemony as the need for the working class to lead a political, rather than merely economic struggle, for a 
‘bourgeois revolution’ against Tsarism, particularly given the bourgeois class’ weakness in Russia. Here, 
‘hegemonize’ refers to the process, in Russian Social Democracy, by which a member of a subordinate class adopts 
tasks attributed to a person from the bourgeois class, in a moment of social change. Anderson shows how Gramsci’s 
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I make artwork in response to viewers’ likely expectations of an image or cultural production; 
the process is self-conscious in ways that variously aim to meet, reject or surpass such 
expectations. Broadly my tendency is to want to disappoint the viewer, to underwhelm. The 
images I produce, for instance, are rarely visually sumptuous – I have always sought to 
intentionally reject a viewer’s admiration. Having recently started producing work in high 
definition moving image I have been interested to disrupt viewers’ expectations of that 
medium, of the degree of attraction to an image or detail one might expect to see in it. An 
example of this is my 2013 moving image work Presentation Skills in which a plainly dressed 
man occupied a grassed space adjacent to a side street; his stances and gaze disconcerting. In 
these ways my work represents a desired disruption of the expectations of a medium, as much 
as an image; it is a response to art and culture from the perspective of an imaginary viewer 
who occupies a day-to-day reality in a condition of inequality.  
 
As my practice is a direct dialogue with the viewer, one undertaken from the perspective of a 
politicised perspective on culture, I have sought, in this thesis to use the terms of the work I 
produce to reverse, as well as extend, some of the classic theories of spectatorship commonly 
known as ‘the politics of spectatorship’.12 As these theories focus on how the work of art or 
theatre can be positioned in order to inspire political agency in its viewers or participants, I 
have used the ways in which my work accords with and departs from the cultural productions 
advocated by the classic critics of spectatorship as the basis for a reviewing of these important 
theories. The central argument here, advocated by Bertholt Brecht and Guy Debord, criticises 
the passivity of the viewer, and calls for her activation – either by ‘distanced’ and critical forms 
of presentation and viewing, collage-based practices in film that resist ‘the spectacle’, or 
                                                                                                                                               
different usage of ‘hegemony’ follows that of the Fourth World Congress of the Third International in 1922, 
signifying ‘the domination of the bourgeoisie over the proletariat’. Gramsci then extended it to signify ‘a differential 
analysis of the structures of bourgeois power in the West’ in which he emphasises the separation between ‘politics 
and economics’. Perry Anderson, ‘The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci’, New Left Review, 100 (1976), 5-78, (pp. 15, 
17-18, 20), Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, (London: Verso, 1985), pp. 57-58.  
12
 References to ‘the politics of spectatorship’ in this text relate to a body of discourse that presents classic critiques 
of spectatorship. It is my intention, in this thesis, to re-address, extend and to an extent challenge the classic 
positions associated with ‘the politics of spectatorship’, by relating them to other perspectives.  
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through playful collaborative activity. In contemporary making, ‘distanciation-based’ practices 
are particularly present in cinema, (for instance in the films of Michael Haneke and Ulrich 
Seidel), but they also continue in theatre and contemporary forms of performance art, artists’ 
moving image and painting.13 Collage in film has a significant lineage within politicised forms of 
art and filmmaking. While today being as likely to occupy the mainstream of commercial 
success, it has also become an important medium in enabling artists to respond to the 
expanded nature of contemporary culture.14 Participatory art is also popularised within public 
galleries and exhibitions, where the emphasis on inclusion in funding strategies has in part 
facilitated its development.15 Each of these important areas of contemporary fine art and 
cultural practice is based on the classic theories on spectatorship, theories that are rooted in 
the critique of the viewer.  
 
Looking at my work in terms of the key debates on spectatorship, rather than critiquing the 
viewer and visual culture in capitalism, I would treat the viewer’s relationship to the image, 
and the people they view in it, as politicised. If the image is an alternative to life - and a banal 
life the ideal context for the functioning of the image - it seems a tautology to demand that the 
                                                 
13
 ‘Brechtian distanciation’ or ‘distancing effects’ are more contemporary terms for Brecht’s ‘alienation effect’, that I 
will go on to discuss here. In contemporary and 20
th
 century cinema distancing effects have manifested in the work 
of notable makers such as Robert Bresson, Jean-Luc Godard and more recently Michael Haneke and Ulrich Seidel. 
Haneke’s approach to this has been described as involving, ‘all the didactic framings that willfully withhold 
information that we, as spectators, are expected to expect,’ also the many ‘devices’ in a film that remind viewers 
they are watching a film. Distanciation influences theatre-producers such as Augusto Boal, Peter Brook and Peter 
Weiss, albeit it exists today as one approach amongst other modes of production. The influence of Brecht can also 
be seen in the work of contemporary performance artists, such as the ‘provisional theatre’ of Ian White, and Jerome 
Bel. Thomas Elsaesser, ‘Performative Self-Contradictions: Michael Haneke’s Mind Games’, in A Companion to 
Michael Haneke, ed. by Roy Grundmann (Chichester: Blackwell Publishing, 2010), p. 61-62. 
14
 Collage and appropriation - having a longer and broader lineage than the work of Debord - nonetheless were 
framed by him in strong, politicised terms that have influenced its use and currency, particularly in film. Yet Nicolas 
Bourriaud’s perspective, in his text Postproduction is symbolic of the softening of Debord’s political aims in the 
contemporary moment whereby collage means using, ‘all existing modes of representation and formal structures’, 
and ‘seizing all the codes of the culture, all the forms of everyday life, the works of global patrimony, and making 
them function,’ the overall aim being to ‘make them one’s own, to inhabit them.’ This occupation of culture could 
be said to underscore the dominance of collage-based practices in the commercial art world today where control 
within culture is emphasised more than a desire to challenge or change it. Nicolas Bourriaud, Postproduction (New 
York: Lukas & Sternberg, 2000; repr. 2002), p. 12.  
15
 Participatory artworks are based on social interaction, on the ‘activation’ of ‘audiences’ by creating contexts for 
their participation. Having expanded significantly since the 1990’s, participatory artworks, like collage, have a much 
longer lineage stretching back to Dada interventions of the 1920’s. The political emphasis on participation has been 
strong, with Guy Debord’s thinking and his promotion of ‘participatory events’ serving to link the involvement of 
audiences to political agency. However, the arguments of Vishmidt (see note 4) raise a criticism of the 
contemporary uses of participation, for instance in the popular and commercially successful work of Tino Sehgal. 
Also, the alignment of participatory rationales with the funding strategies of arts bodies, and their emphasis on 
‘inclusion’ risk institutionalising what was assumed to have political potential.   
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viewer look at her reality as opposed to visual culture (the classic critiques of spectatorship 
focus on making the conditions of a viewer or participant’s reality in capitalism visible). It 
would rather be exactly this that viewers do not want to do. Seen beyond the mystification of 
the worker in capitalism, a notion which underpins these theories, this may be a simple choice, 
of the viewer choosing visual culture over life.16 Relatedly, contrary to the principle theories of 
spectatorship, I treat viewers as watching visual culture because they see and feel the reality 
of their lived situations in capitalism, rather than because they do not.17 This means that 
viewers’ choice of images is inherently connected to their lived situation. By response, in my 
own work I allude to both visual culture and lived experience, an approach which is intended 
to recall the relationship between the real and its representation.  
 
As I approach the role of viewer as inherently politicised, the relational nature of viewing - its 
implied sociality – are a key focus for me. Here, viewing always recalls our relationship to 
another person. The position we take towards those we view is heightened in my work, and 
the range of possibilities here explored: from high affect, to the coldest form of objectification. 
Also important is the position of power we may feel over someone we watch, for instance 
when viewing pornography or someone ‘failing’. The ways in which we might classify a person 
in life are recalled, but also specifically disrupted. Here class, race, gender, social position, role 
and age are both recorded and reframed so that what is most stereotypical and constraining 
about the ways human life is depicted in images can be challenged. Ultimately, the relationship 
we have to a person in an image becomes a way of recalling the ways we interact with others 
in life. So I select actors, and cast them in roles, specifically with a view to problematizing the 
                                                 
16
 ‘Mystification’ is a term used by Karl Marx to signify the ways in which the actualities of the capitalist system are 
concealed by the nature of its processes. He claimed, ‘since all sections of capital appear equally as sources of the 
excess value (profit), the capital relation [which for Marx is a social relation] is mystified.’ Yet, Marx having 
discussed the mystifying relation between ‘Capital-profit…land-ground-rent, labour-wages’ goes further, ‘it is also 
quite natural, on the other hand, that the actual agents of production themselves feel completely at home in these 
estranged and irrational forms of capital-interest, land-rent, labour-wages, for these are precisely the configurations 
of appearance in which they move, and 'with which they are daily involved.’ Karl Marx, Capital, 3 vols (London: 
Penguin Books Ltd, 1981; repr.1991), III, p. 136 & p. 969.   
17
 As I will go on to discuss, this contradicts the common arguments supporting workers’ mystification in capitalism, 
and shifts the emphasis of my thinking away from the classic Marxist arguments that underpin the politics of 
spectatorship, and towards other readings of, or alternatives to, those arguments. 
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viewer’s relationship to them in life, or the image. For instance, in Stacy’s Risk, 2013, I cast a 
female actor one might immediately associate with being a young mother, as a cultural 
commentator. The possibility that viewers might underestimate her was deliberately 
contrasted with the complex and interwoven analytical dialogue she spoke in the work. Her 
casual appearance also became a refusal of the cultural tropes which link conventionally 
beautiful women with visibility in an image. In this work I deliberately disrupt our expectations 
of casting within media, as much as within artworks. It is always my intention that the actors I 
work with create a certain impression, and that impression becomes in part, the context for 
the operations of the work. Such a social treatment of viewing is based on the depiction of 
other people in imagery and how viewers relate to them. This sets out the terms of a 
reciprocal relationship between viewer and image, one that asks what the viewer seeks from 
the image, and what effects the image has on them. 
 
While the way I theorise the viewer’s position in capitalism differs from that of Brecht and 
Debord, the practical approaches taken in my work reflect those they advocated. Firstly, I 
often use distanced methods of staging: Brechtian distanciation is an approach designed to 
disrupt viewers’ potential to become immersed in what they view and refer them to the reality 
of their existence.18 Contemporary forms of cinematic distanciation used by Michael Haneke 
and Ulrich Seidel are of particular relevance to my own work. Their powerful treatment of 
what is most disconcerting about lived reality in capitalist countries is underscored by the 
distanced frames they use and the lack of warmth to their images. Haneke also locates his 
films within a critique of the impact of the media on human life, and there is often a visible 
screen in his shots that off-sets the human relations in the image. Yet the distanciation-based 
approaches that I use, rather than an attempt to render what is ‘real’ visible, are employed to 
disrupt what is familiar in both human life and cultural production. The intention then is to 
                                                 
18
 For Brecht, ‘realistic means: discovering the causal complexes of society/unmasking the prevailing view of things 
as the view of those who are in power/writing from the standpoint of the class which offers the broadest solutions 
for the pressing difficulties in which human society is caught up/emphasising the element of development/making 
possible the concrete and making possible abstraction from it.’ Bertholt Brecht, ‘Against Georg Lukás’, in Aesthetics 
and Politics, trans. ed. Ronald Taylor (London: Verso, 1977; repr. 1980), p. 70.  
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render representation questionable to a viewer; in this, I am always referring to the artificiality 
of the work’s construction. This means that the cultural allusions employed in my work are 
used both to disrupt the work itself, and the aesthetic categories it occupies. So, while Brecht 
sought to inspire a critical attitude and thought in his viewers, my intention is to highlight the 
fundamental difference between the viewer’s reality, and that of the person they commonly 
view in the image. I base a self-reflexive form of art making on this, one that refers to the 
agency we seek through images. So it is my aim to use our already politicised relationship to 
images to provoke affects and emotions which underscore the desire for change we explore 
via images, namely by knowingly recalling and rejecting such allusions. I have also sought to 
make artwork that has the potential to destabilise the perception of the artist, that what they 
do is inherently well meant.  
 
The works I make sometimes appear instructional in a Brechtian sense, yet my use of 
instruction has tended to parody. While the information I have used has often been 
informative, it is always necessarily limited and I reject the position of ‘teaching’ my audience 
anything. I prefer to satirise the possibility of such didacticism and the power it confers. For 
instance, when my actors appear to instruct, they do so by way of hegemonizing the position 
of the educator, taking her position of power, and perhaps presenting content that disrupts 
this. Brecht sought to present people that his audience could identify with, and this is certainly 
an approach that I take. I aim to cast actors which viewers might think are ‘like’ them, as 
critics, decision-makers, and the subject of images; often people who occupy positions of 
power. Yet, as the people in my work do not possess reliably instructional or informative roles, 
what potential they may have to ‘persuade’ possible agents is broadly rejected. I have used a 
notably Brechtian approach, where an actor delivers material by speaking directly to the 
audience - thereby breaking the ‘fourth wall’. Yet today, this method of staging also reflects 
other modes of addressing viewers directly, such as in news reading, or internet videos. So I 
use this approach less to disrupt the ‘separation’ between culture and audience, than to 
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address more literally the sociality between the viewer and those they view. Brecht sought to 
entertain his audiences, and sought audiences who wanted to be entertained; his works reflect 
popular forms.19 Brecht’s theatre also often incorporated different ‘points of view’ and 
montage – a combination he linked to ‘a firm grasp of reality’.20 My works similarly reflect 
popular cultural forms, and point of view is addressed both self-consciously, from the 
perspective of camerawork, and is something that is frequently changed within a character’s 
role.21 For instance, performers’ activities are usually formed by a variety of disparate sources 
from culture and life, an approach having accords with both Brecht and Debord’s cultural 
productions. 
 
Like Debord’s, my works are often rooted in the collage of different information. While I have 
used visibly collaged items of staged and visual material, my work is more focused on an 
inclusion of collaged elements into narrative works. This means that the edges of what is and 
isn’t collaged are blurred. For instance, a gesture, taken from a particular context becomes, 
when displaced within a work, either directly or vaguely familiar to a viewer, depending on her 
relationship to the material. I have sought to enable my actors to perform a kind of agency 
with the material that they deliver, by enacting connections between different types of 
information and gestures that seem both productive and disruptive of the positions they 
                                                 
19
 Brecht aligned ‘popular art’ and ‘realism’ in a desire to speak the language of the masses who suffer. He sought 
cultural production that was ‘comprehensible and profitable’ to people, so that they may ‘receive a faithful image of 
life.’ For Brecht, ‘popular means: intelligible to the broad masses, adopting and enriching their forms of 
expression/assuming their standpoint, confirming and correcting it/representing the most progressive section of 
the people so that it can assume leadership, and therefore intelligible to other sections of the people as 
well/relating to traditions and developing them/communicating to that portion of the people which strives for 
leadership the achievements of the section that at present rules the nation.’ I do seek to make work that is 
identifiable to a broad public. While I would doubt my ability to ‘assume’ another’s standpoint I do choreograph 
particular ‘perspectives’ in my work, for instance views of the world that may disrupt the perspective of a viewer of 
artwork. Brecht, Aesthetics and Politics, p. 80-81. 
20
 Brecht, Aesthetics and Politics, p. 70. In Brecht’s theatre, ‘interior monologue, montage, or mixture of genres 
within a single work were all permissible and fruitful, so long as they were disciplined by a watchful truthfulness to 
social reality.’ As regards my own work, the position taken by the camera operator, editor or director shifts, often 
disconcertingly, in relation to the protagonist, while the protagonist’s perspective shifts frequently too. Rather than 
seeking to make reality visible, I do this in order to make the production of artworks and culture visible, and self-
conscious. Rodney Livingstone and others, ‘Presentation II’ in Aesthetics and Politics, p. 63. 
21
 My use of ‘point of view’ originally derived from an interest in the use of ‘point of view’ in metafictional novels 
(i.e. Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness), particularly such novels’ treatment of narrative as a political entity. 
‘Metafiction’ involves ‘the assimilation of critical perspective within fictional narrative, a self-consciousness of the 
artificiality of its constructions and a fixation with the relationship between language and the world.’ The ‘point of 
view’ that is central to the ‘grammar’ of television and film is also of interest. Mark Currie (ed.), Metafiction (Essex, 
UK: Longman, 1995), p. 2. 
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occupy. The works I make approximate playful means of reconfiguring social relations, in ways 
that are akin to Debord’s ‘participatory’ thinking. They may either appear to undertake a kind 
of informal testing of roles, a playing out of partial aspects of experience, or to be improvised. 
For instance, in Sky High Quality and In Great Shape the ‘scenes’ were delivered to actors in 
such a way that roles and scenarios were known, but the dialogue was improvised. However, 
as my work is generally highly choreographed, any appearance of play or participation is 
generally underscored by the knowledge of the artificiality of its construction. Although there 
is certainly a propositional aspect to my work that suggests people’s potential to ‘become’ 
something other than who they are. I treat the idealised and fantastic structures of culture, 
which I regard as a key means of people exploring alternatives to life, as potentially the place 
to do this. This suggests both a formally advocated and potentially hyperbolic proposition. 
Debord’s focus on a banal reality in capitalism, as set against the ‘spectacle’ in images, has 
accords with the approach I take to my own moving image and performance works. The works 
fuse familiar aspects from human life and visual culture to create productive connections 
between such areas of disparity. These connections are performed by actors who enact agency 
by treating the politicised relationship between life and culture directly. I am concerned with 
the problems of culture that both Brecht and Debord focus on, yet the aims and intentions of 
the work I make differ in important ways, and can often be better explained by their 
relationship to other theories of spectatorship. So it is the ways in which my work and thinking 
both accord with and depart from Brecht’s and Debord’s which mark the starting  point for this 
thesis. 
 
So, rather than emphasising distanciation, participation or collage solely, I draw on these and 
other familiar approaches in cultural production and art making, to highlight the importance of 
cultural production to matters of agency. It is my aim to address the critical space between 
viewers’ lives and the images they consume. In this, my aim is to turn familiar cultural modes 
to a more suggestive use as regards political futures. The most deterministic and structurally 
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‘closed’ forms of culture (such as Hollywood cinema) are of particular interest to me. This is 
partly because they are so familiar, and to an extent occupy a historical position, also because 
they possess a didacticism that, in their popularity, suggests the constraints that viewers may 
seek via the visual. Political futures are imagined as residing in the social, yet also, as 
alternatives that are imagined to be sought through culture. The work I make effectively 
thematizes a relationship to culture that is based on a desire for change, one based in a lived 
inequality in capitalism and explored through images. Here, culture is a route that literally 
replaces and substitutes change. I want to use visual media to provoke affects and emotions 
particular to the disparity between reality and representation, to recall our relationship to 
other people through images and what it is that we seek from images. This involves looking to 
visual media as a key means of viewers managing affects in capitalist life. So I approach this 
thesis from the perspective of the viewer in capitalism, from identification with her position. In 
this, I aim to rethink political approaches to spectatorship in a way that specifically frames the 
context of my own art making, to provide an alternative perspective on spectatorship and 
politics - one having potential implications for political futures.  
 
My PhD project begins by exploring Brecht’s and Debord’s critiques of the viewer based on 
their concerns for human agency and change within a particularly capitalist reality. Then I 
explore Brecht’s advocacy of cultural productions enabling ‘critical’ viewing, and Debord’s 
structural disruption of the continuity of film and pursuit of participation in would-be viewers 
to the realisation of political agency. I follow this by outlining the accords between Laura 
Mulvey and Griselda Pollock’s later formulations regarding spectatorship and Brecht’s and 
Debord’s prior work. I conclude that, if looking at these theories of the viewer from the 
viewer’s perspective within capitalism today, that there is room for further analysis. Then, I 
look to the work of Jacques Rancière who has recently sought to criticise the theories of 
spectatorship derived from Brecht’s and Debord’s thinking. He seeks to liberate the spectator 
from any limitations that may be placed on them culturally or politically. I compare Rancière’s 
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perspective to that of Simon Watney; Watney’s position offers a critique of the classic theories 
of spectatorship, based on a different historicisation of their origins than Rancière’s. He also 
draws conclusions which suggest how perspectives on viewing might be broadened. Where 
both Rancière and Watney undermine the capacity of visual culture to ‘affect’ viewers in a 
unified way, Claire Bishop’s discussion of the disparity between physical existence and the 
screens we view appears to open up an alternative perspective on viewing. I explore how her 
ideas, which draw on Debord’s and Rancière’s work, specifically address the contemporary 
situation of viewing visual media. After setting out the context for political ‘antagonism’ rooted 
in our relationship with visual media, I connect Bishop’s perspective to that of Antonio Gramsci 
who framed culture as a key site of struggle for the working class in capitalism. This notion, 
and other aspects of his analysis, provides the basis for an exploration of the work of Chantal 
Mouffe whose reading of Gramsci’s work is rooted in Lacanian psychoanalysis and Post-
Structuralist thinking. Her perspective opens up the possibility for a treatment of viewers’ 
diversity within a political framing of their viewing; she also suggests the relevance of 
contemporary psychoanalytic and psychological research to a deeper exploration of the 
viewer’s relationship to the image. Finally, where Mouffe advocates political ‘antagonism’, 
Hannah Arendt’s work on ‘agonism’ is used as a basis for exploring accords between the 
viewer’s experience of viewing culture and fundamental aspects of political experience. I 
conclude by suggesting that the politicised potential of the relationship between viewer and 
image in capitalism is one that has particular significance for moving image and live 
performance artworks that retain the viewer as part of a politically focused cultural practice.  
 
In my second section I explore psychological and neurological research which suggests that 
visual culture provides tools for ameliorating life by such means as ‘filling conscious 
awareness’, and also experiencing direct empathy with a protagonist that enables a viewer to 
‘feel like’ them. I tie the uses of culture to ‘manage’ life in capitalism, to Debord’s thinking, in 
order to suggest that this power of the image is based on and underscored by inequality. Here 
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inequalities between the lived situation of viewers and the position of those they view in 
images are tied to economic inequalities. Further, where Debord figured the ‘social relation’ 
central to capitalism as emblematic of a relationship between the viewer and image 
accumulated as capital, I take Debord’s formulation of a ‘social relationship’ with images 
literally. I base this on the direct relationship between viewer and viewed protagonist, a 
relationship rooted in affects, emotions and identifications between people. I go on to link this 
‘social’ treatment of the viewer and viewed person to the centrality of affect to the production 
of ‘the self’. Here affects based in attachments are reframed in relation to viewers’ 
experiences of others in images, in contrast to positions on spectatorship that focus more so 
on desire and the fetish. Here, secure and insecure ‘states’ of the self are explored in terms of 
how they relate to different experiences of using culture. Then, reconnecting this to the work 
of Claire Bishop, I frame the viewer’s relationship to the protagonist in images as based on a 
continuum marked by two extremes. One is based in a desired, affective, hegemonic shift into 
the role of another who is in a notably better position than the viewer, the other, a desired 
emotional withdrawal from a person in a lesser position than us. These extremes are rooted in 
the uses of intimacy, on the one hand, and emotional distance on the other. They represent 
two points at opposing ends of a continuum of political relating that enable viewers to 
experience agency through specific relationships to others in images. This is affirmed by 
evidence that images are used more by people who are ‘insecure’, suggesting a close 
correlation between psychological states linked to ‘attachment’ and our use of images. I 
conclude by setting out how it is this continuum of feeling and relating to protagonists, based 
importantly in the viewer’s own lived position, that is fundamental to the work I produce, one 
that is also suggestive of different ways of formulating the agency of groups. Where agency 
may be politicised by uses of affect that are based in inequality, then the psychological and 
social roots of these approaches suggest a desired context for agency rooted in the equal 
treatment of others. This has accords with the critiques of education and spectatorship by 
Rancière and advocacy of equal relations between unequal people in a political context by 
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Arendt.  It suggests there are different, more relational means of approaching agency in social 
life. Yet this conclusion also specifically frames ways in which we relate to others via images as 
a context for agency, and it highlights cultural productions’ potential to provoke the affects 
associated with our uses of images to seek alternatives. In this, culture is treated as a site 
where agencies happen. This is why my own work thematizes the search for agency through 
images, internalises and to an extent dramatises our relationship to political alternatives 
through it. It is also why I advocate the politicised potential of the moving image and live 
performance that specifically retains the viewer. 
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Chapter One: Agency and the Image 
 
Re-addressing the Critiques of Spectatorship: The Viewer 
 
Group Photo was commissioned for a University gallery. The theme of the work was selected 
in part for its relevance to that setting: the academic group photograph and promotional 
group image being two different, yet familiar, representations of groups here. But these 
‘types’ of images, while common in wider culture, are uncommon in the gallery. Although in 
any gallery the portrait would be a familiar presence, I did not want the images to look like 
portraits found in galleries, or images found in life. Instead, I deliberately applied 
inappropriate techniques to these images, in the intention that they would fail to fit either 
context. For instance, the colouring of the images - blue and orange tones – is ‘displaced’ 
from the cinema into the gallery. This was an intentionally disruptive, self-conscious effect. 
Similarly the framing of peoples’ bodies was constrained throughout: the ‘group’ were never 
shown in their entirety in the work. The intention was, rather than emphasising the people it 
depicted as subjects to be looked at, I would present them in a way that emphasised their 
already being viewed, by the maker, camera person, as well as the viewer. While Group 
Photo alludes to the photograph, the actors were recorded in live action. This meant that 
actors’ maintenance of still poses became a form of test, in which they were bound to show 
movement. Consequently, these shots became about change - between a desired pose and its 
loss. All of the devices in the work: the decision that the group would never be wholly visible, 
the colouring of the images, the disparate camera methods applied to different sections, the 
two ‘types’ of roles the actors performed, were used to disrupt the viewer’s capacity to 
immerse herself in the work. This meant that the viewer’s position was treated self-
consciously as an integral part of the operations of this work; the work seemed to address the 
viewer and her expectations. It also suggested that a usually direct relationship between 
viewer and viewed person exists. 
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Brecht saw passivity as residing in the ‘cathartic’ effect of the theatre, where the viewer would 
follow the ‘inevitable fate’ of the hero.22 He affiliated passivity with the production of a 
‘subjective attitude’ in viewers, wherein they would ‘become completely entangled with what 
was going on’.23 Brecht based his definition of catharsis on the Aristotelian view of tragic 
theatre. This frames catharsis as supporting a ‘purification and purgation of emotions’ through 
theatre or art. It is particularly affiliated with the purging of ‘fear or pity’.24 For Brecht, such a 
cathartic emotional release through the experience of a cultural production provided an end in 
itself, one which satisfied the viewer’s desire to be transported somewhere else. So he sought 
to avoid the ‘passive empathy’ of the spectator, preferring a more active response.25 He said, 
‘empathy alone may stimulate a wish to imitate the hero, but it can hardly create the 
capacity.’26 Brecht saw the viewer’s emotional involvement with the play as destructive of her 
capacity to be activated politically. Yet, his desire to eschew emotional catharsis of any kind in 
his work can be qualified by his assertion that ‘actually, emotions are only clarified in it, 
steering clear of subconscious origins and carrying nobody away’.27 In this, Brecht’s model of 
theatre seeks the production of emotion within a specific context, and avoidance of a powerful 
emotional identification with another’s experience. 
 
Brecht’s focus on ‘catharsis’, its potential to cleanse and remove impurities from a person’s 
emotions, seems dated. Yet the benefit of such a release of emotions associated with a cause 
is well known in psychoanalysis and related practices.28 While this indicates a restorative 
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function, Brecht saw ‘catharsis’ as the opposite of agency. Rather, it was an effect he affiliated 
with emotive drama and the ‘strong centralisation of the story’.29 He described the ‘passion of 
utterance’ and ‘clash of forces’ in bourgeois theatre, and related it to Aristotle’s original 
reference to tragedy.30 Yet Brecht sought a spectator who wants ‘fun’, rather than such deep 
engagement, although the fun he characterised is based on his view of ‘instructional’ theatre 
as being pleasurable.31 He was also scathing of those who want ‘the cockles of their hearts 
warmed,’ who he described as ‘scum’.32 In such statements he sets a clear separation 
between, on the one hand, those who might want simply to be entertained, and on the other, 
those who seek deep or positive emotional engagement from theatre, whom he derides.33 This 
separation between an audience’s desire for ‘fun’, and their search for a positive or deep 
emotional experience, seems to make distinctions between viewers which are prescribed.34 
These distinctions can be contextualised by Brecht’s view of bourgeois theatre as a ‘moral 
institution’ representing bourgeois concerns as if they were static and as if the present reality 
was unalterable - while ostensibly focusing on entertainment alone. However, given the 
expansion of visual media today, engaging in a range of different affects and effects, and also 
the persistence of capitalist culture amidst a relative absence of social unrest, the roots and 
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context of the role of feeling in cultural productions, as to agency, seems open to wider 
exploration.  
 
Debord, writing in 1967 described ‘the spectacle’, that is ‘news or propaganda, advertising or 
the actual consumption of entertainment’ as ‘a social relationship between people that is 
mediated by images’, as ‘capital accumulated to the point where it becomes image’.35 This 
reflects Karl Marx’s view of the capital relation as a social relation.36 Debord is suggesting that 
‘the spectacle’, the image form, is both representative of capital, but also intervenes in the 
social, mediating human relationships rather than enabling direct relationships. Ultimately, 
Debord suggests that any relationship with images is a relationship with capital, one which 
necessarily takes a ‘fantastic form’.37 It is useful to recall the definition of ‘spectacle’ itself, 
which is, ‘a public show’ and ‘anything attracting public attention’.38 This definition highlights 
the role of attention as it relates to the visual, which is central to Walter Benjamin’s use of the 
term in The Arcades Project.39 Debord links ‘the spectacle’ to the worker’s alienation in 
capitalism by describing its pacifying effect on viewers:  
The spectator's alienation from and submission to the contemplated object (which is the 
outcome of his unthinking activity) works like this: the more he contemplates, the less he lives; 
the more readily he recognizes his own needs in the images of need proposed by the dominant 
system, the less he understands his own existence and his own desires. The spectacle's 
externality with respect to the acting subject is demonstrated by the fact that the individual's 
own gestures are no longer his own, but rather those of someone else who represents them to 
him. The spectator feels at home nowhere, for the spectacle is everywhere.40  
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Debord describes a loss of agency for the viewer in the face of ‘the spectacle’, whereby they 
are distanced from, as well as in thrall to, the ‘contemplated object’. Contemplation is for him 
rooted in ‘unthinking’ activity, which situates the person’s gestures as something to be 
projected onto them, from the image. For Debord, the capitalist context of what is viewed is 
central to his critique of the spectator. Yet, he rejects the validity of a spectator outright, for 
instance by describing them as a ‘generally contemptible individual’.41  
 
It seems clear that, like Brecht, Debord had little sympathy with the spectator of the mediated 
spectacle. Yet unlike Brecht, Debord, rather than basing his critique on emotional effects, 
rejected both the spectacle and its viewers. He regarded the spectator as ‘unthinking’ 
(paralleling Brecht’s desire for thinking in his audience) and seems to posit the viewer as 
generally helpless beyond her ability to be controlled by the visual culture viewed. Debord 
roots this control over the viewer in her recognition of needs in the image. In this he suggests 
the viewer requires the image form, but frames her need as a control over the viewer, rather 
than one contextualised by her lived experience in capitalism. In asserting that life decreased 
exponentially to the consumption of the spectacle, he defines viewers’ relationship to images 
as being based in a complete loss of agency. The effect of the spectacle on the viewer was 
posed as a key reason for viewers’ alienation from themselves and each other. 
 
Both Brecht’s and Debord’s perspectives on the passivity of the viewer frame viewers’ 
relationships to cultural productions within a critique of alienation in capitalism, as set out by 
Marx.42 Marx in his Early Writings described the formerly direct relationship of a worker to the 
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land and to what he produced, as being alienated by the removal of the produced object 
within capitalism for sale on the open market. Here, workers become estranged from 
themselves, from other people, the production process, and are ultimately dominated by 
capital.43 Debord extends such domination to the effect of the spectacle on viewers. He does 
this by describing their ‘false consciousness’ in capitalism (a term Marx didn’t use), and 
‘mystification’.44 The notion of ‘the spectacle’ as a mystifying field can be seen in Debord’s 
reading of the spectacle as the existence of ‘reality on the one hand and image on the other’.45 
For him, imagery, rather than representing our reality, ‘serves as a total justification for the 
conditions and aims of the existing system’.46 In other words, the spectacle is always 
functioning to support the most dominant version of ‘reality’, and its function is to provide 
fantasy which is explored and directed within that culture, rather than in a self or collectively 
determined way. In this, cultural productions support the mystification of workers who are 
unable to see their reality clearly.  
 
Brecht, while neither emphasising workers’ ‘mystification’ in his own writings, nor referring to 
their ‘false consciousness’ directly, located his theatre in response to a capitalism that, 
facilitated by the bourgeois culture he saw supporting it, appeared to people as universal and 
unchanging. This directly reflected the writings of Marx which aligned the operations of capital 
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with their concealment of the ‘social relation’ that underpinned them. Brecht stated that in 
theatre ‘what is “natural” must have the force of what is startling. This is the only way to 
expose the laws of cause and effect.’47 In this way he positioned his use of distanciation within 
the desired production of a ‘natural’ reality that is visible, that jumps out at the viewer. So 
Brecht’s distanciation is contextualised by capitalism’s concealment of its origins and reality; 
which people working in capitalism cannot see. By response, in seeking to highlight ‘cause and 
effect’, Brecht’s aim was to show the historical nature of development, to reveal, through his 
theatre, the conditions of working life in capitalism.  
 
Importantly for this discussion, despite the roots of Brecht’s and Debord’s critiques of the 
viewer in Marx’s analysis of the negative effects of capitalism on the worker, neither Brecht 
nor Debord seem sympathetic with the viewer of culture in capitalism. This suggests both 
criticised viewers for their lack of awareness or critical attitude. But it also suggests that 
viewers’ ‘false consciousness’, ‘mystification’, or acceptance of the present reality could be 
broken - by thinking rather than focusing on the demands of their position in capitalism. In 
other words, despite the suggestion of the overwhelming impact of ‘mystification’ and ‘false 
consciousness’ for Debord, and the need for political theatre to ‘make visible’ the historical 
conditions producing capitalist relations for Brecht, based on their criticisms, both thinkers 
seem to suggest that the viewer has the capacity to break it quite easily. This is interesting in 
light of what they advocate as solutions to the situation of the viewer in capitalism, which I will 
now go on to discuss.  
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Re-addressing the Critiques of Spectatorship: Agency 
 
In the first part of Group Photo the group occupy static poses that allude to two types of 
photograph: the formal group photograph that records achievement and participation, and 
the promotional group photograph linked to the advertisement of a service or product. In the 
work these ‘types’ of photograph are depicted as scanned tracking shots of static bodies and 
isolated framings of ‘couples’. Although the way actors are depicted appears to have an 
indirect association with the types of photographs that their actions suggest, actors’ assent 
to this suggests otherwise. Nonetheless this ‘assent’ is disturbed when some actors perform 
expressions, gestures and ‘mistakes’ that disrupt the continuity of the work and what might 
be expected of the group photograph. These might be small rebellions, actions that show 
actors’ desire to spoil the image-making being imposed on them. In this way, the camerawork 
that interrogates bodies and frames ‘couples’ becomes the axis around which the actors’ 
agency is revealed. Yet this agency tends to feel choreographed, codified, limited. Responding 
to what might be called the ‘desires’ of the camera in the most ‘static’ section, the group 
literally move to meet its expectations in the next; they enact romance and respond to the 
call to be scrutinised in ways that both recall, and unsettle  familiar interactions from life and 
culture. Importantly, the actors tend to reject the final moment that might round off a scene, 
instead performing an abstract gesture, a sign that the continuity of their acts is not a given. 
It seems that the formal extremes of the camerawork have enabled actors to become free of 
the conventions of the group photograph. In the last part of the work they initially consent to 
and then progressively reject the terms of the image-making set out. The collaborative forms 
of agency and play that the actors show here could be a direct reaction to the constraints of 
the image that remain, also to their original stillness. As agency becomes tied to the 
operations of the image, the work asks what it is that we expect from images and whether 
this can be disrupted by what is unfamiliar here.  
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In contrast to the passivity they both saw in the viewer, Brecht and Debord sought to produce 
agency, Brecht in his viewers, Debord by promoting collaborative action. In each case, the 
‘activity’ of the spectator was sought, and viewing in and of itself, was denounced as lacking 
any politicised potential. In this way, Brecht sought to ‘teach the spectator a quite definite 
practical attitude, directed towards changing the world’.48 He wanted his audience to be able 
to relate directly to the actors on the stage, to identify with a hero who might be themselves. 
He said:  
 
The view is that the spectator ought to be able to feel himself into the stage character’s skin in 
such a way that he would like to imitate him in real life.49 
 
He sought to ‘stimulate consciousness’ this way, rather than to ‘stimulate’ blind imitation. He 
wanted to produce a ‘critical attitude’ in the spectator, for them to think and to know what it 
is that they see.50 To achieve this he employed the ‘Alienation-Effect’. This approach sought to 
make what is familiar strange by rendering it more visible. The following describes it well: 
 
The achievement of the A-effect constitutes something utterly ordinary, recurrent; it is just a 
widely-practised way of drawing one’s own or someone else’s attention to a thing, and it can 
be seen in education as also in business conferences of one sort or another. The A-effect 
consists in turning the object of which one is to be made aware, to which one’s attention is to 
be drawn, from something ordinary, familiar, immediately accessible, into something peculiar, 
striking and unexpected.51  
 
This act, of making an object strange or unusual in order that it can be seen, shows Brecht’s 
desire to make people aware of their surroundings, the social conditions they occupy.52 By 
alienating the object, or practice, the viewer’s attention – in a condition of alienation in 
capitalism – is broken, and her surroundings are made visible, her ability to understand them 
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clarified. For Brecht, making the familiar strange produced critical vision in the audience. Here, 
the relationship between whether something can be seen or known is related directly to the 
potential to support one’s own search for agency. Brecht’s emphasis on the link between 
knowing and seeing is central to his work. It is a relationship he compared to the inability of 
the person, who is emotionally involved with what they view, to perceive her own reality 
critically - in a way that would support the collective search for political agency. 
 
Differently, Debord advocated collaborative action as the ideal alternative to viewers’ 
engagement with the ‘spectacular’ form of contemporary imagery. Such action included the 
public and hence removed the audience altogether. In 1957 he defined ‘participatory events 
using experimental behaviour to break the spectacular bind of capitalism’.53 Debord advocated 
new, playful modes of interaction which would serve as an alternative to the events in a 
person’s life which are ‘in their immense majority, so undifferentiated and so dull that they 
perfectly present the impression of similitude’.54 He sought to construct situations; ‘collective 
environments’ where groups of individuals could gather together and ‘multiply poetic objects 
and subjects’, creating games between them.55 He advocated the ‘extreme dispersion of acts 
through these activities, positioning this against their ‘concentration’ in tragedy.56 Debord 
asserted a ‘non-continuous conception of life,’ and sought to challenge the fixing of emotions 
in art by ‘always gaining ground on change, on always going further in play and in the 
multiplication of moving periods,’ in the situations produced.57 This shows a desire to expand 
social roles overall, not only for would-be ‘viewers’. So, like Brecht, Debord’s focus on the 
nature of activity moved beyond a simple avoidance of ‘spectatorship’. 
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Yet through Debord’s (and the Situationist International’s) notion of détournement – that is 
influential to the now prevalent process of ‘appropriation’ in fine art – he also advocated a 
critical use of cinema. This revealed a desire for what is least productive about the cinematic 
spectacle to be surpassed. Thomas Y. Levin has described how for the Situationist 
International:  
 
To the extent that cinema is synonymous with spectacle—a spatialization of time, a staging of 
separation, a fostering of passivity, alienation, and so on—it is simply unacceptable and must 
be eliminated.58 
 
Referring to Debord’s statement that, ‘The cinema could have been historical examination, 
theory, essay, memories,’ he went on to say that:  
 
This leaves open the possibility of an alternative sort of cinematic activity incompatible with 
the economy of spectacle, a nonspectacular, antispectacular, or 
other-than-spectacular cinema. Such a realm of possibility is the precondition of 
what one might call situationist cinema.59 
 
This desire to avoid the realm of the spectacle recalls Debord’s trenchant critique of the image 
form in The Society of the Spectacle, yet it situates a possible response within the realm of 
images. However, Debord’s notion that the artwork should disrupt or reject its context in art, 
or culture, and to occupy an anti-art position, clearly suggests that this practice should be 
situated beyond the realm of the spectacle.60 This recalls his advocacy of experimental 
‘situations’, which are clearly posed in the real. Both positions suggest the power of the 
spectacle over the viewer, and either the critical use of images, or the benefits of human 
participation, as routes to achieving the viewer’s agency. 
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Debord’s advocacy of ‘experimental situations’ as a route to agency seems to occupy a 
propositional role which enables groups of people to collectively perform alternative forms of 
social life through play. This places any reading of ‘participation’ in performance as a route to 
agency, in and of itself, as something which – for Debord – seems insufficient as an 
interpretation of his work or aims. In order to overcome the position of viewer, Debord 
located the ‘pacifying’ effect of ‘the spectacle’ as the context that framed participatory 
‘activity’ as necessary. Yet, by advocating collage-based practices in film, he suggests that the 
viewer can be accessed by a change in the structural form of what it is that they watch. If 
détournement of different aspects of culture can be used to disrupt the homogeneity of the 
field of the spectacle then this indicates another route beyond the spectacle. 
 
Taken together, the influence of both Brecht’s and Debord’s critiques of spectatorship has 
been vast and prompted many critical cinematic, theatrical and fine art responses. As set out 
here, both linked their critique of the spectacle to a critique of the viewer. Yet, this meant that 
their arguments risked avoiding a wider exploration of the actual situation of the viewer in 
capitalism. While this is in essence the point of these key theories - that they eschew the 
common position of the spectator in the production of political agency – the limitations they 
placed on the viewer seem to leave room for other perspectives. Both sought viewers or 
participants with particular attitudes, or who want to act rather than look, in ways that suggest 
their exasperation with the viewer.61 Yet this also shows both Brecht’s and Debord’s powerful 
desire for social change, within a situation which they saw as fundamentally compromised. For 
both, the effects and contexts of capitalism were so limiting for the person that any 
engagement with its culture was fatal to a viewer’s capacity to think, and act. This is affirmed 
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by the later texts of Griselda Pollock and Laura Mulvey who, from the perspective of feminism, 
continue the Debordian and Brechtian projects.62 
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 Feminism Extending the Critiques 
 
It was my intention that Group Photo present men and women who viewers may feel able to 
identify with as equals. The five people depicted in the work are of different ages, racial and 
cultural backgrounds. The actors are dressed in their own casual clothes; women were asked 
to wear no, or if preferred, light make up. The way the actors are presented serves to reject 
the aesthetic of photographs of achievement (uniforms, sports strips, formal attire) and of 
promotional images (brightly coloured, new, aspirational clothing, each person arranged 
next to the others in a way that is lively and contrasting). So although these people appear to 
resist the formal codes of the images they occupy, they may, as a result, seem to be more ‘like’ 
the viewer. We might encounter such people daily: they do not represent an ideal of beauty. 
The ideal suggested in this work, aside from its many constraints and more unsettling aspects 
(which nonetheless are applied to people equally), is found in this group. It is a group of 
equals, who are all different. They are each equally able to ‘become’ someone else in the 
work, to shift their role from being in a ‘fixed’ image, to a moving, collaborative activity. They 
are all equally able to shake off their stereotypes. It is important that these allusions to 
equality exist in the work, even though the treatment of actors’ bodies may suggest 
otherwise. In this way, equality becomes ‘visible’ against the power of the camera operator 
and maker. It is important that a sustained image of equality is present in the work – with 
the compromised conditions of capitalist life that challenge it characterising the mechanisms 
of control that frame these people.  
 
Griselda Pollock, in her 1988 text ‘Screening the Seventies’, highlighted the relevance of 
Brechtian distanciation for feminist art practices at the time. Yet Pollock also reinforces the 
Debordian view of ‘the spectacle’, by describing the ‘illusory fictional worlds offered in art, 
fiction and film’, and asks that the ‘social reality’ of women’s oppression not be ‘swept away in 
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the gloss and glitter of the spectacle’.63 Her viewer being ‘swept away’ mirrors the language of 
Brecht, and she suggests that the ‘dominant pacification of populations takes place through 
the passive consumption of meanings naturalised through realist representations’.64 The 
implied control of the viewer by the image is also reinforced in Pollock’s text, and her 
description of viewers ‘consuming’ images, accords with Debord’s analogy for the image as an 
accumulation of capital. Agency is, for Pollock, as for Brecht and Debord, figured in relation to 
making visible the conditions which form the viewer’s reality. She highlights the ‘political 
purpose’ of feminist practices ‘with the intention to expose critical areas’ in patriarchal 
systems producing subject positions.65 Pollock defines the ‘point’ of ‘dis-identificatory 
practices’ as being to ‘liberate the viewer from being captured by illusions of art which 
encourage passive identification with fictional worlds,’ thereby rendering them an ‘active 
participant in the production of meanings’.66 Her framing of the viewer’s position in relation to 
imagery, and agency, interestingly conflates Debordian and Brechtian approaches. Yet 
Pollock’s language mirrors that of ‘the spectacle’ when she re-emphasises its control over the 
viewer: its meanings must be ‘exposed’, and the viewer must be ‘liberated’ from its power, as 
she has been ‘captured’ by it. Writing twenty years after Debord, and fifty years after Brecht 
first wrote about alienation effects in Chinese theatre, Pollock’s text shows the continuing 
importance of Brecht’s and Debord’s framing of the viewer and mediated culture, as regards 
agency, to feminist practices.67 
 
Laura Mulvey, in her influential feminist text ‘Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema’ (1975), 
situated her analysis of the framing of women in Hollywood cinema within the terms of 
Debord’s framing of ‘the spectacle’ in capitalism. Her descriptions of the relationship of the 
viewer to the cinema accord with his, when she refers to ‘the fascination of film’ as reflecting 
existing ‘patterns of fascination’ which have ‘moulded’ the individual subject, and the 
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‘interpretation of sexual difference’ which ‘controls images’.68 She goes on to describe 
mainstream films that: 
 
portray a hermetically sealed world which unwinds magically, indifferent to the presence of the 
audience, producing for them a sense of separation and playing on their voyeuristic fantasy.69 
 
Here Mulvey highlights the power of film over the viewer, in the ‘fascination’ it provides, and 
suggests its role in ‘moulding’ the subject. With images ‘controlled’ from within, she describes 
their portrayal of a ‘sealed’, ‘separate’ world, which supports the potential for ‘voyeuristic 
fantasy’. Mulvey’s terms, while they may not consciously reflect those of Debord, seem to 
directly affirm his framing of ‘the spectacle’ by paralleling the alienating separation of life in 
capitalism. Mulvey too speaks of alienation, but rather refers to the alienation of the subject at 
the point of the Mirror Stage, and its effect on identification based on ‘ego ideal’ positions.70 
Yet, Mulvey affirms the context of alienation in capitalism in her recurrent use of metaphors 
based in distance and separation; her framing of ‘woman as spectacle’.71 Read in Debord’s 
terms, capital could be accumulated as the image of woman, where woman as object and 
‘fetish’ (this parallel’s Marx’s definition of the fetishistic status of the product in capitalism) is 
the ideal occupant of the capitalist image; for Mulvey the ‘perfect product’.72 Mulvey frames 
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have absolutely no connection with the physical nature of the commodity and the material relations arising out of 
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the male viewer (and actor) as ‘active’ in looking, and the woman as ‘passive’ in being looked 
at.73 Yet, as Brecht and Debord regarded the position of viewer as broadly passive, this shows 
the potential of Mulvey’s framing of sexual difference in the viewer’s relationship to cinema, 
to disrupt notions of what is ‘active’ or ‘passive’ in viewing (albeit that she frames this as a 
criticism). Mulvey repeatedly welcomes practices that ‘challenge’ mainstream narrative film in 
her text, inviting their destruction of the ‘satisfaction, pleasure, and privilege of the “invisible 
guest”’.74 Here she reaffirms the dominance of the image over the viewer and – like Debord – 
suggests the need to negate its power, pleasures and effects, which are so harmful to the 
progress of gender politics. 
 
Both Pollock’s and Mulvey’s texts confirm the broad continuance of Brecht’s and Debord’s 
perspectives on the spectator as regards agency. Yet, while Debord and Brecht sought to set 
the terms of viewing, or avoid the viewing role, both Pollock and Mulvey indicate ways that the 
position of viewers can be reconsidered; principally they suggest critical reformulations 
regarding the position of women.75 While I will draw on particular aspects of Mulvey’s and 
Pollock’s texts in my next section, it is clear that amidst the contemporary expansion of visual 
culture across different platforms, the position of viewer cannot be avoided. It rather seems 
ripe to be addressed directly, within a politicised context, in a way that enables a reframing of 
the majority of culture that still maintains the viewer.  
 
                                                                                                                                               
this.  It is nothing but the definite social relation between men themselves which assumes here, for them, the 
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and is not the focus of this text. My treatment of Mulvey and Pollock here reflects this.  
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The Spectator Emancipated 
 
In Group Photo actors are presented to viewers, and actors present themselves to viewers, in 
specific stylised ways. The modes of presentation and activities of the actors alone constitute 
the work. Group Photo deliberately avoids trying to tell or directly communicate anything to 
the audience. Instead, what is conveyed is done so through: the gestures of the actors, how 
they interact together, the way the camera treats them, and also how the work is edited and 
treated in post-production. Images have been produced in the expectation that viewers 
would like to address the people depicted in them directly. Yet the viewer may expect to see a 
reality unlike her own in these images. The likely difference of these moving images, to the 
experience of the person viewing them in capitalism, is to a fair extent rejected. Much of what 
is depicted feels like it could originate from our shared reality. So, what alternative the image 
could provide, is rather suggested through different combinations of gestures and 
interactions that oscillate around familiar tropes from visual culture, art and cinema. The 
image, so often highly rendered and visually seductive today (in art, and across culture) is 
made both banal, unsettling and highly rendered; this might be the dark side of high 
definition moving image. Principally the work rejects the association of high definition with 
positive depictions of life or culture, instead focusing on its potentially unnerving capacity to 
scrutinise. For this reason, these may be images we do not want to view. There is an 
ambivalence about them that is purposeful, which addresses what it is that we seek from 
images, and self-consciously suggests that we look to images for alternative, rather than 
merely different, realities. 
 
Jacques Rancière has recently provided a significant revision to the historically important 
critiques of spectatorship. He, by contrast with Debord and Brecht, positions potential agency 
in the act of viewing, and situates the act of looking as fundamental to social life. Rancière 
suggests that we cannot always be ‘agents’. Instead he frames looking in terms of ‘associating 
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and dissociating’, for him the route to a potential ‘emancipation of the spectator’.76  Here, 
‘association and dissociation’ define the fundamental separation at the heart of cultural 
production: ‘the aesthetic cut which separates outcomes from intentions’.77 Rancière hopes to 
reframe the ‘collective’ power of the audience, which is ‘the power to translate in their own 
way what they are looking at’.78 He contextualises this by criticising the attempt to produce an 
activist energy from the viewer’s knowledge, one which would instigate social change.79 He 
qualifies this by saying:  
 
There is no straightforward road from the fact of looking at a spectacle to the fact of 
understanding the state of the world; no direct road from intellectual awareness to political 
action.80 
 
In this, Rancière offers a direct critique of the positions of Brecht and Debord towards viewers. 
He also breaks the hopes of makers of politically interested works whose intention it is to 
directly instigate activity towards social change in their audience through an emphasis on the 
relationship between looking and knowing alone. He altogether loosens the pressure placed 
on the maker to produce certain effects in the viewer, and frames any desire to do so as 
rooted in the ascription of a ‘lack of capacity’ to the viewer, and ‘capacity’ to the actor.81 He 
suggests that fundamental limits are placed on the status of the viewer by the positions of 
Brecht and Debord. 
 
Rancière locates his critique of these approaches in relation to their roots in theories of the 
‘mystification’ of the person, and hence viewer, in capitalism. Relating ‘artistic critique’ to 
Martha Rosler’s photomontages he describes the root of their intention as:  
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Always a question of showing the spectator what she does not know how to see, and making 
her feel ashamed of what she does not want to see.82  
 
Here he describes a focus on comparing heterogeneous elements, rather than addressing the 
difficult homogeneity between consumption and protest, for instance.83 For him, as there is no 
link between ‘knowing’ or ‘seeing’ the spectacle and being able to effect change, approaches 
intended to reveal reality can be undermined. He offers a scathing critique of this approach, 
positioning its roots in fears, aired in the mid-nineteenth century, of the concern that the 
introduction of visual displays and images in public places produced a situation where ‘too 
many stimuli have been unleashed on all sides’.84 He also contrasts the ‘paternalistic concern’ 
about the potential harm done to workers by these ‘stimuli’, which allowed the ‘multiplication 
of unprecedented encounters’ and the ‘awakening of original capacities in popular bodies’.85 
Rancière posits a form of emancipation at this moment of the expansion of culture, where the 
‘old distribution of what could be seen thought and done’ is reframed.86 He suggests it was a 
paternalistic concern about the negative ‘effects’ culture may have on people that underscores 
both the aims of social critique in art, and Debord’s and Brecht’s framing of the viewer based 
on ‘incapacity’. In making this claim, Rancière suggests that the intentions of ‘social critique’ 
are linked to critiques of the viewer, in a way that risks generalising their roots.87 He frames 
this by saying that:  
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 This contradicts Luc Boltanski and Ève Chiapello’s different historicisation of ‘social critique’. They delineate two 
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In effect, the procedures of social critique have as their goal treating the incapable: those who 
do not know how to see, who do not understand the meaning of what they see, who do not 
know how to transform acquired knowledge into activist energy.88 
 
Rancière suggests that the new visual culture supported capacities which were disruptive to 
the social order by providing information, forms of freedom and different ways of viewers 
constituting themselves in life. For him the aims of social critique stem from the fear of this 
disruption. Rancière’s view of what would be the realm of ‘the spectacle’ for Debord as a shift 
from one sensible world to another seems to underscore this.89 He suggests that culture is 
marked out more so by difference, one which may or may not have a potentially ‘disruptive’ 
effect for a viewer.90 
 
Rancière’s position accords with, and departs from, another ‘classic’ perspective on 
spectatorship ‘Making Strange: The Shattered Mirror’, a 1988 critique of the strategies of 
‘making strange’ in photography by Simon Watney. In this text Watney historicises these 
approaches to photography in the 1920’s and 1930’s, in relation to earlier Romantic notions of 
a ‘flawed perceptual capacity’ and ‘equating knowledge with seeing’.91 He also connects these 
practices to Marx’s concept of ‘false consciousness’ (incorrectly as Marx didn’t use the phrase), 
and claims that for Marx (writing in The German Ideology):  
 
Capitalism is seen to create conditions which cloud or mystify our awareness of ourselves and 
our relations to the world in such a way that we cannot correctly perceive our objective 
conditions of inequality and exploitation, which are misunderstood as if they were ‘natural’ 
and therefore immutable.92 
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Watney’s argument appears to add support to Rancière’s view of the Marxist framing of 
‘mystification’, as fundamental to ‘making strange’ and thereby ‘distanciation’. While Watney 
acknowledged that Marx’s position enabled a ‘radically new emphasis on the ways in which 
culture legitimates particular forms of society,’ for him, the Romantic ‘socially abstracted 
notion of perception’ remained.93 Yet Rancière’s discussion of spectatorship, in light of mid-
nineteenth century fears of the impact of multiple visual ‘stimuli’ on people, appears, in 
contrast to Watney’s, de-historicised from the lineage of the development of art practices that 
relate to ‘making strange’. Albeit that Rancière’s intention seems to be to highlight the accords 
between ‘conservative’ concerns about the effect of visual media on the viewer and those of 
the left. Conversely Watney historicises ‘distanciation’ and ‘making strange’ in the context of 
the activities of the Russian Futurists in pre-revolutionary Russia - setting out the impact of 
figures like Sergei Tretyakov and Victor Shklovsky’s framing of ostranenie or ‘making strange’ 
on Bertholt Brecht. In contrast to Rancière, Watney seems to praise the political ambitions of 
the techniques affiliated with ‘making strange’, especially by the Russian Futurists and in the 
Surrealist movement, yet he bemoans their effect on photography. He accords with Rancière 
in criticising the ‘inflexibility’ of the Marxist framing of ‘making strange’ in Tretyakov, which he 
saw as equal to that of the ‘bourgeois dogmatism which “ostranenie” had set out to 
question’.94 Generally too, he criticises the roots of ‘making strange’ in a Romantic ‘hostility to 
the customary, to all fixed forms of habit and taste’, its overemphasis on the significance of 
‘seeing’.95 In an argument which accords with Rancière’s analysis, Watney claims that ‘the 
thinking self which needs such ideas and habits remained largely untheorised,’ and that 
‘making strange’ was a ‘bourgeois abstraction of thought’ which failed to address the multiple 
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class, race, gender positions within a revolutionary politics.96 Rancière’s rejection of the ability 
of cultural works to produce particular effects in viewers is affirmed by Watney’s claims that 
‘the familiar’ is not determinable across all viewers, that it is ‘neither uniform or 
heterogeneous,’ and is based in social experience.97 Watney sought recognition of the 
‘objective historical conditions’ which contextualise any ‘surprise’ in response to ‘making 
strange’ saying rather that meaning is an ‘infinite dialectic’ between images, subjects and 
institutions.98  
 
Rancière’s critique of Debord’s and Brecht’s attempts to produce agency in the viewer 
provides a significant re-reading of the classic critiques of spectatorship. He reframes the way 
that viewers and artworks may be perceived, and his argument is suggestive of the potential 
for liberation and critique which resides with the viewer. By positioning an agency in viewing, 
he is going against the classic critiques of spectatorship and extending viewing to the centrality 
of the visual to both life and politics. He also posits a viewer with the power to translate 
material as they wish, and entirely loosens the relationship between the intentions of the 
artist, and the effects of the work they make, based on the separation which runs through 
cultural production. He suggests it is impossible to produce particular effects in a viewer, 
rather emphasising her capacity to respond as she wishes. By removing the mystified worker, 
Rancière claims that the worker and person in capitalism is able to see her reality, that there is 
an open relational field in which interpretation can be formed. By disrupting the tenets of 
social critique, he suggests the same disservice is done to the viewer. Also, by positing the 
realm of images as an alternative reality, he removes the dramatic separation between images 
and viewers, and undermines the domination of viewers by images emphasised by Debord. In 
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this Rancière seems to frame a relationship between viewer and image as one potentially 
rooted in equality.  
 
However, there are limitations to Rancière’s critique. While he advocates certain creative 
practices which construct the work as ‘the very tension between the apart and the together’, 
he does seem to allow a general broadening of the frame of the politicised artwork, almost to 
the point where all creative production might be so.99 This seems to generalise specific 
contexts for making work which may address particular areas of social life in a politicised way. 
Relatedly, Rancière’s argument seems to ignore the capitalist character of the ‘alternative’ 
visual field in a way which softens the potential of his analysis. While I find Rancière’s 
argument that the viewer is able to see her reality in capitalism, important, it seems too vague 
to generalise the whole realm of visual production in capitalism as an ‘alternative’. But the 
drastic contrast between his view and the classic critiques of spectatorship, provokes a shift 
away from perspectives emphasising a one-way impact of images on people, enabling a focus 
on the human relationships suggested by our interaction with images. 
 
While Rancière lacks detail at the level of the relationship between people and images, this 
seems intended to leave a freer relational space for the viewer to operate in. Yet, in his 
unwillingness to determine the effects of cultural products, he seems to deny the capacity of 
culture to affect people’s lives. This suggests both that culture does not have the potential to 
‘socialise’ people, and that the same applies to artworks. This has interesting accords with 
Watney’s critique which also seems to suggest the impossibility of art addressing what is 
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‘familiar’ about people’s habits – or having an effect on a viewer. Yet, the effects culture can 
have on viewers are well known.100 
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Affect, Incommensurability and the Image 
 
Group Photo represents people using methods and approaches that aren’t necessarily 
ethical. In fact, they suggest a lack of ethics on the part of the camera operator or maker. The 
scenes using an ‘interrogating’ camera – even though I imagined them as an extreme 
extension of ‘formal’ modes of viewing - parallel the human capacity to ‘scrutinise’ others, 
either via the image, or in life. While the actors appear to rebel against the terms of their 
representation, and the agenda of the camera operator, the viewer is left to pick out the 
errors, problems and issues that they find with the image. Even though highly rendered video 
has the capacity to ‘show’ us things we are unable to see with the naked eye, it is not 
supposed to be used this way. By contrast the ‘ideal’ of romantic love is referred to in other 
images. Yet as the camera continually frames ‘couples’, what may be romantic becomes 
increasingly unsettling and arbitrary. Treated together, images alluding to achievement 
(which have been extended to become interrogative) are aligned with images alluding to 
aspiration (which have been extended to become romantic). The image is depicted self-
consciously as something that is neither inherently ethical, nor something that viewers 
possess an inherently ethical relationship to. Rather, viewers are imagined to be quite 
demanding of the image, seeking something specific from it. This means that the effect of the 
image on the viewer comes before its ethics, framing a viewer who is indiscriminate in her 
use of images. Equally, the expectation that the artwork represents the world view of the 
artist is challenged, as the viewer becomes uncertain that this artist would want to be 
thought to see the world this way. Group Photo addresses the ethical dimension of our 
relationship to protagonists in images by eschewing the ethics of the gallery. The artwork is 
treated as a self-conscious entity, produced in a way that speaks about, as much as embodies, 
the terms of our relationship to an artwork, image or item of culture in a contemporary 
capitalist reality.  
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Having suggested both the potential of, and some possible caveats to, Jacques Rancière’s 
approach towards spectatorship, I will discuss the perspective of Claire Bishop whose position 
both accords with, and departs from Rancière’s. Bishop has recently produced Artificial Hells 
an ambitious text on the politics of participatory performance in the contemporary sphere. She 
has supported Rancière’s ‘reinvention of the notion of “aesthetic”’, his emphasis on the 
‘affective’ properties of art and his notion of art ‘as an autonomous realm of experience.’ 101 
She has also tended to make a strong case for artworks which problematise the relationship 
between the viewers of, and participants in, a performance. For instance, she closes her book 
with this statement about participatory art:  
 
it has the capacity to communicate on two levels – to participants and to spectators – the 
paradoxes that are repressed in everyday discourse, and to elicit perverse, disturbing and 
pleasurable experiences that enlarge our capacity to imagine the world and our relations 
anew.102  
 
This statement indicates Bishop’s desire to explore the range of possible relationships between 
a spectator and what they view. These may be pleasurable, paralleling Brecht’s audience who 
wanted ‘fun’ or their ‘hearts warmed’, as much as they may be ‘perverse’ or ‘disturbing’. This 
suggests that a broader context for ‘engaging a viewer’ exists, one based on a range of possible 
relationships to other people and situations. This breadth seems to accord with the freedom 
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readability and from their unreadability’. Secondly, I have adopted Rancière’s idea of art as an autonomous realm of 
experience in which there is no privileged medium. The meaning of artistic forms shifts in relation to the uses also 
made of these forms by society at large, and as such they have no intrinsic or fixed political affiliation.’ Bishop’s 
description of Rancière’s attention to the ‘affective capabilities of art’ seems to have accords with Simon 
O’Sullivan’s recent claims for an ‘aesthetics of affect’ where art history ‘which attends only to art’s signifying 
character’ would disappear, while ‘art’s asignifying functions’ and ‘affective and intensive qualities’ would be 
emphasised. Claire Bishop, Artificial Hells: Participatory Art and the Politics of Spectatorship (London: Verso, 2012) 
p. 29-30. Bishop cites Rancière, The Politics of Aesthetics, p. 63. and Rancière, Malaise dans l’esthétique, (Paris: 
Editions Galilée, 2004), p. 67, Bishop’s translation. Simon O’Sullivan, ‘The Aesthetics of Affect: Thinking Art beyond 
Representation’ in Jorella Andrews and Simon O’Sullivan, Visual Cultures as Object and Affects (London and Berlin: 
Goldsmiths and Sternberg Press, 2013), p. 20-21. 
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afforded the viewer by Rancière, one also set within the cultures of relating and viewing 
common to capitalism.  
 
Laura Mulvey’s recent reassessment of her earlier arguments in Visual Pleasure and Narrative 
Cinema, in an interview with Roberta Sassatelli, frames a contemporary context for spectator 
positions that accords with this picture of a broadened field of viewing relationships. When 
Sassatelli notes that Mulvey’s earlier text was criticised for ‘having embraced the heterosexual 
matrix and not having seriously considered the widely diverse modalities of spectatorship,’ 
Mulvey, in the interview continues: 
 
There are also multiple audiences and spectator positions, multiple ways in which different 
kinds of social groups are distanced or entranced by the images on the screen.103 
 
Mulvey’s statement emphasises the variable status of the viewer, the different ways in which 
they can ‘become’ viewer and in which they might use the image. In this she significantly 
expands viewers’ potential to experience agencies through images. She also suggests a 
broader capacity to analyse viewers, and viewing, in ways that can be applied to culture 
retrospectively, as well as to a contemporary moment dominated by the digital.  
 
This potential, to address the viewer and viewing in a particularly contemporary context, is 
addressed by Bishop in a 2012 Artforum article ‘The Digital Divide’. In it she seems to strike a 
balance between, on the one hand, Debord’s treatment of ‘the spectacle’ as a separate reality 
and, on the other, Rancière’s perspective on the emancipatory potential of the viewer. In the 
article, in which she discussed the return of film-based practices to the gallery, and debated 
what this meant in the digital age, she made comments particular to moving image practice:  
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 Roberta Sassatelli, ‘Interview with Laura Mulvey: Gender, Gaze and Technology in Film Culture’, Theory, Culture 
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While many artists use digital technology, how many really confront the question of what it 
means to think, see, and filter affect through the digital?104 
 
Here, Bishop seems to open up a debate which could frame a contemporary politics of 
spectatorship. She suggests that most artists using the digital do not address the implications 
of our interaction with those media in their work. Where Brecht sought a viewer to think, here 
Bishop is saying the viewer ‘thinks’ (and ‘sees’) through the digital. Further she asks what it 
means to ‘filter affect through the digital’. In this she sidesteps Brecht’s critique of catharsis 
and rather speaks of affect as the notion of a person in a process of constant becoming, of 
feeling, in a vastly preconscious way. Affect as a force for change becomes, in Bishop’s 
statement, one filtered through the digital.105 Yet Bishop lists a select few artworks which she 
feels address the implications of this, and goes on to say of these artworks:  
 
Each suggests the endlessly disposable, rapidly mutable ephemera of the virtual age and its 
impact on our consumption of relationships, images, and communication; each articulates 
something of the troubling oscillation between intimacy and distance that characterizes our 
new technological regime, and proposes an incommensurability between our doggedly 
physiological lives and the screens to which we are glued.106 
 
 
In this, Bishop indicates how the surfeit of image-based forms, applications and programmes 
which exist today, impact on contemporary human relations and modes of communication. 
She also seems to add a more critical perspective to Rancière’s ‘associating and dissociating’, 
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by describing the ‘troubling’ shift between ‘intimacy and distance’ which seems to underscore 
relationships to the digital. I will explore the implications of this later in the text. She also 
describes the ‘incommensurability between our doggedly physiological lives and the screens to 
which we are glued,’ a statement which seems to open up a more specific contemporary space 
for considering the relationship between viewer and culture.107 Here Bishop suggests a 
dramatic separation between physical and screen-based reality. This recalls Debord’s framing 
of ‘the spectacle’ as a separate realm opposed to the banality of human life. Also, Bishop’s use 
of the word ‘incommensurable’ suggests an inability to relate reality to the image in a direct 
way. It is useful to outline the definition of ‘incommensurable’ which is ‘having no common 
standard of measurement; not comparable in respect of magnitude or value’.108 This appears 
to extend the estrangement common to mystification and the separating power of the 
spectacle by suggesting that fundamental differences separate reality and representation 
creating a form of impasse. It also seems a contrast to the position of Rancière, where his 
‘alternative’ reality becomes a more separate one, for Bishop.  
 
To consider the implications of this further, it is relevant to contextualise Bishop’s use of the 
term ‘incommensurable’ by briefly discussing her earlier critiques of Nicolas Bourriaud’s 
Relational Aesthetics in which she sets out the value of ‘antagonism’ to democracy.109 The 
definition of antagonism is ‘active opposition or hostility’ which, particularly via Thomas Kuhn’s 
theorisation of ‘incommensurability’ in scientific revolutions, seems to set the terms 
‘antagonism’ and ‘incommensurability’ in relation.110 In that text, she drew on Ernesto Laclau 
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and Chantal Mouffe’s influential book Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, which provided a Post-
Structuralist response to Antonio Gramsci’s theories of hegemony.111 Bishop also suggested 
that the artwork of Thomas Hirschhorn and Santiago Sierra represented – through its 
exposition of the more antagonistic aspects of our present ‘democracies’ - ‘better 
democracy’.112 Her analysis of Relational Aesthetics was roundly critiqued by Liam Gillick, a 
prominent artist affiliated with the associated art movement.113 Yet, while Bishop’s emphasis 
on the value of political antagonism in artworks is less prominent in her writings today, her 
2012 comment framing a fundamental incommensurability between the screens we use and 
our physical reality, continues to suggest the viewer’s relationship with the image as a context 
for such an antagonism.114  
                                                                                                                                               
from a revolution…is…often actually incommensurable with that which has gone before.’ Here, each school’s 
‘standards or their definitions of science are not the same,’ and while terms used may remain the same, ‘old terms, 
concepts and experiments fall into new relationships with one another’; they ‘see different things when they look 
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So while ‘antagonism’ is a less central concept for Bishop now, she remains in support of the 
same artists, as were featured in her paper on Relational Aesthetics. For instance, Thomas 
Hirschhorn is one of the artists she suggests addresses the problems of our relationship to the 
digital. In the 2012 article, she describes:  
 
Thomas Hirschhorn’s video of a finger idly scrolling through gruesome images of blown-apart 
bodies on a touch screen, occasionally pausing to enlarge, zoom in, move on (Touching Reality, 
2012).115  
 
From this description, the work appears to address the ethics of the position of the viewer in 
relationship to the protagonist: the languid focus of the former, the violent end of the latter.116 
Viewed in the context of the wider theories of spectatorship, Bishop seems to suggest that 
there is an ‘incommensurability’ between the screen and its viewers’ physical existence. She 
refers to one reality - that of the viewer in her own life, home, or viewing context and to her 
physicality. Then she refers to another reality - which is mediated by and produced for viewing 
on a screen. Yet her discussion of Hirschhorn’s work refers to the power of the viewer, her 
ability to casually watch whatever scene she might wish. This seems a significant shift from 
Debord’s view of the spectacle’s power over the viewer. Instead, Bishop and Hirschhorn seem 
to raise the issue of what it means for one person, occupying (in this case) a more secure 
reality, viewing the aftermath of another’s violent death. Rather than merely highlighting the 
viewing role, Bishop’s selection of this artwork, suggests an important relationship exists 
between the viewer’s reality and the situation of the people they watch on a screen.  
 
This picture of a viewer’s possession of agency in relation to culture - when set against the 
‘incommensurability’ of that culture to our physical lives – is an interesting one. As already 
                                                                                                                                               
discussing the political incorporation of ‘creativity’, based on economic imperatives, she counters, ‘Artists and 
works of art can operate in a space of antagonism or negation vis- à- vis society, a tension that the ideological 
discourse of creativity reduces to a unified context and instrumentalises for more efficacious profiteering.’ Here, 
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writings. Bishop, Artificial Hells, p. 16. 
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discussed, the role of the viewer is generally, in the terms of the classic critiques of 
spectatorship, thought passive or that the viewer must be activated through the particular 
critical nature of the material shown. Yet, based on this argument, viewers may use their 
power over culture, to turn it to relevant personal uses. If the way we experience life as human 
beings, and the representations of that life are incompatible, then it is possible to think of the 
culture we choose to view as a direct response to the lived reality of the viewer. In this way, 
visual culture may be more than just another sensible reality, as Rancière suggests, but provide 
an experience which is necessarily different. Such a necessity shows that culture may, as well 
as having various effects on viewers, serve particular functions for them too, ones underscored 
by the actual disparity between life and the image. So, rather than there being a critical 
relation between the ‘dogged’ physicality of human life and ‘the screens to which we are 
glued,’ a critical relation exists between our mental, physical and social existence and the 
specific ways in which human life is displayed and consumed on screens.  
 
To develop this thinking further, I would like to return to the politics which underscored 
Bishop’s original critique of Relational Aesthetics. While Bishop appears to have stepped away 
from the implications of Laclau and Mouffe’s theories, their roots in Gramsci’s theory of 
hegemony suggest an alternative view of the relationship of a person to culture in capitalism is 
possible. Gramsci’s notion of hegemony afforded subordinate groups agency in society by 
describing their wrestle with dominant groups as to how their culture is represented. This 
differs from the arguments of Debord and Brecht, as to the domination of the viewer by the 
spectacle, and rather accords with the contemporary position of Rancière. Today, Gramsci’s 
perspective seems appropriate to the contemporary cultural context marked out by user-
generated content. The agency to present one’s own view of culture or re-work existing 
culture to new ends (as emphasised by Bourriaud), has become a significant response to a 
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diverse and expanded visual cultural sphere for many artists and cultural commentators.117 
Such practices also continue the lineage of Debord’s own détournement of culture. However, 
Gramsci’s emphasis on the realm of culture as a context for hegemonic struggles directly 
contrasts Debord’s focus on the mystification of workers and his emphasis on them realising 
the conditions of their existence. Rather, Gramsci, by affording the worker greater agency, 
suggests a fruitful context for reframing the classic arguments on the politics of spectatorship. 
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Hegemony, Agonism and the Viewer 
 
In Group Photo the common disparity between the situation of the viewer and that of the 
person they view in an image is, to an extent, rejected. While the types of photography 
suggested in the work allude to achievement and aspiration, the people in the image could be 
you or I. Viewers of this work may have more opportunities to ‘identify’ with the protagonists 
they find in these images as equals, as this work broadly rejects capitalist culture’s ideals of 
beauty, fitness, youth and fashion.  Yet here, the ‘believable’ person is imagined to be entering 
the ‘capitalist’ image from life, occupying it and disrupting or even democratising it. In 
Group Photo the group assent to two disparate forms of representation, while 
simultaneously performing minor disruptions to them. Then they playfully ‘meet’ the 
requirements of the disjunctive camerawork, finally rejecting both representational 
approaches, and the aesthetic of the camera, which persists. Ultimately, this group, having 
‘entered’ the image, have come to rework it on their own terms. This is the narrative of the 
work. Fundamentally it is a narrative about power and the image, and of the uses of images 
to depict groups. Where we are familiar with seeing other kinds of people act in images, here, 
people more like us act in a way that is intended to both recall and disrupt the terms of our 
relationship to images. The group have entered into a self-conscious battle with the forms of 
representation that are applied to them, with the limitations that the image so often, in 
practice, presents. Important to this is the quality of the visual image, of the camerawork and 
the rendering. While we are familiar with people presenting themselves to camera, most 
notably today on the internet, in this work, the choreography and complexity of the actors’ 
self-display suggest an awkward conflation of the imagined democratic, ‘self-organised’ 
ideals of the internet and the more controlling, seductive and professionalised aspects of 
industrial image production.  
 
Gramsci’s notion of hegemony denotes the centrality of the cultural realm to the maintenance 
of power by a ruling group. He emphasised two principal means of keeping power: coercion 
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and consent. Where coercion is linked to the exercise of ‘state coercive power’, he describes 
consent as:  
 
The ‘spontaneous’ consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction 
imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group; this consent is “historically” caused 
by the prestige (and consequent confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its 
position and function in the world of production.118 
 
For Gramsci this consent gave cultural, ideological and moral leadership a significant role in the 
maintenance of a given ‘hegemony’. Relatedly ‘common sense’, for Gramsci, was a social 
group’s ‘traditional conception of the world,’ one which he aligned with all men being 
philosophers and the passing down of modes of thought through history.119 He nonetheless 
sought ‘awareness and criticism’ in such groups by, ‘refusing to accept passively and supinely 
from outside the moulding of one's personality?’120 
 
However, Gramsci afforded the ‘subaltern class’ a greater role in the determination of culture 
than other Marxist thinkers.121 Here, due to the complexity of ‘civil society’, Gramsci advocated 
a ‘war of position’ (as opposed to a ‘war of manoeuvre’ in revolutionary – and military - 
politics).122 For Gramsci the role of ‘intellectuals’ within civil society was important to this 
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struggle, a role he recognised as being challenged from within the ‘subaltern’ class. On this 
basis he called for a reconstitution of the notion of the intellectual – one which negated her 
separation from society. This intellectual was characterised by, ‘active participation in practical 
life, as constructor, organiser, “permanent persuader” and not just a simple orator’.123 He saw 
every man as enacting some form of ‘intellectual activity’ by which:  
 
he participates in a particular conception of the world, has a conscious line of moral conduct, 
and therefore contributes to sustain a conception of the world or to modify it, that is, to bring 
into being new modes of thought.124 
 
This has interesting accords with the recent theorisations of Rancière on the education of the 
lower classes also his discussions of the intellectual and cultural life of working people 
concerning their ‘free time’.125 Gramsci goes on to describe this cultural terrain as one of 
struggle for the mass of people:  
 
who raise themselves to higher levels of culture and at the same time extend their circle of 
influence towards the stratum of specialised intellectuals, producing outstanding individuals 
and groups of greater or less importance.126  
 
Gramsci clearly sets out the terms of an active struggle on the part of the subaltern class to 
intercede within the ‘hegemonic’ order. In this he affords considerable agency to the working 
class by setting them within a dynamic interplay of forces, and struggles – ones necessarily 
aimed at the sphere of culture, ideology and private allegiances. Further, what Gramsci termed 
their ‘consent’ to the cultural hegemony (albeit in a context of coercion) implies an agency 
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which ‘mystification’ and ‘false consciousness’ would not account for in Debord. Here, Gramsci 
provides an important context for the direct application of cultural and ideological practices 
within hegemonic struggles, by the working class.  
 
However, limitations to Gramsci’s analysis arise which challenge the broader conception of 
agency he might provide. His focus, when discussing the working class’ ‘common sense’ 
remains tied to ‘criticism’ and ‘awareness’ in the sense that he, like Debord and Brecht, seems 
to assume the ‘subaltern’s’ generalised lack of awareness of their conditions. Gramsci also 
makes frequent reference to rather wide disparities in capacity. For instance, his notions of 
‘the mass of the simple’ or merely ‘mass’, give a clear impression of vastly stratified classes 
which, apt to his time of writing, are more fragmented today.127 Yet, despite some of the 
limitations of his terms, Gramsci’s analysis affords the ‘subaltern’ class a degree of agency, a 
capacity to struggle within the cultural hegemonic order, that is not seen in Debord’s or 
Brecht’s Marxism. So it is important to address Gramsci’s tendency to limit the framing of the 
working subject, by using the work of Chantal Mouffe, which reinterprets Gramsci’s thinking 
based on Lacanian and Post-Structuralist theories.128  
 
In a 2009 article Chantal Mouffe sought to apply the central tenets of her earlier work (with 
Ernesto Laclau) to the realm of contemporary fine art practice. Arguing for another perspective 
on the political significance of the transition from Fordism to Post-Fordism, she called for a 
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more complex view of the ‘forces at play in the emergence of the current neoliberal 
hegemony.’129 She goes on to describe how:  
  
This hegemony is the result of a set of political interventions in a complex field of economic, 
legal and ideological forces. It is a discursive construction that articulates in a very specific 
manner a manifold of practices, discourses and language-games of very different nature. 
Through a process of sedimentation the political origin of those contingent practices has been 
erased and they have become naturalised.130 
 
By framing hegemony as a ‘discursive construction’, Mouffe situates the maintenance of a 
given cultural hegemony within the realm of the social, of interactions between people, and of 
people’s consumption of culture. In doing this she indicates the potential for diverse subject 
positions. Yet for Mouffe ‘forms of identification’ have ‘crystallized into identities which are 
taken for granted’; this, for her is how ‘common sense’ has been ‘established.’131  
 
To challenge the neoliberal hegemony Mouffe calls for ‘agonistic’ and ‘counter-hegemonic 
practices’ that engaging with, rather than withdraw from, existing institutions (as suggested by 
post-Operaist theorists like Franco Berardi Bifo).132 This is in order to ‘disarticulate the existing 
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discourses and practices through which the current hegemony is established and 
reproduced’.133 Here Mouffe asserts the need for an ‘agonistic’ politics rooted in antagonism, 
and positions herself against Hannah Arendt’s conception of agonism.134 She posits the need 
for conflict between different positions within a ‘radical democratic politics’ and frames the 
struggle in terms which contrast those underpinning the classic theories of spectatorship:  
 
It is also important not to envisage this struggle as the displacement of supposedly false 
consciousnesses that would reveal the true reality.135  
 
She describes this perspective as being at odds with the theory of hegemony ‘which rejects the 
very idea of a “true consciousness,” and asserts that identities are always the process of 
identification’.136 She suggests it is ‘through insertion in a manifold of practices, discourses and 
language games that specific forms of individualities are constructed’.137 For Mouffe this 
necessarily calls for the ‘transformation of political identities’ through ‘insertion in practices 
that will mobilize its affects towards the disarticulation of the framework in which the process 
of identification is taking place’.138 She suggests that, ‘cultural and artistic practices could play 
an important role in the agonistic struggle because they are a privileged terrain for the 
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construction of new subjectivities.’139 For instance, in a 2007 text, Mouffe considers the 
‘possible forms of critical art’ which could ‘question the dominant hegemony’.140 Saying that 
the objective of the ‘agonistic approach’ is to ‘unveil all that is repressed by the dominant 
consensus’ she asserts that critical art is art that foments dissensus, that makes visible what 
the dominant consensus tends to obscure and obliterate’.141 Her use of dissensus, which 
interestingly accords with Rancière’s use of the same term in his political analysis, again 
suggests the need for breaks in the apparently seamless state of culture.142 
 
Mouffe’s approach engages with the ways in which people view or relate to culture, which for 
her are primarily rooted in identification. This refers what is political about viewing to its 
content. It also emphasises the relationship between a person and what they view, and 
suggests that a proxy relationship between people exists here. Such a relationship may, if 
viewed in combination with Gramsci’s perspective on culture, be reciprocal by affording the 
person agency in relation to culture. Further, Mouffe’s use of Post-Structuralist theories, and 
application of them to the notion of hegemony, has important accords with recent 
psychological and linguistic developments which frame culture in a way that is less 
‘dominating’ of its viewers. Here, Mouffe emphasises the process of socialisation in capitalism 
via culture, in a way which situates culture within the realm of the psychological; the 
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production of identities and ‘selves’. Mouffe’s analysis, in both emphasising individual 
subjectivities and political antagonism, also seems to provide a more open conception of the 
agent. 
 
Yet Mouffe departs from Gramsci’s formulation of hegemony in important ways. She actually 
seems to afford less agency to the working class, by emphasising the ‘effect’ of culture on 
people, rather than speaking of the ‘struggle’ that Gramsci saw occurring within culture. 
Mouffe also seems to avoid Gramsci’s suggestion that the working class is involved in 
representing its own interests by calling for the production of new subjectivities. She seems to 
extend the ‘naturalising’ state of culture beyond Gramsci’s more positive formulation of 
‘common sense’. It is also possible that Mouffe’s Post-Structuralism overdetermines the 
impact of culture on people, rather than emphasising their agency in relation to it. Here 
Gramsci’s framing of culture as a context for struggle may provide a more fruitful perspective, 
one which can emphasise the ‘creative’ acts of the working class, alongside any by cultural 
practitioners. Yet, taking Gramsci’s and Mouffe’s positions together, it is possible to unite a 
greater sense of ‘agency’ and struggle in the working person as regards culture, with a greater 
focus on the social and psychological realm, one for which the relevance of ‘antagonism’ may 
return. This has the capacity to locate the direct relationship between viewers and the people 
they view as central to struggles in culture. 
 
Yet, it is possible to extend the formulations of Gramsci, and Mouffe by using the work of 
Hannah Arendt – namely her position on ‘agonism’ - which was dismissed by Mouffe. Arendt, 
speaking of politics in Ancient Greek society, describes a ‘concept of action’ that ‘stresses the 
urge towards self-disclosure at the expense of all other factors’. She goes on to describe how 
this: 
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became the prototype of action for Greek antiquity and influenced, in the form of the so-called 
agonal spirit, the passionate drive to show one’s self in measuring up against others that 
underlies the concept of politics prevalent in the city-states.143 
 
Here, Arendt describes a historical context for agency defined by a space of interaction, one 
based in a person’s capacity to speak and act in the presence of others. Arendt argues that in 
industrial societies such a ‘space’ of political action has been eclipsed, where ‘men show 
themselves only in the privacy of their families or the intimacy of their friends,’144 and, like 
Marx, suggests that this cultural situation is tied to the present socio-economic system. Yet it is 
possible to link her framing of the ‘ideal’ Greek agency to the way viewers engage with culture 
today. Arendt describes the organisation of the polis as enabling certain kinds of visibility for a 
person in the political realm where: 
 
the organisation of the polis…assures the mortal actor that his passing existence and fleeting 
greatness will never lack the reality that comes from being seen, being heard, and, generally, 
appearing before an audience of fellow men….According to this self-interpretation, the political 
realm rises directly out of acting together, the ‘sharing of words and deeds’. Thus action not 
only has the most intimate relationship to the public part of the world common to us all, but is 
the one activity which constitutes it.145   
 
Importantly, Arendt suggests that being seen, heard, and appearing before others is 
fundamental to the political space of the polis. She defines this as a ‘space of appearance’ 
something that, ‘to be deprived of it means to be deprived of reality, which, humanly and 
politically speaking, is the same as appearance.’146 While Mouffe emphasises the more 
consensual aspects of Arendt’s politics in her critique, it is useful to discuss Arendt’s framing of 
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a social and relational ‘space’ of politics in Greek antiquity.147 This political agency is one that 
happens ‘between’ people - people who are, for Aristotle, ‘different and unequal’.148 Rather 
than antagonism, Arendt suggests that a particular space in which agency can be supported is 
needed. 
 
By relating Arendt’s thinking to Mouffe’s emphasis on the role of culture in socialising people, 
it is possible to extend the ‘effect’ of culture on people, at the level of ‘identification’, to a 
more relational context, one that ‘feels’ social, but ultimately is not. If, as for Gramsci, culture 
is a site of struggle, experiences of culture may approximate some of the terms of Arendt’s 
political ‘space of appearance’, by enabling a person to ‘feel’ seen by, or to see, others who are 
‘acting and performing’. This would position the present form of culture as an imbalance 
towards the actor and performer. Albeit that the viewer may relate to actors in a political 
space, represented by visual culture, and thereby ‘feel’ seen by the characters to whom they 
relate. Taking this further, the ‘performance’ of people on video sharing channels and social 
media seems to affirm Arendt’s formulation of the importance of being ‘seen’ by others. Here 
the digital space of sharing and showing becomes an alternative to a physical, public ‘space of 
appearance’ as defined by Arendt. The inequality that Aristotle felt marked the political space 
could be used to define what is fundamentally different about the image – perhaps the 
‘incommensurability’ that Bishop describes - and what is, again, necessarily different here for 
the person viewing it. Yet, rather than enabling direct, political communication between 
different people, with different concerns, this inequality might provide a context for the use of 
imagery to approximate ‘feelings’ of agency, as well as to ‘experience’ others who are in a 
different position to us. Just as for Arendt, one’s achievement in politics may be marked by 
comparison with those witnessing one’s speech and acts, viewers may also ‘use’ the disparity 
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between them and the people they view in the image, to produce felt impressions that 
manifest as proxy experiences of agency.149 
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Conclusion 
 
Arendt’s analysis holds great potential, in combination with the positions of Gramsci, Rancière, 
Mouffe and Bishop for a reframing of the politics of spectatorship, one that affords the viewer 
a different position in relation to culture that can be conceived more productively at the level 
of agency. The viewer may seek a form of relating, via the image, that approximates agency, be 
that ‘antagonistic’ or more so ‘agonistic’. Her viewing may represent a struggle to experience a 
reality through the image that provides or approximates feelings of power or political agency. 
Rather than a one-way form of identification alone, the approximation of ‘the social’ in 
viewers’ interactions with the image suggests, rather than the waning of the social, or 
‘alienation’, an affirmation of viewers’ continuing need for it, for other people. Also, while the 
classic critiques of spectatorship emphasise the production of critical thinking and activity in its 
viewers or participants, the nature of the political context of speech and action in Arendt’s 
terms, and also the ‘filtering of affects through the digital’ in Bishop’s, may suggest the 
existence of a deeper, more social relationship to images. Here viewers’ viewing may accord 
with what they need to feel politically, as members of society.  The status and usage of the 
image becomes, as Rancière suggests, inherently linked to desired political outcomes. 
 
In my work, I aim to critically address the disparity which may be found between the realities 
of lived experience in capitalist cultures and their alternate as visual depictions in culture. 
While in effect these two situations do, as Bishop suggests, appear ‘incommensurable’ - where 
the visual depiction of life is set against what is banal about existence - the banal seems to 
provide the ideal context for the functioning of the image in capitalist culture. It suggests that 
the greater the apparent disparity, the larger the role and need for visual culture, particularly if 
it provides a more entertaining, emotive, or engaging reality, for that period of time. It might 
be that, consciously or subconsciously, visual culture acts as a direct corollary to what is least 
desirable about contemporary life. That is, we may view images as a response, or alternative 
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to, what we actually see, feel and experience in daily life. Rather than positing the realm of 
political agency firmly in the ‘real’ or the realisation of that real it rather suggests that the 
location of the precise function of such imagery for the person could be critical in terms of her 
own relationship to the desire, if not the will, to pursue an alternate reality. This means that 
the interstice of the viewer’s position in her lived reality, and choice of culture is fundamental. 
Yet, given the various possible ways of, and reasons for engaging with, culture this cannot be 
treated prescriptively by producing artworks with a view to instigating human political agency 
in a unified way. Rather it sets the scene for a direct treatment of visual culture in the 
realisation of artworks that address the specific politics of the image, as they relate to the 
social basis of agency. Such artworks may use the relationship between what is common to the 
image in capitalism, and its corollary in life, to create suggestive alternatives originating 
between the image and existence. 
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Chapter Two: Affect, Inequality and the Image 
  
Introduction 
 
In my first section I sought to extend, and depart from, the classic arguments concerning 
spectatorship which have had such an impact on contemporary art practice. By loosening the 
strong association between such theories and the notion of a person in capitalism as 
‘mystified’, I used the work of Rancière, Bishop, Gramsci, Mouffe and Arendt to formulate an 
alternate politics of spectatorship. This is based on both an acknowledgement that people can 
see the reality of their existence in capitalism, and are hence potentially able to change it, and 
that they are engaged in a ‘struggle’ with culture. This struggle can be positioned within a 
range of possible experiences that the viewer might seek from the image - as emphasised by 
Claire Bishop. My conclusions indicate that the relationship between affect, emotion and 
agency may be strong.  
 
In this section, I develop these arguments in order to answer the thesis title of Politicising 
Agency through Affect. I begin by exploring findings in psychology and neuroscience that show 
how uses of visual media may enable viewers to avoid or manage their emotions, also to use 
experiences of others through images to do so. Then, so as to affirm the political implications 
of the ‘social’ effect of viewing others on screens, I return to Debord’s position on ‘the 
spectacle’, reframing this by taking the ‘social relationship’ he speaks of, literally. Following 
this, I base an affective relationship with images that is social, on the inequality between life 
and image that seems productive for the viewer. I connect the centrality of affect to the 
viewing of other people in images, to the basis of affect in the production of ‘the self’. 
Returning to Bishop, her ‘intimacy and distance’ become two extremes of a continuum of 
possible means of relating to others via images. Where we may be able to hegemonically 
occupy a more favourable position via the image, or where we can feel empowered through 
 82 
our lack of empathy for a protagonist, our feeling of gaining in social position is palpable. 
Viewers’ use of their affective relationship to other people in the image, suggests that affect 
politicises agency, but also that it is the basis of our exploration of agency via the image, and 
may also be in life. This underscores the ‘rise’ of images in our culture and frames a context 
that my own artwork productively explores. I then return to discuss my moving image work 
Group Photo, concluding that it both self-consciously occupies and thematizes the debates I 
am setting out here.  
 
 83 
Affect, Emotion and the Way Viewers Use Images 
 
The movement of actors dominates Group Photo. From actors’ tentative stillness in the work, 
to their highly choreographed gestures and interactions, and also their increasingly open 
and collaborative interactions, actors’ bodies are the content that addresses viewers. The 
affective and emotional power of images is rooted in our capacity to relate to other people 
through them.  In Group Photo, the actors’ movements may inspire affective feelings and 
responses in its viewers. The significant change in the actors’ ‘states’ in the work is 
fundamental to this effect, where what is felt by a viewer may differ from monitor to monitor. 
The potential this group might have in life is linked to the affects they may inspire in the 
work, as well as their capacity to transform their roles dramatically here. This work suggests 
that what a viewer feels in relation to moving images is tied to the ways in which an actors’ 
position or situation changes. Change is a common aspect of narrative moving image – 
where actors’ states, situations and positions change from start to finish. Yet, in Group Photo 
this trope is turned to a more suggestive use: the actors occupy fixed stereotypical poses, and 
then undertake actions and interactions that - while still limited – appear to show more 
‘agency’. After this they act more freely while, aside from the positive implications of this 
freer state, their actions still suggest choreography. The feelings that these actors may 
inspire in viewers, the emotional and affective responses to a work that may unnerve as well 
as prompt empathy, are all choreographed in a way that suggests that what we ‘see’ or ‘think 
of’ as agency is also limited. Agency is suggested as being based in affect, in a way that 
becomes jarring next to the work’s choreography. This implies that agency must be 
constituted on people’s own terms, terms that are liberatory, in order to function.  
 
The notion that visual culture may provide a set of deeper functions for viewers is supported 
by recent research in psychology, psychoanalysis and neuroscience. Some research emphasises 
viewers’ potential to view visual culture, read books and listen to music, in order to manage 
feelings and thoughts in daily life. Other research shows how empathy, bodily feelings and 
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affects conveyed via screen media, may be experienced by a viewer. This means that feelings 
experienced between people in life are akin to the effects achieved through screens, in a way 
that seems to frame a literally ‘social’ effect of the media. Given that, as Bishop suggests, 
images also support an ability to distance ourselves from others, this indicates that viewers 
may seek a range of effects via visual media, effects supported by the culture they ‘choose’.   
On the uses of culture to manage feeling, Lisa Butler, while Researcher in Psychology at 
Stanford University, published a 2004 editorial piece, in which she introduced a number of 
recent studies on ‘Dissociation in Culture’.150 A clinical psychological definition of dissociation 
as a disorder describes it as ‘partial or total disconnection between memories of the past, 
awareness of identity and of immediate sensations, and control of bodily movements, often 
resulting from traumatic experiences, intolerable problems, or disturbed relationships’.151  Yet 
in her research, Butler described dissociation at an ‘everyday’ level.152 She defines this as 
operating in a ‘non-pathological’ way, describing it as a tool we use in daily life, to manage 
feeling. Saying how most commentators place special emphasis on the ‘defensive’ role of 
dissociation, in ‘protecting the individual from overwhelming experience’ she went on to say 
that, ‘those with the capacity to dissociate can evade awareness of aversive perceptual, 
emotional or behaviour inputs; past experiences (memories); present meanings, associations, 
and preoccupations and the burdens of volition.’153  Butler frames dissociation within viewers’ 
uses of culture in contemporary life by tentatively proposing three functions of everyday 
dissociation. One of these, dissociation as escape, relates directly to visual culture. She 
describes it as ‘actively sought experiences that fill up conscious awareness, thereby 
temporarily supplanting personal concerns or preoccupations or dissociating them to the 
periphery of awareness’.154 Examples of dissociation as a means of escape are described as 
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listening to music, watching films or reading a book.155 This situates interactions with culture 
within a person’s management of their own thoughts and feelings. 
 
Yet, while the ‘filling of conscious awareness’ involves a detachment from personal feelings 
and concerns, it is based in a process of loading attention with other stimuli. This may also be 
rooted in the uses of feeling, to displace existing feelings that are less desirable. Recent 
findings in neurology and cinema have particular implications for this. The discovery of ‘mirror 
neurons’ by neurologists has led researchers in cinema to delineate the emotional and bodily 
affective properties of film as part of ‘embodied simulation.’156 In this, film’s affective 
properties are rooted in our capacity to feel, in our bodies, what emotions or states actors 
occupy, but also to mirror in the ‘preactivation of motor structures’ the actual state that 
another body is in.157 It means that when we watch a person performing an activity, our bodies 
become prepared for, or actually begin the kind of motor action which would occur were we 
doing it ourselves.158 This is defined as an adaptive tool for ‘knowing the body states of others, 
which are expressions of their mental states’.159 Ultimately, human capacities for empathy, 
adaptive means we have for learning about other bodies socially, become central aspects of 
our ability to have powerful experiences by watching human action on screens. The uses of 
media to fill awareness - but also to engage emotionally or affectively with a real or fictional 
person’s reality - enable us to be distant from our own concerns, while able to feel another’s 
situation.  
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These findings position our relationship to visual media within a continuum of feeling and 
engagement that provides a particular personal function for us. They suggest that the 
consumption of media enables us to manage our feelings in such a way that situates our 
choices of visual culture to view very much within our present lived circumstances. As many 
commentators have set out the context for mental stress in contemporary capitalist societies, 
such stress may provide the ideal context for the ascent and dominance of the image.160 
Where the argument in favour of a person’s mystification in capitalism suggests people 
experience capitalist life as ‘natural’, the evidence for mental illness in this culture indicates 
otherwise. It suggests that people experience stress that they may find various normalised 
ways to manage, such as watching visual media. This means that, a stressful condition of 
labour can be ameliorated by the affective and emotional provisions of the image. As people’s 
need for the image - their usage of it - will vary and can be satisfied in different ways – it is 
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impossible to determine a generalised means of ‘affecting’ all viewers.161 Where people seek 
particular subjects, objects and outcomes through images they become, rather than 
dominated by culture, able to determine their own experience and feelings in relation to it. 
Culture may enable a person to temporarily realise her desire to become someone else or 
occupy a reality other than her own and, given the democratised access to culture in the West 
today, choose exactly who, what, or how. This means visual media frames a critical 
relationship between, on the one hand, the lived and felt experience of a person in capitalism, 
and on the other, the effects they might seek from the culture they view. It also affords 
viewers agency and control over their feelings and over culture. This emphasises what viewers 
take from their viewing, as much as, if not more than, its ‘effect’ on them.162  
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The Viewer and Viewed Protagonist: A Social Relationship 
 
In Group Photo inequalities between the lives of viewers in capitalism and the situation of 
people they view in images are addressed. The reality of the viewer and the context of the 
image are conflated, producing visible disparities and contrasting methods that are used to 
disrupt what is familiar about each. The politicised relation between viewer and viewed 
protagonist is both suggested, and to an extent resolved in this work: the viewer is presented 
with protagonists who may be ‘like them’ who ‘become’ in the image. This means that the 
viewer’s proxy ‘becoming’ within a different reality is undertaken by someone like them. But 
other ‘inequalities’ exist too, namely between the camera methods used, colouring of the 
images and their contents. These visual aesthetics are extensions of the idealised framing of 
convivial relationships in advertising, and the formal recording of achievement by groups in 
official photographs. Where the bright light of advertising frames convivial relationships, it 
reaches its extreme as the warmth of cinematic romance. Similarly, the cold daylight that 
frames the formal photographs of groups becomes the blue light of cinematic distanciation. 
Yet the associations I make when writing the work can also be reversed: the urge to seek an 
ideal relationship or situation in the image may become the corollary of the display of bodies 
in a context of achievement, while the scrutiny of others in images can be linked to the desire 
to ‘become’ in the limited sense of aspiration and consumption. Here, high resolution images 
may become a sign of ‘quality’ that the actors themselves, deliberately, fail to meet.  Where 
actors show ‘mistakes’ in the first part of the work (the ‘wrong’ gesture, a stain on a trouser 
leg, food between an actor’s teeth) they show that just when the group might be at their most 
presentable, they fail to be - their appearance serving as a rebellion against the high 
definition camera that expects perfection. In this work high definition moving image becomes 
the ideal medium for an exploration of inequality, as it expects quality, and it sees everything. 
Group Photo uses what is most unsettling about the perfection of the image to explore the 
political implications of a conflation of the life of the viewer in capitalism and the alternative 
reality viewers seek in images. 
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For Guy Debord, the basis of the politicised relationship between viewer and image is the 
general disparity between the realities of life in capitalism and the ‘reality’ found in the image; 
one so extreme that he situated ‘the spectacle’ of cultural production as opposed to ‘the 
banal’ and ‘boring’ reality in capitalism. While Debord can be said to have generalised the 
banal and the effects of ‘the spectacle’, he defined a gap between the reality of living in 
capitalism and the way capitalist concerns are represented to people living in that culture. This 
disparity is fruitful for building a picture of how the difference between life and image, in 
capitalism, is so important to the image’s function for viewers. 
 
The framing of ‘the spectacle’ in Debord’s terms is at risk of fixing the disparity between a 
banal, uninteresting reality and a visually exciting one. This may support a more dramatic 
separation between life and visual culture - and description of that separation - than exists. 
Yet, this problem can be addressed by using the terms of ‘the spectacle’ to produce a different 
analysis of the image. A Debordian framing of visual culture can be seen in Fredric Jameson’s 
influential assessment of Postmodern ‘Late Capitalist’ culture where, ‘the underside of culture 
is blood, torture, death, and terror’.163 Jameson’s framing of an unreal culture is marked out by 
an emphasis on ‘surface’ which he illustrates using a schizophrenic girl’s experiences of 
‘illimitable vastness, brilliant light, and the gloss and smoothness of material things’.164 Aside 
from the drama of this description, it is notable that while Jameson emphasises the ‘surface’ of 
visual culture, the ‘reality’, or underside of culture, is characterised by events that happen to 
people; the visceral qualities of blood, the pain of torture. This reverses the perspective of 
Thomas Hirschhorn’s earlier mentioned contemporary artwork which emphasised the viewer’s 
ability to lazily consume the violent deaths of people via an image. Such a comparison between 
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Jameson and Hirschhorn’s perspectives highlights the centrality of human protagonists to the 
content of images; it further suggests that a direct ‘social relationship’ exists between viewer 
and protagonist, one defined by inequality. 
 
Debord’s analysis situates capital, and the inequalities it represents, as accumulated as image: 
he frames the ‘social relationship’ with images on this basis. Yet, his approach serves to 
occlude the inequality between the reality of the viewer in capitalism and that of the people 
they view. Albeit that his separation of the ‘banal’ from ‘the spectacle’ suggests what the 
nature of this inequality might be. Where the image form is broadly thought to represent the 
interests of capital, the root of the disparity between viewer and viewed person becomes the 
extent to which the viewer’s life does not correlate with the manifestation of those interests 
represented in the image.165 This produces a disjuncture between visual representations of life 
in capitalism and lives actually lived in that economy. Where, for Debord, the spectacle is 
ultimately ‘a social relationship between people that is mediated by images,’ this can be 
addressed literally.166 The inequality between viewer and viewed person can be treated as a 
‘concrete’ disparity between what is experienced in life and what is seen and felt via the 
image.167 In Debord’s terms, this suggests a social relationship between viewer and viewed 
protagonist which, in capitalism, is underscored by inequality.  
 
Such a social relationship between viewers, and the visual culture they view, links the viewer’s 
‘choice’ of visual material to the nature of the difference that the image contains. Given the 
direct emotional, affective, thought, and also attentional and perceptual effects that it is 
possible for a viewer to experience via the image, this ‘difference’ can be contextualised by the 
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relational effects of each image, on each viewer. Where the ‘social’ relationship with the image 
is inherently unequal, something of this disparity must be productive for the viewer, in her 
viewing experience. For instance, the sociality between viewer and viewed protagonist enables 
a viewer to experience the other person’s emotions and bodily states through a screen, in a 
moving image. Such images also support the ‘displacement’ and management of feelings and 
bodily states through the viewing of cultural material - and ‘use’ of protagonists to ‘determine’ 
feeling. This range of effects shows the breadth of possible means of a viewer relating to the 
image. Yet, it also refers us back to the lived situation of the viewer as the basis of her viewing. 
Here, the ‘evasive’ and acknowledged ‘escapist’ qualities of visual media may be read as 
providing more concrete alternatives to the observable lived, felt, reality in the present 
moment.168 This indicates that the image provides something that cannot be achieved in life. It 
also suggests that critiques of ‘escapism’, if read in terms of Lisa Butler’s framing of 
‘dissociative experience as escape,’ can be contextualised by viewers’ wish to, at least 
temporarily, experience something different to their present reality.169 This sets out both a 
direct context for the viewers’ desire for change within capitalism, and their exploration of 
agency through images. 
 
Where images have the potential to be highly ‘affective’ for a viewer, an important distinction 
opens up: between the literal ‘alternative’ visualised in the image and how the viewer’s 
affective transformation by that image can be contextualised by her lived reality in capitalism. 
For instance, Laura Mulvey spoke of how, in cinema, ‘the character in the story can make 
things happen and control events better than the subject/spectator’; hence by identifying with 
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them, the spectator can experience ‘control’ via the protagonist viewed.170 This means that 
viewers’ use of images to ‘ameliorate’, ‘manage’ and improve the real can be treated with 
empathy. Such an empathy with the viewer’s position allows her politicised relationship to the 
images she consumes to be addressed directly. This initiates a possible frame for dialogue 
about the ‘use’ and significance of images in people’s lives, in directly politicised terms. 
 
Analysis using contemporary therapeutic currents in Attachment Theory and Family Therapy 
has the potential to enable a more direct way of relating to the viewer and viewed protagonist 
in an image.171 It is possible to explore this speculatively here, in order to focus on what a 
viewer’s ‘need’ for the image might be based on. Parallels can be drawn between the ideal 
mode of relating in Attachment Therapy and Family Therapy which might be summed up 
simply as ‘being listened to and taken seriously’, and the relationship between viewers and 
viewed protagonists in moving images.172 I apply this to the proxy ‘dialogue’ between viewer 
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and viewed as an intended disruption and rejection of the dominant use of Freudian and 
Lacanian theories in the analysis of visual culture, which tend to reproduce metaphors for 
separation.173 While affirming Freud’s and Lacan’s emphasis on language in the production of 
identity, Attachment Theorists have emphasised the role of attachment - that is affectional 
bonds between carer and child - in the production of ‘the self’.174 This links language, dialogue 
and communication to affect. Indeed, Gregory Bateson said, in a ‘metalogue’ with his 
daughter:  
  
we have to start all over again from the beginning and assume that language is first and fore-
most a system of gestures. Animals after all have only gestures and tones of voice—and words 
were invented later.175 
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What is ‘affective’ about the movement of bodies relates to the emphasis placed on gesture by 
Bateson and R. D. Laing in their work with schizophrenic patients and their families. Both 
recognised the important interrelationship of gestures, spoken language and facial expressions 
for the child’s mental health. For Bateson and Laing, confusion here had the potential to 
disrupt the development of ‘the self’; the child’s ‘attachment’ to her carer being an important 
factor underscoring this outcome.176 Further, in Attachment Therapy, separations from 
important carers, with whom affectional bonds were present, had the potential to produce 
‘insecurity’ and, at worst, ‘disturbed attachment’ in later life.177  
 
The basis of affect and language in the body becomes important for the relationship between 
viewers and the protagonists they view in images. Where the viewer is able to ‘mirror’ the 
body state of another person in an image - to experience changes in her mental and physical 
state in response to watching another person’s actions, movements and gestures - affectional 
relationships with images gain a wider context. This is relevant to Laura Mulvey’s emphasis on 
Lacan’s ‘Mirror Stage’; the viewer’s search for an ‘ego-ideal’ in the protagonist viewed.178 As 
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life where our relationships there, such as with potential partners, tend to follow the same patterns (i.e. avoidant, 
ambivalent, etc), although the patterns may differ depending on the context. Lavinia Gomez, An Introduction to 
Object Relations, (London: Free Association Books, 1997; repr. 1998), p. 161. Dorothy Heard, Brian Lake and Una 
McCluskey, Attachment Therapy with Adolescents and Adults, (London: Karnac Books, 2009), pp. 76-77.   
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 See note 68 on Lacan. Mulvey states that, ‘Important for this article is the fact that it is an image that constitutes 
the matrix of the imaginary, of recognition/misrecognition and identification, and hence of the first articulation of 
the 'I' of subjectivity’. This is a moment when an older fascination with looking (at the mother's face, for an obvious 
example) collides with the initial inklings of self-awareness.’ This latter point emphasises the impact of the parent, 
and the ‘image’, on the child’s development of ‘self’. Yet it is possible to balance this with John Berger’s description 
of ‘the reciprocal nature of vision’, which he regarded as more fundamental than that of spoken dialogue.’ This 
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the mirror stage applies to the child seeing her own image in the parent’s face (not only the 
mirror), the loving or affectional aspect of this relation can be emphasised. This signifies how 
the carer’s look communicates her affection for the child, in the terms of Attachment 
Theory.179 For instance, Parveen Adams describes (in respect of the artwork as ‘ego-ideal’ of 
the viewer):  
 
This ego ideal is necessarily involved in narcissism because the ego ideal is the point from 
which the subject feels himself to be satisfactory and loved.180 
 
 
Rather than narcissism, it is possible to emphasise the importance of feeling ‘loved’ for the 
child; of the child’s search for a loving gaze from her parent. Where the artwork or image looks 
on the viewer from a position of love, the image itself, via its maker, or the identified with 
actor, may become a proxy for the kind of ‘look’ that we would like to receive from a parent. In 
cinema or television, the confident pose of an actor, and her open display of emotions, might 
enable the protagonist to become the ideal person with whom we would most want to 
interact. The actor may appear to show us the love that we seek in life, albeit that the actor 
actually directs this ‘emotion’ towards his co-star in the film.181 This suggests an experience 
                                                                                                                                               
enables a shift to the importance of the dialogic nature of interactions with carers to the development of ‘self’. 
Further, Laura Mulvey’s discussion of sadism and masochism in viewing are described, in Attachment Therapy, as 
‘ego states’ based in ambivalent attachment. This suggests an association between attachment and the positions of 
the viewer that Mulvey describes. Mulvey, p. 18; John Berger, p. 9; Ruth A. Blizard, ‘Masochistic and Sadistic Ego 
States’, Journal of Trauma and Dissociation, 2: 4 (2001), pp. 37-58. 
179
 For Bowlby and his adherents the loving look from the parent (attachment figure) confers confidence in the 
child, supporting the development of her secure sense of ‘self’. Where such a look is not present, or not meant, a 
context for insecurity is said to be provided. Relatedly, the baby’s smile is said to act as a ‘social releaser’, that ‘the 
function of the baby’s smile is that of increasing interaction between mother and baby and maintaining them in 
proximity to one another,’ (also see note 172). John Bowlby, Attachment and Loss: Attachment, I, pp. 280. 
180
 Parveen Adams, ‘The Art of Analysis: Mary Kelly’s Interim and the Discourse of the Analyst’, in The Emptiness of 
the Image, (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 77. Mary Kelly’s Interim is said to disrupt this expectation by providing, for 
instance, a reaction in Slavoj Zizek more akin to horror. Adams, p. 86.  
181
 This is supported by the shot-reverse-shot camera technique used in cinema and cinematic-style television 
series. Where George Bataille described the ‘Cruelty of Art’ this might rather be the ‘Cruelty of the Image.’ Bataille 
spoke of the artwork’s role as always being to please, meaning that the most ‘terrifying painting is there to attract 
visitors.’ He also spoke of the ‘double-bind’ from which, ‘the very meaning of art emerges – for art, which puts us on 
the path of complete destruction…offers us ravishment without death.’ Here, the pleasure afforded by art enables 
our ‘disordering the order that suffocates us’. The association between ‘pleasure’ and the image in Mulvey, accords 
with Bataille’s perspective, where her focus is on sadism and Bataille’s is on ‘cruelty’. Yet it is possible to pose this 
‘pleasure’ more simply, at the level of the relationship sought by viewers with others. For instance, in cinema, the 
attraction to the actor, the feeling of being her opposite in the film - that she is speaking to us - becomes rather 
than a relationship necessarily underscored by the cruelty of the viewer, one that may accord more so with Lauren 
Berlant’s notion of ‘cruel optimism’. For Berlant ‘all attachments are optimistic’ and relatedly, ‘cruel optimism is the 
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with images that in some way accords with ‘attachment,’ one which may underscore the 
affective ‘pleasure’ of relating to the image. This may be further underscored by the overuse of 
visual media by an ‘insecure’ self; with this insecurity being said to have a particular relation to 
capitalist life.  
 
The significance of an ‘insecure’ viewer relates to the framing, in Attachment Therapy, of two 
different states of ‘the self’: one when in dialogue with others, and another when experiencing 
one’s own mental state, for instance when alone.182 Therapists have noted the increased 
presence of negative internal dialogues in ‘insecurely attached’ people, especially when 
alone.183 Uses of digital media and visual and aural culture have been described as enabling 
insecure people to manage their thoughts and feelings.184 This links insecurity in adults and 
                                                                                                                                               
condition of maintaining an attachment to a problematic object in advance of its loss.’ This could position optimistic 
attachments as a key factor in viewers’ choices of images to view. The ‘star system’ in Mulvey remains: we feel we 
know the people we have watched, to have experienced intimacy with them, yet we do not know them. Where 
feelings of relating, or being related to, are sought, we may go to the image to ‘feel like’ this is happening, then turn 
from the image, computer, leave the cinema and find ourselves alone or in a less ideal relationship or situation. In 
this, the image is an inadequate alternative to life, albeit, in its popularity is capable of making up for what a 
person’s experience in life lacks, with other feelings, sights, experiences. Here pathos, loss, inadequacy may 
underscore our relationship to the image. This further reinforces the relevance of attachment to the image as ‘loss’ 
has such an impact on the growing ‘self’, presenting a strong likelihood of insecurity. In addition, just as the child 
needs care and affection, she needs ‘a secure base’ in Bowlby’s terms, that is enough space so that they can play, 
explore interests freely, while knowing the carer is available, visible. Such a ‘secure base’ could be provided by the 
image where, through strategic identifications we may stabilise the self. This reaffirms Bishop’s closeness and 
distance, as regards the image, and shows its strong connection to the needs of a child for closeness, and distance 
(albeit within a context of empathy) and what the image may provide. This is something I will go onto discuss here 
further. George Bataille, ‘The Cruel Practice of Art’, originally published in Medecine de France (June 1949) 
<supervert.com/elibrary/georges_bataille/cruel-practice_of_art> [accessed: 27 June 2014]; James, Affluenza, p. 
427; Berlant, p. 93-94.  
182
 Dorothy Heard, Brian Lake and Una McCluskey, contemporary adherents of Attachment Therapy, describe the 
‘internal’ and ‘external’ environment of the person. They define the ‘internal environment’ as ‘the self’ in a state of 
‘subjectivity’, how the person experiences her own subjectivity, and the ‘external environment’ is defined as a 
person who is ‘interacting with other people and making a life through planning forthcoming events with them.’ The 
influence of a ‘secure’ or ‘insecure’ state of the self on these ‘environments’ is said to be significant: for instance, 
‘insecure selves suffer waves of loneliness and emptiness, which is usually coped with by the use of defensive 
strategies. So long as the strategies work, all may seem well.’ Dorothy Heard, Brian Lake and Una McCluskey, p. 45, 
51.   
183
 This has accords with the Freudian ‘Super-Ego’, which is one of the ‘agencies of the personality’ acting as ‘judge 
or censor’; which for Bowlby marks the ‘rules for appraising action, thought and feeling…overlearned during 
childhood and adolescence’ which as a result ‘come to be applied automatically and outside awareness.’ Laplanche, 
J., Pontalis, J.B. p. 387; Bowlby, Attachment and Loss: Loss, 3 vols (London: Random House, 1998; 1980), III, p. 55. 
184
 Insecure attachment may involve avoiding ‘information whose recognition evokes dread’ (fear being a significant 
outcome of ‘insecure attachment’ as a result of inadequate ‘caregiving’) by a range of means that ‘give care or 
comfort to the self’, such as food, or drugs, but also, ‘for the person to become immersed in some activity that 
claims attention’ whereby ‘attention is diverted on to a subject of absorbing interest and the distress of the dreaded 
event is temporarily put out of mind.’ Differently, Oliver James describes young people’s attachments to celebrities 
as ‘a form of virtual relationship, of second-hand living, a fantasy relationship with a stranger.’ He adds that ‘people 
with such attachments to celebrities are also prone to emotional distress’ and continues, ‘adolescents with weak 
attachment to parents, or who are exceptionally reliant on peers for their sense of status and well being, are at 
greater risk of being obsessive.’ Dorothy Heard, Brian Lake and Una McCluskey, pp. 66-67; James, p. 427-8.  
 97 
children to the pursuit of visual media. Oliver James cites 40% of children and 50% of people as 
being insecure, a point he bases on the disruption of early attachment relationships in 
capitalism.185 Where visual media may be used to ‘manage feeling’ here, the presence of 
insecurities or existing attachment issues seem to prefigure a greater reliance on such media. 
Also, if being alone with oneself and one’s thoughts is unbearable or uncomfortable, the 
experience of visual media can help to manage or displace these feelings. This contradicts 
Butler’s rather reserved assessment of the uses of visual media for ‘everyday dissociation’, and 
instead situates such media as a potentially important tool in managing capitalist life. This 
places the various uses of visual media in a deeply personal, psychological and hence political 
relation to the viewer’s, one rooted in social experience in capitalism.  
                                                 
185
 James, p. 345. Oliver James supports John Bowlby’s findings on the importance of strong early attachment 
relationships to a lack of ‘emotional distress’ or ‘insecurity’ in adulthood. He has linked insecurity in children and 
adults to the common practice of using childcare services in capitalist countries for children under four - for James 
the key period in a child’s life at which disruptions in attachment may be harmful. This positions the demands of 
labour as affecting the wellbeing of children in capitalism.  
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A Politicised Relation between Intimacy and Distance 
 
In Group Photo the shift between viewers being affectively drawn to an ideal situation in an 
image, is combined with their capacity to affectively withdraw from another person’s 
situation in an image. This means that the shift between warm and cool imagery – and the 
attendant shift in its content – is one that oscillates between two extremes: one in which we 
might want to ‘be’ the protagonist, and another in which we are happy not to be, but may be 
entertained by her situation. Both scenarios enable a viewer to feel power in relation to a 
protagonist, thus providing a context for agency, one through identification, affect and 
empathy, the other through the rejection of each. In this way, Group Photo stages and seeks 
to explore, as much as temporarily resolve, the viewer’s relationship to agency via the image. 
While the ideally desired reality and the least desirable reality are both present, they are 
choreographed to produce an ending that rejects both, one that seems more ideal in social or 
political terms. This change reflects the cinematic mode of transforming an actor’s state or 
situation, albeit at a speed that is beyond ‘natural’, which makes the changes self-conscious 
and visible. Group Photo is a work about the inequality between viewers and protagonists 
they view in images, and the agencies and alternatives we seek through those protagonists. 
Yet, while the unequal conditions of this relationship are reproduced and staged, a resolution 
is suggested by the responsive and playful interactions present in the work. These suggest 
that affect is fundamental to agency, and that the answer to social change may be found 
between the viewer and those they view in images. 
 
The importance of affect and ‘affectional bonds’ to the development of ‘the self’, and visual 
media’s role in supporting a more manageable experience of self, makes it possible to return 
to Claire Bishop’s analysis. She described the ‘troubling’ oscillation between ‘intimacy and 
distance’ experienced by the viewer of images.186 Yet ‘intimacy’ and ‘distance’ reflect exactly 
the problems of the child in the family: she needs to feel cared for as well as to have enough 
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 Bishop, ‘The Digital Divide’, 2012, (para 2 of 15).  
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mental and physical space in which to play and explore her interests safely. Here, the 
relationship of people to the images they view develops an interesting corollary to the 
affective balance needed by a child whose ‘self’ is developing.187 This defines viewers’ 
relationships to images as enabling them to ameliorate affectional issues and insecurities that 
lie at the heart of the capacity of the child to become an agent.188  
 
This means that intimacy and distance frame a political relation between viewer and image. 
Rather than being troubling, per se, I would like to explore this as a potentially productive 
relation, especially for politicised cultural work. Here, valences of ‘intimacy’ and ‘distance’ 
become two extremes of a broad continuum of relating between viewer and viewed 
protagonist in an image. These extremes underpin different means of a viewer seeking agency 
via the image. The first extreme is an experience of culture that supports the highest degree of 
identification-based, emotional and affective transference – one enabling a viewer to feel most 
like the protagonist viewed. The second is an experience of culture that supports the least 
emotional engagement - but which allows a viewer to feel power or control in relation to the 
viewed protagonist. I will now discuss each in turn. 
 
                                                 
187
 Just as Oliver James links insecurity in the young to a greater tendency to attach to stars, an emotionally 
neglected child may have a greater need for images. This suggests that the affective properties of the image can 
ameliorate what is lacking affectively in life. In this way, the capacity to engage with others and to support ‘the self’ 
can be linked to the pursuit of agency. Hence, agencies can be explored through the image: via viewers’ 
identification with apparently ‘active’ figures (like celebrities). Conversely, in a context of adequate emotional 
support, viewers’ own agencies would be nurtured in social life, enabling them to act more in accordance with their 
own interests. The political ramifications of this alignment of agency with the image seem clear. In a different way, 
Mulvey recently reversed her notable formula, whereby the woman in the cinematic image was the object of the 
male gaze, saying how, ‘the figure of the male star…emerges as an object of the spectator’s possession…Implicitly, 
as the female spectator is now able to manipulate and control the image, she can reverse the power relationship so 
central to cinema of 24 frames per second, in which the female spectator is amalgamated into the male look.’ This 
suggests a new ‘agency’ in relation to images, possessed as a result of the capacity of viewers to alter or rearrange 
their form and content. Yet, I would also suggest that this ‘possession’ of the male, as object, imaginary partner, or 
attachment figure, by the female viewer, was perhaps always possible, and a central part of the powerful affective 
impact of the cinematic image for the female viewer. Sassatelli, p. 141. 
188
 Laing, also Deleuze and Guattari have argued for the positive benefits of the loss of the ego as the route to 
liberation, if not political agency. Yet, Laing’s work with schizophrenic patients at Kingsley Hall, in which he 
encouraged them to delve deeper into their psychosis was notably unsuccessful. Where the experience of the 
schizophrenic is traumatic in a way that tends to close down social interaction and action, a ‘self’ that is produced 
through supportive and collaborative interactions with important others affirms the enabling of a person most 
capable of individual and collaborative agency.  
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The first extreme is one defined by relationships with culture that support the highest degree 
of affective transference via the image. In cinema, as opposed to theatre, the structural 
representation of scenes, so as to emphasise a viewer’s feeling of ‘being in’ or in relation to 
that scene, is notable for the intimacy it suggests. Mulvey emphasised the effect of this on a 
viewer by describing how ‘the function of film is to reproduce as accurately as possible the so-
called natural conditions of human perception’.189 Yet, she might also have extended this to 
the natural (or ideal) conditions of human relating, and thereby to feeling. In comparison to 
catharsis as a means of ‘managing emotions associated with a cause’, the actual complexity of 
emotional and affective transference is now known to reach far beyond this.190 Various 
affective and emotional interplays can take place between viewer and protagonist. In addition, 
cinema often seems to heighten feeling, rather than to reproduce naturalised feeling from life. 
This is supported by Leo Bersani and Ulysse Dutoit’s statement: 
 
And undoubtedly we owe part of our pleasure in going to the movies to the promise of a 
protected momentary intimacy (protected because all the presumed knowing of the other is 
on our side) with other persons massively and defencelessly exposed. So comforting is this 
expectation that in order to defeat it the film-maker must somehow traumatise perception.191  
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 Mulvey, p. 21. 
190
 Damasio has described, ‘our connection to others occurs not just by visual images, language, and logical 
inference but also via something deeper in our flesh: the actions with which we can portray the movements of 
others. We can perform four-way translations among (1) actual movement, (2) somatosensory representations of 
movement, (3) visual representations of movement, and (4) memory.’ Further Damasio distinguishes between 
emotions and how they feel in our bodies and says that emotions are triggered ‘by images of objects or events that 
are actually happening at the moment or that, having happened in the past, are now being recalled. The situation 
you are in makes a difference for the emotional apparatus. You may be actually inhabiting a scene of your life and 
responding to a musical performance or to the presence of a friend; or you may be alone and remembering a 
conversation that upset you the day before. Whether “live,” reconstructed from memory, or created from scratch in 
one’s imagination, the images initiate a chain of events. Signals from the processed images are made available to 
several regions of the brain. Some of those regions are involved in language, others in movement, others in 
manipulations that constitute reasoning. Activity in any of those regions leads to a variety of responses: words with 
which you can label a certain object; rapid evocations of other images that allow you to conclude something about 
an object; and so forth.’ Damasio, Self Comes to Mind, p. 83; 89.  
191
 Leo Bersani and Ulysse Dutoit, Forms of being: cinema, aesthetics, subjectivity (London: BFI, 2004), p. 8. This 
statement by Bersani and Dutoit also has interesting correlations with the position of power the viewer may adopt, 
particularly when watching others who are ‘exposed’ or ‘vulnerable’, in internet videos, for instance. A more 
disturbing corollary of Bersani and Dutoit’s statement would be Mulvey’s ‘At first glance, the cinema would seem to 
be remote from the undercover world of the surreptitious observation of an unknowing and unwilling victim.’ Her 
comment suggests accords between cinema and the contemporary ‘reality show’. Laura Mulvey, ‘Visual Pleasure 
and Narrative Cinema’, p. 17  
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Here, the ‘intimacy’ experienced by the viewer is ‘protected’. That is, she is safe to manage 
feeling through culture, as well as experience feeling at its most powerful.192 This safety can 
also be contextualised by what John Bowlby described as the ‘secure base’ sought by a child 
with her parents, where emotional safety creates a context for the child’s action.193 This 
suggests that the actor’s ability to convey emotions accurately enables viewers to experience 
other people more directly - and importantly in a way that may even feel more honest and 
safe than perhaps it would in life.194 In such a circumstance, it is unsurprising that the ability of 
a viewer to feel like an actor is so powerful and potentially transformative. Viewers are able, in 
essence, to literally ‘become’ that person by affectively approximating her bodily and 
emotional state. Relatedly, screens in a therapeutic setting, are said not to lessen the ways 
that ‘affectional bonds’ might be affirmed between parent and child.195 This means that our 
experience of others through screens is as if we were communicating with them face-to-face, 
feeling their feelings for us, their attachment to us. It also means that the informality of an 
internet video need not limit the capacity for viewers to feel like protagonists. 
 
This capacity to feel what others feel through images has implications for the possibility of 
affectively occupying another’s position, from the perspective of a hegemonic struggle in 
culture. It has particular accords with what Laclau and Mouffe describe as the meaning of 
hegemony within Early Russian Social Democracy:  
                                                 
192
 It may be that there is more opportunity to feel deeply via images, than in life, where we may feel too exposed 
or vulnerable to do so. This reaffirms the ‘safety’ sought in attachment relationships as something we may seek 
through our relationships with others in images. 
193
 The matter of emotional ‘safety’ is interestingly mentioned by Roberta Sassatelli regarding ‘applications in virtual 
reality’, that, ‘offer us the possibility to be masters of emotions by immersing ourselves in various forms of safe 
eventfulness.’ This suggests the continuation, and expansion of cinematic forms of emotional immersion into very 
popular contemporary entertainments such as gaming. Sassatelli, p. 135.  
194
 The insecurity of relationships within capitalist cultures is well known. A recent event drew on research by Hito 
Steyerl, Katja Diefenbach and Hannah Black among others, that sought to ‘make connections between the financial 
crisis, the commodification of relationships, the ideological dimension of love, psychopathologies of gender and the 
idea that personal is political.’ I am suggesting that the experience of images may ameliorate such losses, that 
rather than replacing them, it determines them. Also, as attachment styles are known to provide ‘patterns’ of 
relating which tend to continue into adult relationships, it is possible that viewers’ ‘attachment styles’ may either be 
reflected in, or ameliorated by, their relationship to those watched in moving images. Love Against Lovers: Capitalist 
Crisis of Feeling, Showroom Gallery, London, 11 May 2013.  
195
 A study with a mother and young child caused both to be upset when the ‘wrong’ facial expression was 
displayed, at a point when both thought the video to be a live link. This has interesting implications for Skype as it 
suggests our communications with people we are close to, using this medium, need not be experienced as being 
any more emotionally distanced than they would be when experienced in person. Heard, Lake and McCluskey, p. 38  
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‘hegemony’ here designates, more than a relation, a space dominated by the tension between 
two very different relations: a) that of the hegemonized task and its 'natural' class agent; and 
b) that of the hegemonized task and the class hegemonizing it.196 
 
Here, central to the revolutionary moment, is a ‘proletarian’ ‘hegemonizing’ a bourgeois task: 
adopting a person’s position that is higher in the class system than her own.197 While this 
relates to a particular historical situation in Tsarist Russia, people’s ability to change their social 
position in order to take on a more dominant or active role, seems important for our 
relationships to the image. Yet, where Laclau and Mouffe have spoken of the importance, in 
Russian Social Democracy, that the ‘bourgeois’ task remains bourgeois in character, they say 
that:  
 
the democratic potential can be developed only if this bond is broken, only if the conditions 
disappear which permitted the emergence of a rigid separation between leaders and led within 
the masses.198 
 
Through this, Laclau and Mouffe suggest that to enable the democratic potential of the 
working class to hegemonize tasks, the traditional relationship between the vanguard and the 
group it leads must be dissolved. Their inference is that only within a condition of equal and 
direct relations between those theorising or imagining political change, and also those who 
might effect that change, can such a hegemonic transformation for working persons occur.  
 
Returning to the viewer and the image, such an equal relation between different classes 
suggests that viewers may engage with protagonists who are in different situations to them on 
direct terms; they may want to empathise with and feel like them. This suggests both the 
potentially great hegemonic power of identifications with protagonists but also affirms direct 
and equal relations as the ideal basis of agency within social life and change.199 Addressing the 
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 Laclau and Mouffe, p. 50.  
197
 Laclau and Mouffe, p. 50. 
198
 Laclau and Mouffe, p. 57-8.  
199
 Gramsci’s framing of culture as a site for struggle is reaffirmed here – with viewers of culture able to experience 
a form of hegemonic becoming via their relationship to protagonists in images. This suggests the viewer’s agency in 
relation to the image and correlates with the definition of hegemony that applies to Russian Social Democracy. It 
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position of viewers in capitalism in these terms, it is possible to see viewers’ relationship with a 
viewed protagonist - whose position is more desirable than theirs - as based in a potential shift 
in role; one that parallels a desired ‘hegemonizing’ of a task or social position. It seems to be 
Hollywood cinema that most enables such a ‘hegemonic shift’ for a viewer; that is an affective 
improvement of the viewer’s position in life, through the image.200 In cinema emotions and 
bodily states tend to be accurately conveyed by actors occupying identifiable contexts – in a 
way that best supports identification and emotional and affective ‘transference’. This means 
that cinema and cinematic-style television series are able to produce powerful feelings of 
‘being like’ a protagonist, through such technical methods as shot-reverse-shot and naturalistic 
acting.201 They can support an ascendance in role within a cultural production that the viewer 
has selected to view, one which rather than correlating with her own experience, presents an 
improvement of it, within capitalism or fantasy.202 This means a viewer’s hegemonizing of an 
actor’s role suggests that a context of political change, of political dialogue and 
                                                                                                                                               
also positions equal relations as the basis for political agency, in a way that accords with Rancière’s politics, the 
structures of Hannah Arendt’s framing of Greek politics, and the format of Open Dialogue Therapy. Where ‘the self’ 
is threatened, equal meeting based on open communication is sought (this being the impression that cinema 
creates via the exposure of actors’ apparent emotional honesty.) Interestingly too, Attachment Theorists 
significantly lessen the importance of identification for experiences of loss, in contrast to Freud. Here, attachment 
and the desire to recover the lost person replace yearning for them. This suggests that attachments may hold a 
larger role in our relationship to images, where identifications have often been emphasised. It also, within the 
notion of ‘hegemony’ situates our identifications as being with those who are not ‘like us’, hence again destabilising 
the ‘similarity’ that identification implies. Here our search for a broader range of objects, imaginary partners, or 
attachment figures through images gains a stronger context (see note 187.) Bowlby, Attachment and Loss: Loss, III, 
p. 24-28. 
200
 While ambition might be very much tied to a conventionally capitalist reality, as much as the more prosaic notion 
of ‘social climbing’ (a person anxious to gain higher social status), hegemony would appear to mirror such forms of 
social ascent, yet serving as a functional ‘displacement’ within a situation of social change; the relationship between 
the two is interesting here. It would also correlate with the ‘ego-ideal’ where our identifications may be based on a 
more ‘perfect’ version of us.  
201
 The popularity of cinematic television series today demonstrates the continuing impact of cinematic methods on 
viewers. In these series, cinematic production levels are extended to multiple episodes occupying a much greater 
length of time than a film. American channels like HBO have popularised such material with series such as Mad 
Men, True Blood and Breaking Bad. 
202
 Where Brecht saw ‘bourgeois theatre’ as showing capitalism to be universal and unchanging it is perhaps 
interesting to emphasise the importance of change, for both theatre and cinema. Cinema is rooted in the 
transformation of situations, characters and contexts. This means that not only outcomes (or fates) are realised, but 
the ways in which a character’s life alters during the film, within a fixed and ultimately fast timeframe that ‘feels’ 
natural, are significant. Hence, while such changes generally occur within a fictional mimesis of a capitalist reality, 
our identifications with and attachments to protagonists in films serve to enable us to feel what their 
transformation is like and to map it onto our own experience. Where change is central to cinema and cinematic 
style television programmes, this situates changes in role, not only within a ‘vertical’ route of hegemonic 
‘ascendance’ but also within the horizontal changes that produce a powerful ‘feeling’ of transformation and 
improvement in time, albeit within the existing system.  
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subjectivisation, is an appropriate frame for the viewer’s affective transformation through the 
image.203 
 
The common disparity between the lived position of the viewer in capitalism and the position 
of the viewed protagonist in culture suggests that a greater need for affective transference 
might be found in groups under greater economic strain, or in positions of personal insecurity. 
In this light, such audiences may be in need of positive transference with the image or culture; 
transference which would enable them to feel ‘better’, in a way that positions ‘pleasure’ in 
viewing, within a wider situation of struggle. This also actually suggests viewers’ existing 
discontent within their capitalist reality. The consumption of a didactically themed and framed 
film or play which will almost certainly end well therefore becomes understandable – and 
framed by the political actualities of capitalist life. Ultimately, the most deterministic of 
Hollywood films becomes the corollary of the viewer’s ability, or need, to change from a worse 
to a better position in capitalism, due to the power and safety of the structural representation 
of narratives in the cinematic system.204 This also politicise the uses of catharsis whereby those 
most disadvantaged in capitalism may use the image as a means of ‘managing emotions 
associated with a cause’.  
 
So, rather than the viewer being solely a product of the control of the image over them, this 
‘capacity’ for a viewer to transform in relation to the image suggests a form of agency. If the 
viewer’s relationship to culture supports her ability to experience a different social position, 
the viewer’s agency would situate them in a position of power in relation to what they choose 
                                                 
203
 Where, for Rancière, viewers’ relationships to images occupy a position of relative equality, their relationship to 
protagonists can be seen as one of affective ‘becoming’. Yet, if for Gramsci culture is the site of struggle and Arendt 
sees as a political space in which ‘unequal’ people pursue political ends, viewers’ ‘use’ of the ability to feel like 
someone in a different situation to them suggests both that viewers seek a condition of equality for political 
subjectivisation, also that they pursue hegemonic agencies through images.  
204
 This safety is based on the viewer’s ability to determine her emotions in relation to a particular protagonist, via 
cinema, also to feel another’s emotions and actions without her own being significantly compromised or risked. This 
correlates with the safety sought by the child via her familial, or ‘attachment relationships’, the loss of which leads 
to fear. Rather, secure attachment based in affection contextualises experiences of security, confidence and the 
pursuit of agency. This reframes the criticisms levelled at class subjects’ consumption of popular entertainment by 
both left and right commentators.  
 106 
to view, enabling them to ‘determine’ feeling.205 Also, as contemporary visual culture is now 
democratised across different producers and viewing platforms, our capacity to ‘determine’ 
emotions and bodily effects via the selection of appropriate media to the ‘cause’ is expanded. 
Our agency over culture becomes an agency in the management of feeling and thought within 
a capitalist context likely to produce, rather than readily give occasion to address, the 
emotions and instabilities it provides.206 This immediately politicises the powerful effects of 
mimetic dramatic modes. It also emphasises their historic role amidst the development of the 
Hollywood system, one notably tracking important economic developments in capitalism. 
Importantly, such dramatic forms continue to have significant influence today, for instance in 
the rise of cinematic television series.207  
 
The other extreme of the viewer’s experience regards her search for agency through the image 
via her capacity for emotional distance from the people she watches, who occupy less 
desirable situations than her own. The viewer’s ability to remove herself from another’s 
experience, at the level of identification, emotion and affect, provides an interesting corollary 
to the search for a deeper affective transference by a viewer with a protagonist. It also 
positions such relations as a choice in the manner of Butler’s framing of the uses of culture as a 
‘tool’. While agency is the ability to act and exercise power in one’s own social reality, if 
opportunities or conditions for the pursuit of that agency seem too few or too difficult, the 
achievement of power through other means becomes relevant. Claire Bishop’s work recalls 
                                                 
205
 The ability to determine feeling seems to be contextualised by the expansion of ways of accessing culture today; 
on mobile platforms, online, cinema, television, DVD, etc. It is notable that cinema, as well as being accessed via the 
cinema can be viewed on DVD, via online subscriptions, as well as illegal downloads. It becomes something that can 
be ‘selected’ and engaged with as desired, also stopped, recorded, distributed - in a way that accords with Mulvey’s 
recent arguments regarding the agency of the viewer concerning visual culture (see note 185.) 
206
 The emphasis in capitalism on emotional distress as something to be addressed at an individual level, often using 
medication, personalises struggles that are familial, and social. This could be seen as pushing people to the 
individual consumption of entertainment, for the amelioration of those affective struggles.   
207
 The dominance of Hollywood cinema between the 1920’s and 1960’s tracks the development of what Ernest 
Mandel described as a third ‘purer’ stage of capitalist development, beginning post-war until the early 1970’s. The 
impact of the affectively transformative power of cinema during this time may be connected to the role of the 
image in the ‘amelioration’ of political concerns. Where for Autonomist thinker Virno, culture is the ‘matrix’ of post-
Fordism, perhaps visual culture is the ‘matrix’ of the pursuit of agency in contemporary capitalism. Following this, 
might peer to peer networks, copying, mixing, ripping, somehow reflect the micro level of agency, the disruption of 
‘permissions’, of the re-staging of interactions with culture that are about subverting capital? 
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this when she refers to those participatory performances which retain viewing as an important 
part.208 In these performances, she suggests, workers may experience viewing a performance, 
based on their own exploitation in capitalism, as a ‘perverse pleasure’.209 In this, she recalls an 
important part of the viewing process – that is our ability, in the safety of the viewing role, to 
consume performances or images of those who are in a similarly disadvantageous or less 
desirable situation than us. This is a reversal of the kind of ‘hegemonic’ ascent which the 
cinematic mode might most suggestively enable. Rather, in this case, a viewer may feel 
empowered when faced with the less favourable position of the person viewed. An example of 
this would be the infiltration of reality and game shows on television where people are 
frequently tested, lined up, seen crying, rejected; albeit willingly.210 What is fundamental here 
is our capacity to lack empathy for others, to affectively distance ourselves from their 
disadvantage, even pain or distress, and potentially gain entertainment from it.211  
 
Again, perspectives in Attachment Theory and Family Therapy can be used to connect viewers’ 
capacity to view people without empathy in life, to their capacity to do the same through 
screens. The link between disturbed attachment and the inability to empathise with others is 
                                                 
208
 For instance, Bishop discusses Pierre Bal-Blanc’s participatory performances, which are based on the writings of 
Pierre Klossowski’s formulation of bodies as ‘living currency’. Bishop, Artificial Hells, p. 233-34  
209
 Bishop, Artificial Hells, p. 236. This extends Mulvey’s analysis regarding sadism in cinema, to the experience of 
viewing others labouring in a similar or worse situation than our own in a participatory performance. 
210
 Gilles Deleuze connected the rise of such popular television shows to their accuracy of the conditions of labour 
by stating that, ‘if the most idiotic television game shows are so successful, it’s because they express the corporate 
situation with great precision,’ Gilles Deleuze, ‘Postscript on the Societies of Control’, October 59, Winter 1992, MIT 
Press, Cambridge, MA, pp.3-7. p. 4   
211
 People’s potential to watch the pain of others relates to Hannah Arendt’s well known analysis of the Holocaust in 
terms of the ‘banality of evil’. The findings of the Stanford Prison experiment and Stanley Milgram Experiment also 
add support to this. The Stanford Prison Experiment in particular is relevant. Here, the presence of an ‘authority’ 
figure to which people (acting as prison guards) reported, enabled them to feel absolved from blame when ordered 
to cruelly punish others. Relatedly, each guard’s occupation of a ‘higher’ position than the ‘prisoners’, in the light of 
my arguments here, suggests this higher position supported their ability to eschew empathy for others. This also 
ties with the earlier mentioned artwork by Thomas Hirschhorn in emphasising the viewer’s position of power over 
the person watched. An interesting corollary to this is provided by Lisa D. Butler and Oxana Palesh. They noted the 
large number of commercial films that depict mental disorders, and now that dissociation is more common than 
previously thought, ‘that many film directors and cinematographers skillfully use cinematic devices to convey and 
dramatize the dissociative experiences of their characters–and the force of these techniques may issue from the 
movie-viewer’s personal knowledge of relatively normative dissociative experiences related to traumatic or stressful 
life events.’ Here the power of cinema to enable viewers to experience a person’s equally, or less preferable reality 
is notable. Lisa D. Butler and Oxana Palesh, ‘Spellbound: Dissociation in the Movies’, Journal of Trauma & 
Dissociation, (2004), 5: 2, 61-87, (pp. 62-65). 
 108 
suggested by a number of commentators.212 This associates disrupted attachment in early 
childhood experience (some say in combination with genetic factors), with a limited ability to 
feel for others. It again supports the importance of affect and attachment to our relationship 
to other people in images. The ‘power’ to avoid feeling, the ‘agency’ not to care for or be 
affected by others we watch, becomes a position which may be an ‘ego’ supporting activity, in 
Laura Mulvey’s terms.213 The ability to watch a figure unsympathetically was explored by 
Mulvey where she sets out the fetishistic and sadistic currents in Hollywood cinema.214 Yet, 
given the significance of attachment being discussed here, Mulvey’s approach could be said to 
emphasise internal psychological processes, and desire, at the expense of the social relevance 
of viewing patterns. However, Mulvey seems to provide an ideal metaphor for separation, one 
that supports the relevance of ‘distanced’ psychological relationships to viewers’ use of 
images.215  
 
Yet by treating the viewer’s relationship to a viewed protagonist as a social one, this can be 
linked to the support of ‘the self’ in Attachment Therapy.216 Here, ‘the self’ would most ideally 
be generated through a range of processes linked to the strengthening of identity, amidst 
                                                 
212
 Simon Baron-Cohen asserts that extreme forms of insecure attachment as a result of negative experiences of 
lack of parental care in early childhood and possible genetic underpinnings impact on the capacity for a person to 
‘lack empathy’ to the extent of psychopathology. In this he adds support to the findings of John Bowlby and 
Attachment Theory. Simon Baron-Cohen, Zero Degrees of Empathy: A New Theory of Human Cruelty, (London: 
Penguin, 2011), p. 48-50. 
213
 Here, the ego as a self-oriented part of the mental apparatus emphasised by Freud and Lacan, facilitates 
separations between self and others, also the idealisation of the ego, in the ego-ideal. An image of self as strong and 
defensive, able to deflect hurt or emotional pain may ensue, where strength is gained from its perceived separation. 
The commonality of ‘egotism’ in capitalism would perhaps accord with this. 
214
 See note 179. 
215
 Mulvey recently re-emphasised distance, more so from the perspective of the fetish, yet in a way which adds a 
further context to this argument, when she claimed, ‘the human body, which was always quite detached from real 
life, particularly in the eroticised representation of women, is now becoming further detached in digitalisation…I 
think we come back to the question of the commodification of the body.’ For this argument, the question becomes 
what ‘function’ such a distance may have for the viewer. Sassatelli, p. 134  
216
 This has accords with Michel Foucault’s notion of the ‘Care of the Self’ which is ‘a certain way of considering 
things and having relations with other people’, an ‘attitude towards self, others, and the world’, it is a ‘form of 
attention, of looking’; ‘a certain way of attending to what we think and what takes place in our thought’ and it also 
names a series of actions ‘exercised by the self on the self’ and ‘by which one takes responsibility for oneself and by 
which one changes, purifies, transforms, and transfigures oneself.’ Simon O’Sullivan describes this as an ethics 
based on a particular form of attention, one that seems to have accords with the modes of democracy described by 
Arendt. Michel Foucault, ‘The Hermeneutics of the Subject’ (Lectures at the College de France 1981-1982) in Simon 
O’Sullivan, On the Production of Subjectivity (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012), p. 63-64. 
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important collaborations and interactions with others.217 In this, the desired break down of 
‘the ego’, in Deleuze and Guattari’s terms, may rather be exchanged for the generation of an 
experience of ‘self’ that is contained enough to enable agency, yet is also social; enabling 
empathic and collaborative action and sharing.218 Given the basis of attachment to identity this 
suggests the importance of feeling and empathy to political agency.219 It also frames a viewer’s 
potential for emotional distance in relation to a viewed protagonist as enabling them to feel in 
a better position than the person they watch. Albeit doing so in a way that positions the 
protagonist’s undesirable position as a means of affectively leveraging the viewer’s position in 
life. The importance of a lack of empathy seems clear here, in a way that again situates 
empathy as critical to a social, rather than individual, conception of agency. Viewed this way, it 
is distance which, in Bishop’s terms, becomes most ‘troubling’, as it becomes a search for 
agency based on a withdrawal from the social.  
 
Taken together, a viewer’s capacity for direct empathy with, or conversely to lack empathy for 
a protagonist in an image, are two extremes of an important continuum of relating that seems 
central to a viewer’s ‘search’ for agency via the moving image. This supports the politicised 
situation of the viewer, but also reaffirms the relevance of the viewer’s position to that of the 
agent in social life. Both extremes occupy poles of a continuum of modes of relating which are 
rooted in affect and empathy, where our ability to feel like another person is contrasted with 
our ability to avoid feeling like that person. Here, empathy becomes, via its close relationship 
                                                 
217
 Heard, Lake and McCluskey in their text Attachment Therapy with Adolescents and Adults define this as follows: 
care seeking, care giving, interest sharing, affectionate sexuality, shaping the external environment, the internal 
environment, self defences. Richard Sennett has also recently discussed political collaboration in relation to notions 
of ‘the self’ where he says, ‘The 'self' is a composite of sentiments, affiliations and behaviours which seldom fit 
neatly together; any call for tribal unity will reduce this personal complexity.’ He adds that where, ‘Cooperation can 
be defined, drily, as an exchange in which the participants benefit from the encounter,’ he emphasises ‘dialogic 
skills’ such as ‘listening well’ in its realisation. He sets out how ‘collaboration enables the human infant’s mental 
development’, reaffirming Bowlby’s findings and showing the centrality of cooperation to developments of the self, 
and of political life. Richard Sennett, Together (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2012), p. 4-10.  
218
 Psychotherapist Gwen Adshead describes the person’s experience of her own subjectivity as ‘being a constant 
process of organising and disorganising’. She suggests it is people’s aim to achieve a ‘manageable’ sense of self. 
Gwen Adshead [Consultant Forensic Psychotherapist at Broadmoor Hospital], Start the Week, Radio 4, (9:00 BST, 2 
May 2011) 
219
 Where attachment is central to a ‘secure’ self, the self itself is socially constituted; that is built up through social 
interactions. It suggests that affect and attachment aid collaboration, provide a context and secure basis for 
multiple engagements. It also indicates that, in Arendt’s terms, providing a context in which people are seen and 
taken seriously by others is a key context for the promotion of agency.  
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to a viewer’s search for an alternative to her social reality through her relationship to others in 
images, a politicised empathy, one based in a social relation.220 ‘Becoming’ through the image, 
or rejecting another’s situation to one’s own empowering profit, become two contrasting, yet 
interlinked ways, in which the social is explored through the image. Where affect is the basis of 
the secure self, and is also central to the viewing relationship, it supports a kind of becoming 
which is personal, and social.221 This suggests accords between a viewer’s experience of agency 
via a viewed protagonist in visual culture, and the basis of a person’s agency in contemporary 
life.  
 
Group Photo alludes to both extremes of this relationship: between on the one hand, visual 
material designed to promote the viewer’s wish to experience the preferable reality of the 
protagonist, and on the other, visual material in which the protagonist is in a much less 
desirable situation than the viewer. By presenting images that are ‘warm’ in colour, in which 
only couples are framed, and that allude to romantic cinema, what is most ideal about this 
experience of images becomes, in this work, a mode of constraining and limiting the image. 
The warm image that we would want to affectively enter, becomes a place where the actors 
variously do and don’t meet the expectations of romance. They toy with and seem conscious 
of the expectations of the camera, and its aesthetic, while ultimately eschewing it. This means 
that what is ‘symbolically’ inviting about the warm image is denied in a context of distanciation 
in which this ‘cinematic’ effect jars against ‘cool’ images. These blue-toned images exemplify 
                                                 
220
 Where, for Marx, the capital relation is a social relation, it is to the nature and experience of the social, of 
interactions, that concerns about social change and political agency may turn. Watney described Marx’s ‘problem’ 
of ‘how to picture consciousness as an “ensemble of social relations” rather than as a historically given “essence”, 
and how to relate this picture to the rest of material life,’ connecting it to the notion of ‘false consciousness’. Yet, 
Marx’s view, shown in his Early Writings, of consciousness as ‘social’ can be connected to my discussions here 
where ‘the self’ is fundamentally a collective entity. Ideally produced within a context of secure attachment, any self 
- being produced in different social scenarios, also in relation to culture - will always differ. Hence the impossibility 
of generalising ‘consciousness’ is clear, while the question of how to create connections between ‘social’ selves, 
remains. Assuming ‘selves’ are often ‘insecure’ it would be for political discourse to create spaces in which political 
subjectivities can be enabled. Ultimately the political ‘treatment’ of working people in a condition of capitalist 
labour needs to be supportive of their ‘social’ self, the one that would enable collaboration in a safe context, also 
that would enable their existing positions to be understood. Simon Watney, p. 156.  
221
 Where Jameson notably claimed the ‘waning of affect’ in the ‘Postmodern’ age, the foundational basis of affect 
to attachment, for any growing child affirms that however affect may be ‘managed’ or displaced, that its centrality 
remains to social life, as much as to our relationship with images. Jameson, Postmodernism or, The Cultural Logic of 
Late Capitalism, p. 15 
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the visual aesthetic of such Brechtian-inspired cinema directors as Michael Haneke. Here, the 
distant camera and cold imagery cause us to look at the subjects in images, and to be very 
conscious of our looking. While, in this work, the acting oscillates between apparently ‘staged’ 
and ‘natural’ actions, the intention of this work is to stage the important political relationship 
between lived, and desired realities. The intention, in using cool images, is to disrupt the kind 
of empathy that warm images suggest: what is ‘cold’ about their aesthetic correlates too 
neatly with what is in the image – interrogating assessments of human bodies. The aesthetic of 
the work becomes a way of prefiguring the treatment of the bodies in it. That is, we come to 
expect what is disturbing about these images: the cold and merciless scanning of bodies, the 
camera’s exploration of parts, gestures, the inability of the camera to see the group, the way it 
has to break it down, to disrupt it. The distanced feel of the image accords with the position of 
this group which is less than ideal; they are effectively ‘trapped’ in the context of a photograph 
and only manage to change their roles within the work, not beyond it. This might indicate a 
problem for realism; where a truthful image might be sought, that ‘shows reality as it is’, this 
may actually work to support the capacity for a viewer to feel in a better position than the 
protagonist viewed. The ethics of our relationship to images is based in how the viewer 
positions herself in relation to the protagonist. If, as Bishop suggests, the viewer is 
indiscriminate in her viewing, it is a jarring work such as this one that both refers to, and aims 
to unsettle, the viewer’s ‘usage’ of others through images.  
 
In Group Photo the people who become the focus of the ‘romantic’ camera, are also the focus 
of the ‘interrogating’ camera. In this, what is indiscriminate about viewing is applied to the 
protagonists in the artwork. The two aesthetic extremes become the contrasting realities and 
forms of representation that the group have to negotiate. This starts with the ‘photo’ – the 
depiction of which is distorted by the aesthetics used – and continues with the actors’ seeming 
assent to these aesthetics, and ultimately their rejection of them. What the group do in the 
work is connected to how they interact, and the valences of feeling suggested here, connect 
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agency with affect. In Group Photo the movement of bodies is tied to the aesthetic extremes of 
the work. This connects what is affective about the actors’ actions to the viewer’s search for 
different feelings from images. These different feelings are represented by extremes 
extrapolated from familiar forms of imagery. The proxy agencies we want to occupy, through 
viewing a protagonist in a preferable reality in an image, are set against their opposite, the 
more disturbing capacity to view the actions of others coldly. Yet in this work, what might be 
singular or satisfying about both experiences is disrupted, as neither ‘effect’ is allowed to last 
very long. Here the cool, distant aesthetic and the warm, romantic aesthetic, despite all that is 
derivative about them, become extremes employed together. They become visual tools used 
to explore different ways of experiencing agency via images. This work, as all my work, is 
rooted in a self-conscious exploration of the political relationship I see between viewers and 
the images they view, the agencies they might seek there and quite often the pathos and 
tragedy that underpins their search for other people, and realities through it. Tragic endings 
have been common in my work, but what I see as the final ‘state’ in Group Photo, is suggestive 
of a collaborative agency and play. This ‘state’ is the product of actors’ successfully negotiating 
(and transcending), two extremes of empathy and emotional distance which, as discussed, 
seem key both to our relationship to agency via images, and also to our relationship to agency 
in social life.
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Conclusion 
 
I have always been interested in exploring some of the most unsettling aspects of image-
making: the control that underpins their production, the potential to limit how a person is read 
through the way they are framed in an image, the apparent power of the viewer over the 
viewed protagonist, the presentation of events as ‘true’ when they are choreographed, the 
difficult line between what is ‘natural’ and ‘staged’, the reading of images as ubiquitous and to 
an extent democratic, and also depictions of class subjects and inequality in images and how 
these are addressed by viewers and producers. Such concerns, always an undercurrent within 
my art practice, have been clarified during the PhD process in a way that enables me to 
explore them more knowingly in my artwork, future writing and research.  
 
The factors that work against achieving forms of collectivity in a meaningful political sense 
have also always concerned me, as much as those factors that may enable it. This correlates 
with my intention in this document – to set out a fundamental connection between the 
capacity to feel for others, as well as to withdraw feeling from others, through images, and the 
pursuit of agency there, and in social life. This conclusion deliberately sought to encompass 
both the positive and negative implications of our relationship to others as regards political 
futures. The parallels between my own work and that of Jerome Bel, Ian White, Artur 
Zmijewski, Yvonne Rainer, Pavel Althamer, Gail Pickering, Hito Steyerl, Omer Fast, Victor 
Alimpiev also the cinema of Michael Haneke, Ulrich Seidel, Andrea Arnold and Luis Buñuel are 
relevant to these concerns. Equally, the fictional writings of Michel Houllebecq, J.G. Ballard 
and Elfriede Jelinek are important. The artistic practices mentioned approach the presentation 
and choreography of human action within staged live performances and moving image work in 
specific, generally self-conscious ways. All retain and address the viewer, and their 
expectations, in a way that is directly contextualised by conventions of exhibition making, 
cultural and image production. They also each address realities of human experience and 
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feeling in ways that serve to disrupt the concerns of the image and even the artwork. Each also 
sees ethical concerns as existing in the way that people are addressed in life and culture. I am 
interested in a particular area of cultural production that has strong roots in mainland Europe 
and has underlying connections with the political responses to the Holocaust. The concern 
about what people are capable of doing, or allowing, in relation to others, correlates directly 
with the ‘uses’ of images of people whose position we would not want to occupy.  
 
I see potential in the propositional implications of the thesis I have set out, existing beyond my 
own art practice in the realm of political practice. The centrality of affect to agency, and our 
suggested tendency to seek feelings or impressions of agency through people in images, 
indicates particular ways in which political groupings can be realised. Where agency, sought 
through the image, may be read in terms of the disparities between people, these differences 
can be contextualised by a search for direct empathy and understanding. This means that we 
can turn to the conditions of the personal relationships and societal situations which seem to 
drive viewers to the image - to delineate a political setting where agency can be explored. It 
seems fruitful to consider how groups might be formed that can best facilitate political 
dialogue in a way that is rooted in each person’s own exploration of her personal 
circumstances and experiences within capitalism. Importantly, this would be a setting where 
each person, regardless of insight or experience is treated equally, where everything heard and 
said is acknowledged and taken seriously. Such means of enabling political agencies, based on 
the needs of ‘the self’, connect with both Arendt’s ‘agonistic’ politics and types of Family 
Therapy discussed here. The potential for subtle forms of facilitation and means of connecting 
local groups seems to exist in a way that is suggestive for the creation of autonomous contexts 
for negotiating experiences of the economy. Yet I do not seek to realise such political 
outcomes in socially engaged artworks. Rather, I intend my works to negotiate what is 
powerful and political about addressing our expectations of, and relationships to, other people 
via imagery. However, I am interested in the wider implications of this research and in 
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considering the ways that looking for literal political answers in the space between the viewer 
and the protagonist they view can be explored.  
 
Nonetheless, the collaborative and discursive scenes in Group Photo did allude to the above 
political conclusions in ways that were important for this work, and marked a sharp contrast to 
the other more ‘static’ states of its actors. All my work has been concerned by what is political 
about the relationship between people viewing others in images, and how this relates to 
people’s interactions with others in life, and also within the work. This interest, now informed 
by greater knowledge of productive forms of group engagement, has potential extensions, yet 
may principally be explored in subtle ways that enable me to produce performative work that 
expands how we imagine social relations to occur both through, and beyond images. In my 
work I have increasingly sought to accurately simulate particular effects from cultural 
productions, forms of human communication, and ways of being in life, so that what I make 
might most directly recall aspects of life and culture that are familiar to viewers. In this, the 
work is intrinsically tied to the ‘effects’ it might have on viewers. Yet, as a significant aim is to 
unsettle what is already seen, such recollections of what is ‘familiar’ have never been imagined 
in a way that might engender agency in viewers. Instead, effects are imagined at the level of 
the image, in a relational way, rather than being something that exists as an outcome, with the 
viewer acting or behaving in a particular manner. 
 
While my work is focused on our relationship to other people through images, it is an art 
practice that is also engaged in a certain form of image production. My work has always sought 
to produce an image that refused to meet all its possible expectations. There is something 
deliberately underwhelming about my productions, much that is left out. As I have discussed in 
this thesis, the historical and current impact of cinema, and the recent ‘cinematic’ form of 
television series, have a direct tie to the work that I make. The ability to immerse oneself in 
another’s reality is political. Yet the emphasis of mobile media and similar contemporary 
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cultural aesthetics on the absorption of attention seems tied to the ‘dissociative’ effects of 
media, their ability to ‘fill awareness’. Where another person’s reality is sought through the 
image, the capacity of the image for depth is marked. The extent of our possible connection to 
others through images, as much as in life, becomes the locus of the works I produce. The 
simulation of people and replacement by graphic entities, seems in some ways suggestive of 
an absence, for viewers seeking agency through images. By avoiding the provision of affective 
routes to agency, such images, by filling attention, may disable what is most suggestive about 
the reproduction of others in images.  
 
Yet the suggestion that our future resides in the image accords with the concerns of this thesis; 
what happens in the image can be treated as an extension of our lived realities. Yet, the 
development of the image may gather pace, as the realities of our own social, relational, 
environmental existences remain surprisingly static, or decline. In order to address the image 
or the moving image today, it is possible to assert its politicised relation to the perceivable, felt 
reality that is both socially and materially present. As Arendt asserted, what is ‘common’ about 
our reality, is provided by what is agreed among us collectively. Hence, the agreement of 
certain realities must necessarily occur in the social, as well as via forms of communication 
that allow us to share them more widely than ever before. This relation, between the image-
based world of culture and communication, and that of the lived reality of the viewer, is one 
that I affirm here as being profoundly important to the consideration of both political futures, 
and the nature of art practices to come. The intention is that the images I produce close down 
the gap between human life, and visual representation in capitalism; always problematizing 
this relationship. It is this concern that underpins my thesis, and is one that I will continue to 
explore within my art practice. The work I make, rooted as it is in our relationship to images, 
embodies the space between the lived reality and the image that seems most suggestive of the 
ways in which future agencies might be constituted. By addressing this relationship self-
consciously, it is my intention to provocatively occupy the boundary of what is familiar about 
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life in capitalism and what we want to experience through the image, as it is here that ‘agency’ 
resides.
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Artworks, Exhibitions and Publications: 2010 – 2014 
 
Moving Image and Live Performance Artworks produced 
Group Photo 9’00” 2014 (Commissioned by Gallery II) 
Presentation Skills (extended) Live performance 2013 
Presentation Skills 1’00” 2013 (by invitation, Kerry Baldry) 
Stacy’s Risk 18’00” 2012-13 
Values, Efficiency and Commitment 1’30” 2011 (Commissioned by LUX) 
Sky High Quality and In Great Shape 18’27” 2011 
 
Works on paper:  
Family in a therapy meeting/ Family in a round table 
debate (Copy of a sketch) 
Found public seating with monoliths  
(Tracing of a photographic image) 
A well-known method of survival among animals 
(Text on A3 paper; folded) 
 
2012 (3 works by invitation, Wysing 
Arts,) 
 
Credits for Group Photo:  
Actors: Alyson Marks, Carmen Martorell, Ross Newell, Sarah Oldknow, Kesh Sharma  
Cinematographer: Will Simpson, Omni Pictures Ltd 
Equipment & Installation: Lumen, Leeds 
Additional Technical Assistance: Sam Belinfante 
Direction and Editing: Claire Hope 
 
Exhibitions 2010-2014 
 
Group Photo (Solo Moving Image Commission) 
14/2/14 – 15/3/14 Gallery II, University of Bradford 
A solo exhibition of commissioned moving image work curated by Amy Charlesworth 
(supported by the Arts Council). The exhibition included an event on the 11th March - a live 
reading by actress Alyson Marks of a specially commissioned text by Sean Ashton. 
 
One Minute Volume 7 (Group Screening) 
25-6/1/14 & 1-2/2/14  Furtherfield Gallery, London  
Screenings curated by Kerry Baldry, Presentation Skills, 2013 shown. 
 
One Minute Volume 7 (Group Screenings) 
6/9/13 – 12/6/14 Various venues, UK and International 
Screenings curated by Kerry Baldry; Presentation Skills, 2013 shown. 
 
A Priori (Group Exhibition) 
29/9/13 – 15/10/13  Hanover Project, UCLAN, Preston 
Group exhibition in which Presentation Skills, 2013 was shown on a monitor and 
Presentation Skills (Extended), 2013, a new live performance was shown.  
 
London Seizure (Part Two) (Group Screening) 
30/6/13  Arbeit Gallery, London 
Group screening of works focusing on the current politics of housing and space in London, 
curated by Carmen Billows; Complex Financial Instruments, 2008 was shown. 
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Playing with Space (Group Screening) 
27/6/13 Firstsite, Colchester, UK 
A group screening about how urban space can both invite and repress playful and 
performative behaviour curated by Lawrence Bradby as part of RIBA Love Architecture 
Festival; In all honesty there’s nothing I’d like more, 2005 and Boy Nature, 2009 were shown. 
 
London Seizure (Part One) (Group Screening) 
23/5/13  Bermondsey Project, London 
Screening of works on the current politics of housing and space in London, curated by 
Carmen Billows; Boy Nature, 2009 shown. 
 
Taking Place (Group Screening) 
25/2/13 Black Maria, Granary Building, London  
Group screening exploring physical, imaginative and ideological constructions of architecture 
organized by the British Artists Film & Video Study Collection; Complex Financial 
Instruments, 2008, shown. 
 
Solid on our Source Planet (Group Exhibition) 
30/9/12-28/10/12 Wysing Arts Centre, Cambridge 
Group exhibition of works by the artists on the 2012 Wysing Arts retreat on ‘The Self’; A 
Determined Search beyond Romance, 2010, and works on paper shown. 
 
Wysing Arts Open Weekend 
14/7-15/7/12 Wysing Arts Centre, Cambridge 
Group activity and screening of Sky High Quality and In Great Shape, 2011. 
 
In Production (Event) 
31/3/12  David Dale Gallery, Glasgow   
Screening of Stacy’s Risk moving image work in production, with Corin Sworn, guest speaker 
Kitty Anderson and curated by Beth Bramich. 
 
Public Screens (Public Moving Image Project) 
2/5/11 – 8/8/11 i/o/lab, Stavanger, Norway  
Values, Efficiency and Commitment, 2010 shown in public locations as part of new LUX 
commissioned programme. 
 
Residencies, Retreats, Placements 
2012 Documenta Research/Work Placement June-September 2012: 3 
public events produced as part of The Self in Dialogue with the 
Economy and the Paul Ryan installation: 18/8/14 with Adam 
Kleinman and Stuart Ringholt; 23/9/14 with Marcos Lutyens and 
Marina Vishmidt and a workshop with Johanne Timm, Sheenagh 
Geoghegan and Julek Kreutzer. 
2012 Wysing Arts Retreat on ‘The Self’ (curated Mark Titchner) (28-31 
May 2012) 
Publications 
2014 Group Photo review, This is Tomorrow, Adam Pugh 
2014 Group Photo, publication accompanying the exhibition 
2013 ‘Between the Lines’, Curated Selection, Axis website, Helen Hillyard 
2011-12 Dec/ Jan Listed in ‘100 Artists to Watch’ in Modern Painters Magazine  
 
 120 
Bibliography 
 
Adams, Parveen, ed., Art: Sublimation or Symptom (London: H. Karnac, 2003) 
 
Ahmed, Sara, The Cultural Politics of Emotion (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004) 
 
Anderson, Perry, Considerations on Western Marxism (London: NLB, 1976) 
 
Arendt, Hannah, Eichmann in Jerusalem, 2nd edn. (New York: Viking Press, 1964)  
 
—— On Violence (San Diego: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1970) 
 
—— The Human Condition (Chicago: The University of Chicago, 1958) 
 
Bateson, Gregory, Steps to an Ecology of the Mind (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1972; repr. 2000) 
 
Baron-Cohen, Simon, Zero Degrees of Empathy (London: Penguin Books, 2011) 
 
Barthes, Roland, Camera Lucida, trans. by Richard Howard (London: Vintage, repr. 1980, 2000) 
 
Bauman, Zygmunt, Liquid Modernity (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2000, repr. 2006) 
 
—— Modernity and Ambivalence (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1991)  
 
—— Modernity and The Holocaust (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1989) 
 
Berlant, Lauren, ed. Compassion: The Culture and Politics of an Emotion (New York: Routledge, 
2004) 
 
—— Cruel Optimism (Durham, N.C: Duke University Press, October 2011) 
 
Benjamin, Walter The Arcades Project trans. Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press; 2002) 
 
—— Understanding Brecht, trans. by Anna Bostock (London: Verso, 1966; repr. 1994) 
 
Berger, John, Ways of Seeing (London: Penguin, 1972) 
 
Bersani, Leo & Ulysse Dutoit, Forms of Being: Cinema, Aesthetics, Subjectivity (London: BFI 
Publishing, 2004) 
 
Bishop, Claire, Artificial Hells: Participatory Art and the Politics of Spectatorship (London: 
Verso, August 2011) 
 
—— Installation Art (London: Tate Publishing, 2005) 
 
Bloch, Ernest and others, Aesthetics and Politics, Taylor, Ronald, trans. ed., (London: Verso, 
1977; repr. 1980)  
 
Boltanski, Luc and Chiapello, Ève, The New Spirit of Capitalism, trans. Gregory Elliott (London: 
Verso, 2005; repr. 2007) 
 121 
 
Bourriaud, Nicolas, Postproduction (New York: Lukas & Sternberg, 2000; repr. 2002) 
 
—— Relational Aesthetics, trans. Simon Pleasance and Fronza Woods, with Mathieu Copeland 
(Dijon: Les presses du réel, 2002) 
 
John Bowlby, Attachment and Loss: Attachment, 3 vols (London: Random House, 1997; 1969), I 
 
—— Attachment and Loss: Separation, Anger and Anxiety, 3 vols (London: Random House, 
1998; 1973), II 
 
—— Bowlby, Attachment and Loss: Loss, 3 vols (London: Random House, 1998; 1980), III 
 
Braidotti, Rosi, Metamorphoses: Towards a Materialist Theory of Becoming (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Polity Press, 2001)   
 
Brecht, Bertolt, On Theatre (London: Methuen Books, 1978; repr. 2001) 
 
—— The Messingkauf Dialogues, 2nd edn. (Indiana USA: Bloomsbury Methuen, 1965), 
 
Buckley, Peter, Essential Papers on Object Relations (New York: New York University, 1986) 
 
Currie, Mark, ed., Metafiction (Essex, UK: Longman, 1995)  
 
—— Postmodern Narrative Theory, 2nd edn. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, August, 2011) 
 
Damasio, Antonio, R., The Feeling of What Happens (London: William Heinemann, 1999) 
 
—— Self Comes to Mind: Constructing the Conscious Brain (New York: Pantheon Books, 2010) 
 
Day, Gail, Dialectical Passions (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011) 
 
Debord, Guy, The Society of the Spectacle, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith, (1967; New York: 
Zone Books, 1994) 
 
—— Comments on the Society of the Spectacle, trans. Malcolm Imrie (London: Verso, 1990) 
 
Deleuze, Gilles, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (1968; New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1994) 
 
—— Cinema 1: The Movement Image (1983; London: Continuum, 2005)  
 
—— Cinema 2: The Time Image (1985; London: Continuum, 2005)  
 
—— Masochism: Coldness and Cruelty & Venus in Furs (New York: Zone Books, 1991) 
 
—— Nietzsche and Philosophy trans. Hugh Tomlinson (1962; New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2006) 
 
Deleuze, Gilles & Felix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Robert 
Hurley and others (1972, London: Continuum, 2004) 
 
—— A Thousand Plateaus, trans. Brian Massumi (1980; London: Continuum, repr. 2007) 
 122 
 
Diamond, Nicola and Mario Marrone, Attachment and Intersubjectivity (London: Whurr 
Publishers, 2003) 
 
Fisher, Mark, Capitalist Realism (Hampshire, UK: Zero Books, 2009) 
 
Forgacs, David, ed., The Gramsci Reader: Selected Writings 1916-1935, (New York: New York 
University Press, 2000) 
 
Foucault, Michel, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France 1978-9, trans. 
Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, repr. 2008) 
 
—— Power: The Essential Works of Michel Foucault 1954-1984: Essential Works of Michel 
Foucault 1954-1984, trans. Robert Hurley and others, 3 vols (1994; London: Penguin Books, 
2002) III  
 
____ ‘Sex, Power and the Politics of Identity’, in Foucault Live: collected Interviews, 1961-1984, 
Sylvère Lotringer, ed. (New York: Semiotext(e), 1984, repr. 1996) 
 
—— The Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality, trans. Robert Hurley, 3 vols (London: 
Penguin Books, 1976; repr. 1998) I 
 
Freud, Sigmund, Freud Complete Works, Ivan Smith, ed. (2010) 
 
Gomez, Lavinia, An Introduction to Object Relations, (London: Free Association Books, 1997; 
repr. 1998) 
 
Gramsci, Antonio, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, trans. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey 
Nowell Smith (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1971, repr. 1998) 
 
Gregg, Melissa & Gregory J. Seigworth, eds., The Affect Theory Reader (Durham, N.C: Duke 
University Press, 2010) 
 
Grundmann, Roy, ed., A Companion to Michael Haneke, (Chichester: Blackwell Publishing, 
2010) 
 
Guattari, Felix, Chaosmosis: an ethico-aesthetic paradigm trans. Paul Bains and Julian Pefanis 
(Bloomington, IA: Indiana University Press, 1995) 
 
Habermas, Jurgen, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: Inquiry into a Category 
of Bourgeois Society (London: Polity Press, 1962) 
 
Hardt, Michael and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2000) 
 
Harvey, David The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change 
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1990, repr. 1999) 
 
Heard, Dorothy, and others, Attachment Therapy with Adolescents and Adults, (London: 
Karnac Books, 2009), 
 
Holloway, John, Crack Capitalism (London: Pluto Press, 2010) 
 
Horkheimer, Max & Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment (1947; London, Verso, 
1972) 
 123 
 
James, Oliver, Affluenza (London: Vermillion, 2007) 
 
Jameson, Fredric, Brecht and Method, (London: Verso, 1998) 
 
—— Postmodernism or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (London: Verso, 1991; repr. 1999) 
 
—— The Cultural Turn: Selected Writings on the Postmodern, 1983-1998 (London and New 
York: Verso, 1998) 
 
—— Valences of the Dialectic (London: Verso, 2009) 
 
Kuhn, Thomas, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd edn. (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago, 1970) 
 
Lacan, Jacques, The Other Side of Psychoanalysis, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, XX vols, trans. 
Russell Grigg (London: W.W. Norton, 2007) XVII 
 
—— Ecrits, trans. Bruce Fink (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1970; repr. 2006) 
 
Laing, R.D., Knots (New York: Routledge, 2005; repr. 1970) 
 
—— The Divided Self (1960; London: Penguin Group, 1990) 
 
—— The Politics of Experience (1967; London: Penguin Group, 1990) 
 
Laplanche, Jean and Jean, B. Pontalis, The Language of Psychoanalysis trans. Donald 
Nicholson-Smith (London: The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1973) 
 
Mackay, Robin, Collapse: Philosophical Research and Development, Volume II: Speculative 
Realism (Oxford, UK: Athenaeum Press, 2007) 
 
Mandel, Ernest, Late Capitalism, trans. Joris De Bres (London: NLB, 1972) 
 
Marcuse, Herbert, One-Dimensional Man (London: Routledge, 1964; repr.2007) 
 
Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto, trans. Samuel Moore (London: 
Pluto Press, 2008) 
 
Marx, Karl, Capital, 3 vols (London: Penguin Books, 1976; repr.1990), I 
 
—— Capital, 3 vols (London: Penguin Books, 1978; repr.1992), II 
 
—— Capital, 3 vols (London: Penguin Books Ltd, 1981; repr.1991), III 
 
—— ‘Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts’ in Early Writings (London: Penguin, 1975; repr. 
1992) 
 
—— The Grundrisse, trans. Martin Nicolaus (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1939; repr. 1973) 
 
—— Theories of Surplus Value, trans. G. A. Bonner and Emile Burns (London: Lawrence & 
Wishart, 1951) 
 
 124 
McDonagh, Tom, ed., Guy Debord and the Situationist International, (Cambridge and London: 
MIT Press, 2002) 
 
Meillassoux, Quentin, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency, trans. Ray 
Brassier (London: Continuum, 2008) 
 
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, The Phenomenology of Perception (Abingdon and New York: 
Routledge, 1967; repr. 2002) 
 
Mouffe, C. & Ernesto Laclau, Hegemony as Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic 
Politics, 2nd edn. (London: Verso Books, 1985; repr. 2001) 
 
Mulvey, Laura, Visual and Other Pleasures, 2nd edn. (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 2009) 
 
—— Death 24x a Second: Stillness and the Moving Image (London: Reaktion Books, 2006) 
 
Nietzsche, Friedrich, ‘On the Genealogy of Morals’ in Basic Writings of Nietzsche, ed. & trans. 
Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 2000) 
 
—— The Will to Power, ed. Walter Kaufmann, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale 
(New York: Random House, 1968) 
 
O’Sullivan, Simon, On the Production of Subjectivity (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012) 
 
Parr, Adrian, ed., The Deleuze Dictionary (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005) 
 
Pollock, Griselda, ed., Psychoanalysis and the Image (London: WileyBlackwell, 2006) 
 
—— and Anthony Bryant, eds., Digital and other Virtualities: renegotiating the image (London: 
I.B. Tauris, 2010) 
 
—— Vision and Difference (New York: Routledge, 1988; repr. 2006) 
 
Ranciere, Jacques, Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics, ed. and trans. by Steve Corcoran 
(London and New York: Continuum, 2010) 
 
—— The Emancipated Spectator (London: Verso Books, 2009) 
 
—— The Future of the Image (London and New York: Verso, 2007) 
 
—— The Ignorant Schoolmaster (Stanford, Calif. :Stanford University Press, 1991) 
 
—— The Politics of Aesthetics (London: Continuum, 2004; repr. 2007) 
 
Séchehaye, Marguerite, Autobiography of a Schizophrenic Girl, trans. G. Rubin-Rabson (New 
York: Plume, 1968) 
 
Sennett, Richard and Jonathan Cobb, The Hidden Injuries of Class (New York: Random House, 
1972) 
 
—— Together (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2012) 
 
Shaviro, Steven, Post Cinematic Affect (Hampshire, UK: Zero Books, 2010) 
 
 125 
—— The Cinematic Body (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press 1993) 
 
Sholette, Gregory, Dark Matter: art and politics in the age of enterprise culture (London: Pluto 
Press, 2010) 
 
Steyerl, Hito, The Wretched of the Screen (Berlin: Sternberg Press, 2012) 
 
Thompson, Della, ed., The Concise Oxford English Dictionary of Current English, 9th edn. 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995) 
 
Virno, Paolo and Michael Hardt eds., Radical Thought in Italy, A Potential Politics, (Minnesota: 
University of Minneapolis Press, 1996) 
 
von Hantelmann, Dorothea, Notes on the Exhibition: 100 Notes – 100 Thoughts, No.088, 
Documenta 13 (Kassel, Germany: documenta und Museum Fredericianum Veranstaltungs-
GmbH, 2012) 
 
White, Ian, Ibiza Black Flags Democracy (Berlin, Berliner Kunstlerprogramm/DAAD, 2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 126 
Articles 
 
Adams, Parveen, ‘The Art of Analysis: Mary Kelly’s Interim and the Discourse of the Analyst’, in 
The Emptiness of the Image, (London: Routledge, 1996) 
 
Anderson, Perry, ‘The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci’, New Left Review, 100 (1976), 5-78 
 
Augé, Marc, “From Places to Non-Places,’ in Non-places: Introduction to an Anthropology of 
Supermodernity (New York and London: Verso, 1995), 75-120 
 
Bataille, George, The Cruel Practice of Art. Reprinted in George Bataille, Oeuvres Complètes, 
vol XI, (Paris: Gallimard, 1949, repr. 1989) 
 
Berlant, Lauren, ‘Cruel Optimism’, in Differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies, 17: 3 
(2006), 20-36 
 
Bersani, Leo, ‘Is the Rectum a Grave?’ October, Vol. 43, AIDS: Cultural Analysis/Cultural 
Activism (Winter, 1987), 197-222 
 
Bifo, Franco Berardi, ‘Cognitarian Subjectivation’, E-Flux Journal, 20 (November 2010), 1-8 
 
—— and Goddard, Michael, ‘Schizo-Economy’, SubStance, Issue 112, 36:1, 2007, 76-85 
 
Bishop, Claire, ‘Antagonism and Relational Aesthetics’, October, 110, (Fall 2004), 51–79 
 
—— ‘Claire Bishop responds’, October, 115, Winter 2006, 95-107  
 
Blizard, Ruth A., ‘Masochistic and Sadistic Ego States’, Journal of Trauma and Dissociation, 2: 4 
(2001), 37-58 
 
Boczar, Ana et.al, ‘Discontent in the era of consumption: “I enjoy, therefore I exist”’, 
International Forum of Psychoanalysis, 14: 3, (2005) 206 – 209 
 
Bordowitz, Gregg, ‘Picture a Coalition’, October, Vol. 43, AIDS: Cultural Analysis/Cultural 
Activism (Winter, 1987), 182-196 
 
Butler, Judith, ‘Ethical Ambivalence’ in The Turn to Ethics, ed. by Margorie Garbor and others 
(New York: Routledge, 2000) 15-28 
 
Butler, Lisa D., ‘The Dissociations of Everyday Life’, Journal of Trauma & Dissociation, 5: 2 
(2004), 1-11 
 
—— and Palesh, Oxana (2004) 'Spellbound: Dissociation in the Movies', Journal of Trauma & 
Dissociation, 5: 2, 61-87 
 
Chan, Paul, The Unthinkable Community’, E-Flux Journal, 16 (May 2010), 1-11 
 
Debord, Guy, ‘Towards a Situationist International’, 1957, in Claire Bishop, Participation 
(London: MIT Press and Whitechapel, 2006) 
 
Gilles Deleuze, ‘Postscript on the Societies of Control’, October 59, Winter 1992, MIT Press, 
Cambridge, MA, 3-7 
 
 127 
Draxler, H, ‘Beyond Privation and Abundance, Psychoanalysis as Political and Aesthetic Theory’ 
in Texte Zur Kunst, 68 (2007), 123-129 
 
Ferris, David, ‘Politics after Aesthetics: Disagreeing with Rancière’, Parallax, 15: 3 (2009) 37 – 
49 
 
Funk, Rainer, ‘Living by the manual: Ego-oriented social character - pathogenic effects of 
globalization’, International Forum of Psychoanalysis, 19: 2 (2010) 84 - 91, First published on: 
23 April 2009 (iFirst) 
 
Gillick, Liam, ‘Contingent Factors: A Response to Claire Bishop’s “Antagonism and Relational 
Aesthetics”’, October, 115, Winter 2006, 95-106 
 
Gold, Steven N., ‘Fight Club: A Depiction of Contemporary Society as Dissociogenic’, Journal of 
Trauma & Dissociation, 5:2 (2004) pp. 13-34 
 
Guilfoyle, Michael, ‘Grounding a Critical Psychoanalysis in Frameworks of Power,’ Theory 
Psychology, 17: 4 (2007) 563-585  
 
Hardt, Michael, ‘Affective Labour’, in Boundary 2, 26:2 (Summer, 1999), 89-100 
 
Helms, Gesa, Marina Vishmidt and Lauren Berlant, ‘Affect & the Politics of Austerity: An 
interview exchange with Lauren Berlant’ in Variant, 39/40 (Winter 2010), 3-6 
 
Laclau, Ernesto, ‘Psychoanalysis and Marxism’, Critical Inquiry, Vol. 13, No. 2, The Trial(s) of 
Psychoanalysis (Winter, 1987), 330-333 
 
Le Grice, Malcolm, ‘Problematizing the Spectator Placement in Film’, Undercut, 1 (1981) repr. 
in Undercut Reader, Danino.N & M. Maziere, eds. (London: Wallflower Press, 2003) pp. 22-23 
 
Martin, Stewart, ‘Critique of Relational Aesthetics’, Third Text, 21:4, 2007, 369-386 
 
Moskowitz, Andrew, ‘Dissociation and Violence: A Review of the Literature,’ Trauma Violence 
Abuse 5: 1 (January 2004), 21- 46 
 
Mouffe, Chantal, ‘Democratic Politics in the Age of Post-Fordism’ in Open 2009, No. 16, ‘The 
Art Biennial as a Global Phenomenon’, 32-40 
 
—— ‘Artistic Activism and Agonistic Spaces’ in Art & Research, Volume 1. No. 2, Summer 2007, 
1-5 
 
Morgan, Anthony ‘Boredom, Autonomy and Self-Transformation’, Space Studios, London 1st 
December 2012 
 
—— ‘The Self in Psychology and Psychiatry, Wysing Arts Centre, Cambridge, 31st May 2012 
 
Peter Osborne, ‘Distracted Reception: Time, Art and Technology’, in Timezones, ed. by Jessica 
Morgan and Gregor Muir (London: Tate Publishing, 2004) 
 
O’Sullivan, Simon ‘The Aesthetics of Affect: Thinking Art beyond Representation’ in Jorella 
Andrews and Simon O’Sullivan, Visual Cultures as Object and Affects (London and Berlin: 
Goldsmiths and Sternberg Press, 2013) 
 
 128 
Osborne, Peter, Art beyond Aesthetics: Philosophical Criticism, Art History and Contemporary 
Art, Art History, 27:4 (September 2004) 651–670 
 
Pellegrini, Ann and Jasbir Puar, ‘Affect’, Social Text 100, 27: 3 (Fall 2009) 35-38 
 
Pollock, Griselda, ‘Art/Trauma/Representation’, Parallax, 15: 1 (2009) 40 – 54 
 
Rancière, Jacques, ‘The Emancipated Spectator’ Artforum, March 2007, 271-280 
 
Roberts, John, ‘The Political Economisation of Art’, Leeds University, February 29th 2012 
 
Said, Edward W., ‘Opponents, Audiences, Constituencies, and Community’ Critical Inquiry, 9:1, 
The Politics of Interpretation. (September, 1982), 1-26 
 
Sassatelli, Roberta, ‘Interview with Laura Mulvey: Gender, Gaze and Technology in Film 
Culture’, Theory, Culture & Society 28:123 (2011) 123-143 
 
Seikkula, Jaakko, ‘Becoming Dialogical: Psychotherapy or a Way of Life’, The Australian and 
New Zealand Journal of Family Therapy, 32: 3 2011, 179–193 
 
—— and David Trimble, ‘Healing Elements of Therapeutic Conversation: Dialogue as an 
Embodiment of Love’, Family Process, Vol. 44, No. 4, 2005, 461-475 
 
—— and Olson, Mary E., ‘The Open Dialogue Approach to Acute Psychosis: Its Poetics and 
Micropolitics’, Family Process, 42:3, (2003), p. 405. 
 
Silva Jr, Nelson da and Lírio, Daniel Rodrigues (2005) 'The postmodern re-codification of 
perversion: On the production of consumer behaviour and its libidinal grammar', 
International Forum of Psychoanalysis, 14: 3, 217 — 223 
 
Simmel, Georg, ‘The Metropolis and Mental Life’ (1903) in Gary Bridge and Sophie Watson, 
eds. The Blackwell City Reader (Oxford and Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2002) 
 
Sontag, Susan, ‘The Pornographic Imagination’, (1963) in Styles of Radical Will by Susan 
Sontag, (London: Secker & Warburg, 1969) 
 
Steyerl, Hito, ‘Politics of Art: Contemporary Art and the transition to Post-Democracy’ in E-Flux 
Journal, 21 (December 2010), 1-6 
 
—— ‘In Defence of the Poor Image’ in E-Flux Journal, 10 (November 2009), 1-9 
 
Vishmidt, Marina, ‘Allegories of Labour’, Paper, Historical Materialism Conference, 14-16 
January 2010, CUNY Graduate Centre, New York 
 
—— ‘Mimesis of the Hardened and Alienated: Social Practice as Business Model’ e-flux journal 
#43, March 2013, 1-11 (p. 9). 
 
—— ‘What is Speculation as a Mode of Production’, Lecture, Weld, Stockholm, 17 October 
2013 
 
—— ‘Work, Work Your Thoughts, and Therein See a Siege’ in Communization and its 
Discontents, ed. by Benjamin Noys (New York: Autonomedia: 2011) 
 
 129 
Watney, Simon ‘The Shattered Mirror’ in Thinking Photography, ed. by Victor Burgin (London: 
MacMillan, 1982) 
 
 
Internet Resources 
 
Art & Language and Chris Smith, Now they are Surrounded Reconfigured, Essay for ‘Now they 
are Surrounded’, Exhibition, Unit 2 Gallery, London (2007)  
<http://www.systemsart.org/a_ltext.html>  
 
Laura Barnett, ‘The play that wants to change the way we treat mental illness’, The Guardian 
24 March 2014 <www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2014/mar/24/play-mental-illness-
eradication-schizophrenia-western-lapland-open-dialogue-hallucination>  
 
Berlant, Lauren, Supervalent Thought, Research blog <http://supervalentthought.com/>  
 
Bifo, Franco Berardi and Mark Fisher, ‘Give me Shelter’, Frieze, Issue 152, January-February 
2013, www.frieze.com/issue/article/give-me-shelter/>  
 
Bishop, Claire, ‘The Digital Divide’, Artforum, September 2012 
<http://artforum.com/inprint/id=31944> [accessed: 9 October 2012]  
 
Braidotti, Rosi, ‘Bio-power and Necro-politics’, Published as: ‘Biomacht und nekro-Politik. 
Uberlegungen zu einer Ethik der Nachhaltigkeit’, in: Springerin, Hefte fur Gegenwartskunst, 
Band XIII Heft 2, Fruhjahr 2007, 18-23 
<http://www.springerin.at/dyn/heft_text.php?textid=1928&lang=en>  
 
Frederic Engels, ‘Engels to Franz Mehring’, from Marx and Engels Correspondence, 1968) 
<http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1893/letters/93_07_14.htm>  
 
Oliver James, ‘Why Genes are Leftwing’, in The Guardian, 
<http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/oct/12/why-genes-are-
leftwing>  
 
Wiles, David, ‘Aristotle’s Poetics and ancient dramatic theory’, The Cambridge Companion to 
Greek and Roman Theatre. 1st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 92-107. 
Cambridge Companions Online. Web <http://0-
dx.doi.org.wam.leeds.ac.uk/10.1017/CCOL9780521834568.006> 
 
 
Radio Resources 
 
Adshead, Gwen [Consultant Forensic Psychotherapist at Broadmoor Hospital], Start the Week, 
Radio 4, (9:00 BST, 2 May 2011) 
 
 
 
 
 130 
Filmography/Videography 
 
Victor Alimpiev, Corona, (2012) 
 
Pawel Althamer, Weronica, (2003/4) 
 
Andrea Arnold, Red Road (2006); Fish Tank (2009) 
 
Clio Barnard, The Arbor, (2010) 
 
Ed Atkins, Us Dead Talking Love, (2012) 
 
Michelangelo Antonioni, L’Eclisse, (1962); The Passenger, (1975) 
 
Robert Bresson, Mouchette (1967); The Devil Probably (1977); L’Argent, (1983); Les Dames du 
Bois de Boulogne (1945) 
 
Peter Brook, Marat/Sade, (1967) 
 
Luis Buñuel, Belle de Jour, (1967); Exterminating Angel, (1962) 
 
Victor Burgin, Watergate, (2002) 
 
Paul Chan, Waiting for Godot, (2007) 
 
Adam Chodzko, Plan for a Spell, (2001); Around, (2007); The Pickers (2009) 
 
Alan Clarke, Psy-Warriors (1981); Beloved Enemy (1981) Christine (1987); Elephant (1989) 
 
Patrice Chéreau, Intimacy, (2001) 
 
Keren Cytter, 2.6.04 (serious) (2004); Four Seasons (2009); Something Happened, Serious 
(2007); Avalanche (Lonely Planet) (2011) 
 
Rod Dickinson, The Milgram Re-enactment, (2002) 
 
Stephen Dwoskin, Dyn Amo, (1972) 
 
Omer Fast, Continuity, (2012); Everything that Rises Must Converge, (2013) 
 
Melanie Gilligan, Crisis in the Credit System, (2008) 
 
Michael Haneke, Seventh Continent (1989); Benny’s Video (1992); Funny Games (1997); Piano 
Teacher (2001); Caché (2005); Funny Games (2007); The White Ribbon (2009); Amour; (2012) 
 
Camille Henrot, Coupé/ Décalé, (2010) 
 
Thomas Hirschhorn Touching Reality, (2012) 
 
Claude Lanzmann, Shoah, (1985) 
 
Joseph L. Mankiewicz, Suddenly Last Summer, (1959) 
 
Renzo Martens, Episode 3 – ‘Enjoy Poverty’, (2009)  
 131 
Paul McCarthy, Class Fool, (1976); Piccadilly Circus, (Video and Installation, Hauser & Wirth, 
London, 2003); F-Fort, (2005) 
 
Nathaniel Mellors, Ourhouse, (2010) 
 
Jennifer Montgomery, Threads of Belonging, (2003) 
 
Bruce Nauman, Anthro/Socio, (1992) 
 
Joshua Oppenheimer, The Act of Killing, (2012) 
 
Hila Peg, A Crime Against Art, (2007) 
 
Pier Paolo Pasolini, Accattone, (1961); Medea (1969); Mamma Roma; (1962); Salò, of the 120 
Days of Sodom (1975); Porcile, (1969) 
 
Catherine Sullivan, The Chittendens, (2005) 
 
Stephen Sutcliffe, Come to the Edge, (2003) 
 
Gail Pickering, Hungary! And Other Economies, (2006) 
 
Yvonne Rainer, The Lives of Performers (1972); The Man Who Envied Women (1985) 
 
James Richards, Voices Hits and Near Misses Compilation, (2007) 
 
—— and Steve Reinke, Disambiguation, (2009) 
 
Emily Roysdon, Story of History (2009); A Motion Picture (2009) 
 
Eyal Sivan, The Specialist (1999) 
 
Ulrich Seidl, Import/Export, (2007) 
 
Hito Steyerl: November (2004); Lovely Andrea (2007); Guards, (2012) 
 
Laure Prouvost, You are the Only One, (2008) 
 
Luchino Visconti, Rocco and his Brothers; (1960), The Leopard; (1963), Death in Venice; (1971) 
 
Barbara Visser, Last Lecture, (2007) 
 
Emily Wardill, Ben, (2007) 
 
Gillian Wearing, Self Made, (2010) 
 
Artur Zmijewski, Repetition (2005); Them (2007) 
 
 
 
 132 
Live Performances 
 
Jerome Bel, Disabled Theatre, (2012) 
 
Gregg Bordowitz, Sex Mitigating Death: On Discourse and Drives: A Meditative Poem (Tate 
Modern, London, 2011) 
 
Dan Graham, Like (1969) Lax /Relax (1969-1995) Past Future Split Attention (1972) 
Performance/Audience/Mirror (1975) 
 
Anibal López, Testimonio, (2012) 
 
Gail Pickering, Mad Masters (South London Gallery, London, 2008) 
 
—— Zulu (Speaking in Radical Tongues) (Tate Modern, London, 2008) 
 
Adrian Piper, Catalysis I-VII, (1971) 
 
Yvonne Rainer, Trio A Pressured and Where’s the Passion? & Chair and Pillow, (Tramway, 
Glasgow, 2010) 
 
Emily Roysdon, Work, Why, Why Not, (2008) 
 
Grace Schwindt, Chapter 01 - The individual account, (ICA, London, 2010) 
 
Tino Sehgal, Kiss, (2003); This Variation; (2012); These associations; 2012 
 
Ian White and Jimmy Robert, Marriage à la Mode et Cor Anglais, (ICA, London; 2009) 
 
Ian White, Black Flags (Tate Modern, London, 2009) 
 
—— Democracy (DAAD Galerie, Berlin, 2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
